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This dissertation explores the development of systems of public health in the 
American South. It argues that debilitating diseases, including hookworm, pellagra, 
and malaria, played an important role in southern economic underdevelopment at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Between 1930 and 1930, however, a workable 
system of public health, based on cooperation between the federal government, private 
philanthropy, emerged in the southern United States. Initially spurred by war, federal 
intervention was continued as a result of bureaucratic entrepreneurship. In 1935, the 
system of federal-state-county cooperation developed in the South was nationalized as 
Title VI of the Social Security Act, providing the framework for our contemporary 
system of public health. By the end of World Way II, hookworm, pellagra, and 
malaria had largely been eliminated in the southern United States. This dissertation 
argues that public health workers, largely unconstrained by accountability to national-
level governing institutions, created networks of public and private cooperation, which 
were formalized into institutional arrangements for confronting the region’s pressing 
public health concerns. Public health workers convinced local elites to support public 
health programs by relying on arguments grounded in local understandings of race, 
disease, and economic development. Emerging networks of local support and political 
legitimacy were further underpinned by the genuine threats posed by disease and the 
demonstrated competence and capacity of the Rockefeller Foundation and the United 
 States Public Health Service. Local support and political legitimacy, generated by 
entrepreneurial public health workers at the ground level, was translated into national-
level legitimacy in the aftermath of two focusing events, the 1927 flood of the 
Mississippi River and the 1930-1931 southern drought. Although the contemporary 
“Sunbelt” is unimaginable without the elimination of sharecropping and racial 
segregation and the advent of air-conditioning, it is equally unimaginable without the 
elimination of hookworm, pellagra, and malaria. Just as outside intervention played a 
crucial role in the elimination of the South’s debilitating diseases, this dissertation 
argues, the region’s paradoxical needs for both outside assistance and local autonomy 
to preserve white supremacy and segregation played a central role in defining the 
contours of public health throughout the nation. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 At the beginning of the twentieth century, the southern United States 
resembled, in many respects, the contemporary Third World.1 Set beside rapid 
industrialization in the North and the nation’s dynamic westward expansion, the 
South’s relative stagnation was unmistakable.2 In the South Atlantic and East South 
Central Census divisions, “per capita income was less than 50 percent of the national 
standard.”3 While immigrants streamed into northern cities, only around 2 percent of 
the South’s population was foreign born in 1910.4 Illiteracy, meanwhile, was 
widespread: 16.6% of southerners over the age of ten were illiterate in 1910, compared 
with only 4.5% of those living in the rest of the United States.5 Northern capitalists 
invested in the development of southern mining, steel production, and other industries, 
but “inflows of northern capital were not associated with permanent migration of 
people.” As a consequence, “most southern industries continued to rely on imported 
                                                
1 Throughout, the “southern United States” refers to the eleven states of the former Confederacy plus 
Kentucky and Oklahoma, which was admitted to the Union in 1907. Though definitions of the South 
are contested (in part due to its incongruous social, political, and geographic borders), this definition 
encompasses four significant criteria: a high degree of mono-crop agriculture (cotton, tobacco, or 
sugar), Democratic Party dominance of politics during the first half of the 20th Century, de jure racial 
segregation, and a broadly similar disease burden (including hookworm, pellagra, and malaria). 
2 Important discussions of southern economic underdevelopment may be found in Roger L. Ransom and 
Richard Sutch, One Kind of Freedom: The Economic Consequences of Emancipation, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Gavin Wright, Old South, New South: Revolutions in the 
Southern Economy since the Civil War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996). For an 
analysis of the role of southern sectionalism and economic underdevelopment in American political 
development, see Richard Franklin Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877-
1900 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); ———, Sectionalism and American Political 
Development, 1880-1980 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1984). An excellent discussion 
of southern economic thought, dealing with the region’s relative underdevelopment and its relationship 
to the northern economy, may be found in Joseph J. Persky, The Burden of Dependency: Colonial 
Themes in Southern Economic Thought (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992). 
3 Sutch, One Kind of Freedom, p. 174. 
4 Wright, Old South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy since the Civil War, p. 77. 
5 Calculated from 1910 Census of Population and Housing,  (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota, Minnesota Population Center. National Geographic Information System: Pre-release 
Version 0.1, 2004).  
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machinery that embodied an imported technology adapted to northern, not southern, 
conditions.”6 
Although largely unrecognized at the time, debilitating diseases, including 
hookworm, pellagra, and malaria, played an important role in southern economic 
underdevelopment.7 Throughout the region, the southern “trilogy of lazy diseases” 
hindered the development of human capital, curtailed agricultural and industrial 
productivity, and deterred outside investment and migration.8 As I hope to show, the 
manner in which the southern United States was ultimately freed from these diseases 
has significant implications for our understanding of American political development 
and the origin and contours of federal intervention in public health. Deeply intertwined 
with southern social and economic conditions, hookworm, pellagra, and malaria were 
eliminated as significant regional public health threats in the face of ongoing poverty, 
malnutrition, and substandard housing. It was not prosperity or social change that 
brought the end of disease, but state intervention, in the form of a network of county 
health departments backed by the federal government. 
                                                
6 ———, Old South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy since the Civil War, p. 173. A 
variety of factors, including differences in the composition of iron ore in southern Appalachia compared 
to northern iron ore, meant that local technological adaptations would have been necessary for the 
output of the southern steel industry, centered in Birmingham, to have rivaled Pittsburgh’s. See ———, 
Old South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy since the Civil War, p. 170-71. 
7 A growing literature has emphasized the role of disease in hindering economic development in the 
contemporary Third World. The work of Jeffrey Sachs on this issue, and on the potential for growth that 
might be unleashed if debilitating diseases were eradicated, has been particularly influential. See Jeffrey 
D. Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time (New York: The Penguin Press, 
2005); Jeffrey Sachs and Pia Malaney, "The Economic and Social Burden of Malaria," Nature 
415(2002); Jeffrey D. Sachs John Luke Gallup, and Andrew D. Mellinger, "Geography and Economic 
Development," International Regional Science Review 22, no. 2 (1999). 
8 The phrase “southern trilogy of lazy diseases” is from George B. Tindall, The Emergence of the New 
South, 1913-1945, ed. Wendell Holmes Stephenson, vol. X, A History of the South (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press and the Littlefield Fund Southern History of the University of Texas, 
1967). 
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BUREAUCRATIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP, WAR, AND TRAGEDY 
The development of this network and elimination of the South’s debilitating 
disease burden was far from an inevitable occurrence. At its heart were the efforts of a 
small group of entrepreneurial bureaucrats, employed by the United States Public 
Health Service and, particularly during the early years, by the Rockefeller Foundation. 
Operating largely without direction or oversight from Congress or the President, 
federal public health workers developed networks of local support and political 
legitimacy for state intervention in public health throughout the South. They generated 
workable public health techniques within the context of the southern social, political, 
and economic status quo and relied on local elites and institutions to facilitate the 
diffusion of these techniques throughout the region. The fundamental components of 
the South’s public health revolution were assembled between World War I and 1930, 
during a period in which public health was viewed largely as a police power, left to the 
states under the 10th Amendment to the Constitution. 
Often, the lines between public and private authority and national and local 
authority were blurred. Beginning in the 1910s, the Rockefeller Foundation paid 
individuals to develop and operate county health boards, to work in state hygienic 
laboratories, and to carry out research projects throughout the South. Though their 
salaries came from the Rockefeller Foundation, these public health workers were 
made agents of state boards of health. Following in the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
footsteps and concerned with not overstepping its constitutional bounds, the Public 
Health Service both assigned officers to work as county health officers, deputized by 
state authorities, and recruited local physicians to serve as county health officers. 
These physicians were appointed to positions in the Public Health Service at nominal 
salaries, ensuring the transfer of information between local and national authorities. 
 
 4 
Two focusing events, World War I and the 1927 flood of the Mississippi 
River, gave federal public health workers the opportunity to extend their reach into 
local public health efforts. Federal intervention in southern public health during World 
War I was viewed as a military necessity: the national government needed to protect 
soldiers being housed and trained in the region from the debilitating effects of malaria 
and other southern diseases. Intended to be a short-term endeavor, this wartime 
intervention proved the catalyst for the development of extensive federal involvement 
in public health at the local level. 9 
After forming relationships with local elites and successfully combating 
malaria and other diseases during the course of the war, federal public health workers 
pushed for Congress to extend the role of the Public Health Service into a cooperative 
peacetime program for developing local public health infrastructure. When Congress 
declined to pass the Public Health Service’s proposed grant-in-aid bill, officers from 
the Public Health Service decided to employ an existing line of funding, designated 
for ill-defined “surveys and demonstrations” in rural sanitation, to continue their 
cooperative arrangements with local governments into the post-World War I years. 
As an example of bureaucratic entrepreneurship, the actions of the federal 
public health workers who forged the network of relationships between local 
governments and the national Public Health Service in the years following World War 
I are both particularly striking and consequential. On their own initiative, they created 
                                                
9 Classic statements of the argument that “wars make states and states make wars” are made in Charles 
Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, Ad 990-1992 (Cambridge, MA: B. Blackwell, 1992); —
——, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer Peter Evans, and Theda Skocpol (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985). On the 
role of war and other external and international factors in shaping the American state, see Ira 
Katznelson and Martin Shefter, ed. Shaped by War and Trade: International Influences on American 
Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press,2002). 
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a system that became the basis for both the transformation of both the southern disease 
environment and the role of the federal government in public health.10 
The consolidation and expansion of federal intervention in southern public 
health occurred in the aftermath of the catastrophic 1927 flood of the lower 
Mississippi Valley.11 Where federal action a decade before had been prompted by the 
need to ensure the availability of manpower during wartime, the expanded effort after 
1927 was a result of the confluence of humanitarian concerns on the part of national-
level officials and the availability of an apparent policy solution. Acting swiftly and 
adeptly, Public Health Service officers were able to persuade high-ranking Executive 
Branch officials and members of Congress that the expansion of the county health 
program they had been working on since World War I represented an appropriate 
means for confronting the public health problems that resulted from the flood.12 
Techniques that the PHS had been developing to deal with the region’s debilitating 
diseases were implemented throughout the flood area and the role of the federal 
                                                
10 For conflicting interpretations of the role of bureaucratic entrepreneurship in policy development and 
the role of congressional oversight in limiting bureaucratic autonomy, see Daniel P. Carpenter, The 
Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive 
Agencies, 1862-1928 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Roger Noll Matthew McCubbins, 
and Barry Weingast, "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Policy Control," Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization 3(1987); Matthew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, "Congressional 
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms," American Journal of Political Science 
28(1984). While Carpenter argues that bureaucratic entrepreneurs can forge autonomy from Congress 
under certain conditions, Noll, Weingast and McCubbins and McCubbins and Schwartz have 
emphasized the controls available to Congress in limiting bureaucratic discretion. My analysis of the 
development of institutions of public health is closer to that of Carpenter. 
11 The importance of emergency situations or tragedies, such as natural disasters, in creating windows 
of opportunity for new government policies has long been recognized in the literature on agenda-
setting. See Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public 
Policies (New York: Harper Collins, 1984); Daniel Carpenter and Gisela Sin, "Policy Tragedy and the 
Emergence of Regulation: The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938," Studies in American Political 
Development 21(2007). 
12 Members of Congress were largely unaware of the Public Health Service’s “rural cooperative” 
program during the immediate post-World War I years. The members who paid special attention to it 
were representatives of southern districts and states whose constituencies were directly affected by it. 
Ultimately, much the pressure for them to embrace the program came from below, in the form of 
expressions of support from county commissioners, judges, health officers, and other southerners who 
had first-hand experience with federal public health interventions. See below, Chapters 3 and 4. 
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government in local public health efforts was greatly increased. Further expanded 
following the 1930 southern drought and incorporated into the 1935 Social Security 
Act, the system of federal-state-county cooperation that developed in the years 
following World War I ultimately became the basis for federal intervention in and 
coordination of local public health efforts throughout the nation. 
 
POLITICAL ECONOMY, DISEASE, AND PUBLIC HEALTH 
As in the contemporary Third World, the South’s debilitating diseases were 
both the cause and consequence of poverty and economic underdevelopment. Half a 
century before the Rockefeller Foundation became the first outside organization to 
attempt to improve the health of rural southerners, investment in the Confederate war 
effort had destroyed much of the region’s banking system. Meanwhile, the 
capitalization requirements of the National Banking Act, passed during the Civil War, 
helped to ensure that few new banks were chartered during the ensuing decades.13 The 
abolition of slavery, the basis of antebellum credit markets, required the development 
of new forms of agricultural credit in the South.14 As Gavin Wright has argued, the 
“movability of slaves and the well-developed slave markets made them highly 
attractive as collateral for loans, even at long distance.” Land, the region’s most 
tangible resource, “did not have these properties; prudent nineteenth-century bankers 
did not consider real estate to be an acceptable backing for loans, and indeed such 
loans were prohibited under the National Bank System.”15 
Within a short period of time, landlords and furnishing merchants came to 
dominate local credit markets, accepting a lien on the upcoming crop as security for 
                                                
13 Bensel, Political Economy of American Industrialization, p. 95, 97. 
14 Wright, Old South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy since the Civil War, p. 87. 
15 Ibid., 88-89. 
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extending credit for seed and household supplies.16 As essentially monopoly lenders 
engaged in a risky trade, landlords and merchants exercised a great deal of influence 
over what crops tenant farmers planted, often demanding that they plant cotton or 
other cash crops, such as tobacco, which were viewed as a solid investments. 
Upcountry farmers, along with farmers in southeastern regions where the soil had 
previously been considered exhausted, were increasingly drawn into the cotton 
economy.17 Fluctuations in cotton prices, along with high rates of interest, meant that 
southern tenant farmers were often unable to accumulate savings or even break even at 
the end of the year.18 
As farmers concentrated more and more on cash crops for export, southerners 
became increasingly dependent on food imports, particularly corn, from outside the 
region. Between 1850 and 1890, grain production per capita in the South dropped 
approximately 50%. During the same period, head of cattle per capita dropped to 
42.4% of the antebellum level and swine ownership dropped to only 34.5% of the 
1850 level.19  Along with its impact on self-sufficiency and food availability, the 
demand that farmers focus on planting cotton led to regional overproduction, which, in 
turn, helped to fuel southern poverty. 
 
The history of southern disease broadly tracks that of the southern political 
economy. Unlike hookworm and pellagra, which were only discovered in the United 
States during the first decade of the 20th century, the presence of malaria in the South 
 
                                                
16 See Sutch, One Kind of Freedom, “The Emergence of the Merchants’ Territorial Monopoly,” p. 126-
48; Wright, Old South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy since the Civil War, p. 97-98. 
17 On the geographical expansion of cotton production, see Steven Hahn, "The Transformation of the 
Countryside," in The Roots of Southern Populism: Yeoman Farmers and the Transformation of the 
Georgia Upcountry, 1850-1890 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); Wright, Old South, New 
South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy since the Civil War, p. 34-36. 
18 Sutch, One Kind of Freedom, p. 169. 
19 Ibid., p. 152. 
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Figure 1. The Distribution of Malaria as Indicated By Mortality Reports, 1919-1921. 
Source: Adapted from Maxcy, “Distribution of Malaria,” 1923. 
 
had long been known. Since the colonial period, the disease had served to deter 
migration into the region; as in the Caribbean, malaria had been used to justify the 
importation of West African slaves, who were less affected by the disease than 
Americans of European descent and could be forced to work regardless of the disease 
environment. Often present at the frontiers of white settlement in the United States, 
malaria had, outside of a lingering pocket in California’s Central Valley, long since 
receded from most of the North and West. 
The disease was particularly prevalent in the coastal plain and in the 
Mississippi Valley. As Public Health Service epidemiologist Kenneth Maxcy later 
noted, the conditions surrounding cotton cultivation often fostered endemic malaria: 
“where the type of agriculture is intensive, requiring many hand laborers, as in the 
raising of cotton, where the houses are close together and located in the rich ‘bottom 
lands’ near Anopheles’ breeding places, conditions are favorable for the development 
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of a malaria problem. In the South there is a striking connection between malaria and 
the raising of cotton.”20 Describing a typical endemic focus in Alabama, Maxcy wrote 
that the black tenants of local cotton plantations were “poorly housed, poorly clothed, 
poorly fed, living in unscreened houses, self-medicated with inadequate ‘chill tonics,’ 
and made miserable by the hordes of mosquitoes which swarm in from the nearby 
swamps at sundown each evening.” No end appeared in sight: “Every year brings its 
tolls of deaths resulting directly or indirectly from the ravages of neglected malaria. 
The negroes accept ‘chills’ as a necessary evil and pay it scant attention. The 
plantation owners passively acquiesce in this shameful human and economic waste.”21 
Unrecognized in the South until 1902, the discovery of endemic hookworm 
further reinforced the region’s sickly reputation. At home in warm, loose, and sandy 
soil, hookworm had been brought to the United States by infected West African 
slaves. The parasite spread easily in the rural South as a result of the absence of 
sanitary privies and tendency of many poor southerners to go shoeless. In southern 
Appalachia, where miners came into frequent contact with dirt under less than sanitary 
conditions, the disease also spread easily. Deposited in the soil by human feces, the 
hookworm enters the body through the feet or hands and, in time, makes its way to the 
intestines. If enough worms are present, hookworm sufferers experience chronic blood 
loss, leading to iron-deficiency anemia. Their skin “becomes waxy and acquires a 
sickly yellowish color,” while they often experience pain in their joints and lower 
extremities, “headache, fatigue, and impotence.”22 
 
 
                                                
20 Kenneth F. Maxcy, "Epidemiological Principles Affecting the Distribution of Malaria in Southern 
United States," Public Health Reports 39, no. 20 (1924): p. 1117. 
21 Ibid.: p. 1119. 
22 Simon Brooker Peter J Hotez, Jeffrey M Bethony, Maria Elena Bottazzi, et al., "Current Concepts: 
Hookworm Disease," The New England Journal of Medicine 351, no. 8 (2004): p. 802. 
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Figure 2. Percentage of School Children Infected With Hookworm. Source: Data 
collected from Rockefeller Sanitary Commission Annual Reports, 1910-1915, based 
on surveys conducted by the RSC. 
 
The disease’s impact on human development in the South was significant. In 
children, hookworm impaired cognitive development, stunted growth, and often led to 
poor attendance at school. A strong correlation existed between childhood hookworm 
disease and illiteracy. 23 For adults, meanwhile, the disease was often incapacitating. 
Pregnant women, in particular, were susceptible to developing iron-deficiency anemia 
as a result of hookworm, and the consequences for both them and their children were 
significant. Infection led to higher rates of maternal mortality and difficulty producing 
milk. The children of mothers with hookworm were more likely to be born 
prematurely and underweight, paving the way for future problems.24 In the first decade 
                                                
23 Ibid.: p. 802-03; Hoyt Bleakley, "Disease and Development: Evidence from the American South," 
Journal of the European Economic Association 1, no. 2-3 (2003). 
24 Peter J Hotez, "Hookworm Disease," p. 802-03; Peter J. Hotez Simon Brooker, Donald A.P. Bundy, 
"Hookworm-Related Anaemia among Pregnant Women: A Systematic Review," PloS Neglected 
Tropical Diseases 2, no. 9 (2008). 
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of the twentieth century, slightly less than 40 percent of southerners were likely 
infected. 
Beginning in 1907, only a few years after the South’s hookworm problem was 
discovered, physicians became aware of the prevalence of pellagra in the region.25 A 
dietary deficiency disease, caused by lack of niacin, pellagra’s most prominent 
symptoms are dermatitis, diarrhea, and dementia. The dermatitis takes the form of 
discolored and symmetrical skin eruptions that tend “to be painful to touch during the 
acute phase and can eventually become so clinically striking that the patient may 
become ostracized.”26 As the disease progresses, its victims begin to feel increasingly 
lazy and weak, developing poor appetite, vomiting, and diarrhea. In addition to the 
disease’s often disturbing physical manifestations, people with pellagra have difficulty 
concentrating, experience headaches and anxiety, and often become depressed and 
tired. If the disease continues to progress, they die.27 
The southern pellagra problem was an extreme manifestation of widespread 
malnutrition, worsened by the region’s increased emphasis on cotton and tobacco 
monoculture following the Civil War. Although state and federal authorities never 
developed a means of accurately assessing the extent of pellagra morbidity, the Census 
Bureau’s mortality reports make it clear that the disease was almost exclusively 
confined to the southern United States.28 Physicians, public health workers, and 
                                                
25 A 1931 Public Health Service report found that, prior to 1908, “At the very most,” the information 
available to medical students in the United States covered its unknown origins, presence in southern 
Europe, symptoms, and “last, but by no means less stressed, that it did not occur in the United States.” 
See G.A. Wheeler, "A Note on the History of Pellagra in the United States," Public Health Reports 46, 
no. 38 (1931): 2226. 
26 Robert A. Schwartz Juraj Hegyi, Vladimir Hegyi, "Pellagra: Dermatitis, Dementia, and Diarrhea," 
International Journal of Dermatology 43(2004): p. 2-5. 
27 Ibid.: p. 3. 
28 In southern states within the Census Bureau’s registration zone in 1920, which was viewed as a 
particularly mild year for pellagra incidence, the Crude Death Rate per 100,000 ranged from 31.1 in 
Mississippi to 2.68 in Kentucky. Outside of the region, no state had a CDR higher than the border state 
of Missouri’s rate of 0.73 per 100,000. Pellagra’s greatest impact was in morbidity, rather than 
mortality, and contemporary evidence suggests that the vast majority of cases were not reported. 
Beyond providing some empirical basis for establishing the geographic extent of pellagra, this 
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academics noted that pellagra was most prominent in areas of intense mono-crop 
agriculture and little truck farming, where there was little access to meat, fresh 
vegetables, and milk. 
For individuals, families, and communities, the combined effects of these 
diseases were devastating. Illiteracy, inability to work, ongoing fatigue, medical costs, 
visits to physicians, and time spent caring for sick family members fueled the 
persistence of poverty, sapping millions of individual initiative and depriving the 
region of much-needed intellectual innovation and creativity. Compounding these 
effects, the presence of dangerous diseases worked to isolate the South from the rest of 
the United States and from European immigration.29 Although the contemporary 
“Sunbelt” is unimaginable without the elimination of sharecropping, desegregation, 
and the advent of air conditioning, it is equally unimaginable without the elimination 
of hookworm, pellagra, and malaria. 
 
THE “NEW SOUTH,” RACE, AND DISEASE 
Neither the infrastructure to confront the South’s public health problems nor 
the demand to create such an infrastructure existed during the first years of the 
twentieth century. Ultimately, the primary driving force for change was external: 
public health workers from the Rockefeller Foundation and the United States Public 
Health Service created demand for public health efforts by reaching out to local elites, 
often relying on economic arguments. In the decades following Reconstruction, 
southern elites became increasingly aware of the yawning divide in prosperity between 
their region and the rest of nation. Among the most potent manifestations of this 
                                                                                                                                       
information should not be considered particularly reliable. Crude Death Rates were calculated by the 
author with data from Mortality Statistics, 1920: Twenty-First Annual Report,  (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1922). 
29 On the effects of disease in deterring immigration, see for instance Malaney, "The Economic and 
Social Burden of Malaria."; John Luke Gallup, "Geography and Economic Development." 
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awareness was the emergence of the “New South” creed, which imagined a 
reinvigorated, industrialized, and prosperous South freed from the economic shackles 
of slavery and restored to respectability and equal status within the national Union. 
Although this vision proved elusive, the desire for economic renewal and 
redemption retained a strong hold on southern thought in the early decades of the 
twentieth century. As a means of generating support for public health interventions, 
appeals centered on the need for regional economic development proved powerful. 
More immediately, public health workers found that planters, businessmen, and other 
local elites could be persuaded that their own economic interests would be furthered 
by a workforce freed from the effects of hookworm, pellagra, and malaria. 
Both in practice and in presentation, this meant that public health efforts were 
aimed at improving the health status of both white and black southerners.30 Rural 
black and white southerners lived and worked in close proximity, meaning that whites 
could not be freed of infectious diseases unless blacks were also. Meanwhile, neither 
the white nor the black workforce could be expected to reach full productivity without 
being relieved of the burdens of disease. 
In pursuing their aims, public health workers relied on class stereotypes, such 
as the poor southern white, along with local racial beliefs and preconceptions as a 
resource, reinforcing or reinterpreting them where necessary in order to gain the 
support of local white elites. In the push against hookworm, poor whites were 
portrayed as the victims of a disease brought to the region and spread by African 
slaves and their descendents. The South’s poor whites, it was argued, could only 
                                                
30 A recent line of scholarship has pointed out that the colorblind nature of disease meant that effective 
urban public health reforms required the provision of services to both black and white. See Don H. 
Doyle, New Cities, New Men, New South: Atlanta, Nashville, Charleston, Mobile, 1860-1910 (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990); Werner Troesken, Water, Race, and Disease 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004); Stuart Galishoff, "Germs Know No Color Line: Black Health 
and Public Policy in Atlanta, 1900-1918," Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 40, 
no. 1 (1985w). For a more detailed discussion, see also below, Chapter 1. 
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become productive members of society if freed from hookworm, and hookworm could 
only be eliminated among whites if it was also eliminated among the blacks who 
served as a “reservoir of disease.” In gaining the support of white elites for efforts 
against pellagra, which is not an infectious disease, public health workers emphasized 
the economic impact of the disease, which often prevented its victims from working at 
full capacity. Though more blacks than whites were afflicted with pellagra, county 
health boards confronted the disease vigorously and with great success after it was 
discovered during the late 1920s that consuming brewer’s yeast, which contains 
niacin, was an effective treatment. 
Claims made about race and malaria followed in a similar vein. Although 
many whites lived in higher-quality housing less likely to be infiltrated by mosquitoes 
than that of blacks, many did not. Either way, malaria among black could easily spread 
to whites. The economic rationale behind fighting malaria, meanwhile, was powerful. 
Once white elites were persuaded that the fevers and chills that kept farm workers 
weak or at home sick rather than in the fields could be prevented through methods 
such as screening, larvicide, and drainage, they proved eager to support public health 
interventions. Along with the substantial immediate impact of the disease, in terms of 
lost productivity, Public Health Service officers argued that malaria kept whites from 
inhabiting large swaths of the South. There was little incentive, they maintained, for 
outsiders relocate to an area, such as the Gulf Coast or Florida, where the disease was 
known to be widespread. 
Beginning in the 1910s, public health workers from the Rockefeller 
Foundation and the Public Health Service generated support for public health 
interventions by linking their efforts to concerns about the interracial transfer of 
disease, the economic prospects of poor whites, the productivity of both black and 
white labor, and regional economic underdevelopment. As I hope to show, the result 
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was a system of public health consistent with the southern status quo but designed to 
provide effective services to all. Poor whites and blacks, the primary victims of the 
southern trilogy of lazy diseases, were, in turn, the most immediate beneficiaries of 
state intervention. 
 
THE CONTOURS OF FEDERAL INTERVENTION 
The careful cultivation of county-level support for public health efforts 
coordinated by outside organizations during the 1910s and 20s is crucial to 
understanding the ultimate institutionalization of federal intervention during the New 
Deal. At first centered in the efforts of charismatic individuals and their base of 
support among planters, businessmen, and county judges and commissioners, public 
health measures were transformed, over time, into a formal component of state power. 
As county and state health departments became increasingly capable of monitoring 
disease, carrying out effective community outreach programs, and implementing 
various public health measures, power shifted from the individual to the institution. 
The national-level political prominence of southern Democrats during the New 
Deal helped to facilitate the transfer of legitimacy from the local level to the national 
level, a process that culminated in the inclusion of the Public Health Service’s “rural 
cooperative sanitation” program, the effort that had grown out of World War I, in the 
1935 Social Security Act. Initially fragile programs, dominated by strong personalities 
and not fully capable of translating scientific knowledge into change on the ground, 
assumed, by the end of the 1930s, an air of permanence and effectiveness. 
 
Just as federal intervention in southern public health ultimately transformed the 
southern disease environment, helping to pave the way for the region’s subsequent 
economic transformation, the unique needs of the South proved central in the 
 16 
development of today’s somewhat disjointed system of federal-state-county 
cooperation in public health, coordinated by the Atlanta-based Centers for Disease 
Control. The modern system of grants-in-aid through which the federal government 
attempts to regulate and standardize the public health practices of state and local 
governments is a direct descendent of the program created by the Public Health 
Service and institutionalized under the Social Security Act. The CDC, meanwhile, 
grew out of the Public Health Service’s World War II anti-malaria efforts; it was 
envisioned as a means of coordinating the federal government’s role in local public 
health efforts by individuals who had worked to establish and legitimate this role 
beginning in the years following World War I. 
In documenting the extent of federal intervention in southern public health at 
the local level, I hope to provide an important qualification to the assumption that 
southern elites were wholly resistant to interventions by well-intentioned outsiders and 
in particular by the national government.31 Southern politicians, highly influential in 
Congress as a result of the seniority system and the region’s one-party political 
system, played a central role in defining the contours of federal intervention in public 
health. 
Open to the potential benefits of national state expansion, most southern 
Democrats retained a strong rhetorical and ideological commitment to states’ rights 
                                                
31 While potentially misleading, the anti-statist reputation of early twentieth-century southern elites is 
well-known. C. Vann Woodward traced the origins of the white South’s late 19th century aversion to 
government action to the reaction against federal intervention during Reconstruction. Intense 
dissatisfaction with Republican policies following the Civil War “became reaction against 
governmental interference of any kind.” “The distrust and suspicion of legislative action and political 
power that accompanies any laissez-faire philosophy,” Woodward argued, “was more deep-seated in 
the South than elsewhere. Laissez faire became almost a test of Southern patriotism.” See C. Vann 
Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913, ed. Wendell Holmes Stephenson and E. Merton 
Coulter, vol. IX, A History of the South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press and The 
Littlefield Fund for Southern History of the University of Texas, 2005), p. 65. For an account of the 
benefits of a stronger national state, as perceived by southern and western agrarians during the 
Progressive era, see Elizabeth Sanders, Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State, 
1877-1917 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
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and limited government. Within Congress, southern Democrats employed party 
solidarity as a means of ensuring local control over issues of race and labor. Where it 
might infringe upon the autonomy of states and localities, southern Democratic leaders 
routinely equated federal action with the Reconstruction period, black rule, and the 
unsettling of social, economic, and racial relationships. At its extreme, this line of 
reasoning viewed federal intervention in almost any form as a potential vehicle for the 
political rebirth and eventual social integration of black southerners. 32 An invasive 
and potentially expansive endeavor, intervention in public health by the federal 
government might easily have been portrayed as a potential threat to states’ right and 
local control, as indeed it ultimately was during the debate over national health 
insurance during the late 1940s. 33 
That public health interventions were not portrayed as a treat to local 
autonomy is a testament to the capacity of outside bureaucrats to cultivate 
relationships with local elites and to define public health problems and their solutions 
in a manner consistent with prevailing racial mores. Particularly during the early New 
Deal years, southern Democrats were strong advocates for increased federal 
intervention in public health. Already working in counties throughout the South, 
representatives of the United States Public Health Service were a welcome presence in 
the region. As the issue of southern race relations emerged as an increasingly divisive 
                                                
32 For a classic analysis of the role of southern Democrats in national government in guaranteeing white 
supremacy and local autonomy, see V.O. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation (Knoxville: The 
University of Tennessee Press, 1984). See also Ira; Geiger Katznelson, Kim; Kryder, Daniel, "Limiting 
Liberalism: The Southern Veto in Congress, 1933-1950," Political Science Quarterly 108, no. 2 (1993). 
33 The potentially expansive nature of public health interventions is well-illustrated by recent public 
health interventions such as New York City’s ban on trans-fats in food. Measures as diverse as the 
lowering of speed limits, construction of sewers, and gun control may be plausibly framed as necessary 
for the preservation of the public’s health. Accepting a legitimate role for government in attempting to 
regulate and ensure “public” health raises the potentially unanswerable question of where the line might 
be drawn between personal choice and community well-being. As Paul Starr put it, “The maintenance 
of the public’s health allows- some would say demands- concern with almost every aspect of life.” See 
Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine (New York: Basic Books, 1982), p. 181. 
See also James Morone Rogan Kersh, "How the Personal Become Political: Prohibitions, Public Health, 
and Obesity," Studies in American Political Development 16, no. Fall 2002 (2002). 
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national political issue the 1940s, however, southern Democrats worked to guarantee 
that federal funding would not lead to greater federal regulation and a federal assault 
on white supremacy. In 1946, they ensured that the Hill-Burton Act, the basis for the 
federal government’s new program for providing aid for hospital construction, 
included an explicit “separate but equal” clause. In 1948 and 1949, they played a 
central role in sealing the fate of Harry Truman’s push for national health insurance. 
Nonetheless, southern members of Congress remained interested in bringing in federal 
money for health programs. They continued to support the Public Health Service’s 
ongoing local public health efforts and provided a workable, if incomplete, counter-
proposal to Truman’s health insurance proposal: a federally backed insurance program 
administered by the states and aimed at helping the indigent that foreshadowed the 
plan enacted as Medicaid sixteen years later. Developed in response to the needs of the 
South, the nation’s public health infrastructure reflects the region’s historically 
paradoxical relationship with federal authority. 
 
 
PUBLIC HEALTH INTERVENTIONS AND THE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT OF DISEASE 
The primary contributions of this study are to the field of American Political 
Development and in particular to our understanding of the origins, development, and 
contours of public health infrastructure, both local and national, within the United 
States. My emphasis on bureaucratic innovation and policy entrepreneurship is 
broadly consistent with the work of Daniel Carpenter, who has argued that, under 
certain conditions, bureaucratic actors are capable of fostering constituencies that 
allow them to pursue policy programs that diverge with the policy objectives of 
Congress. By contrast, other scholars, including Matthew McCubbins and Thomas 
Schwartz and McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast, have emphasized the 
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significance of congressional tools of oversight in limiting the autonomy of 
bureaucratic actors. In fostering local support for the development of local public 
health infrastructure, working to create practical public health methods, and in 
translating local support into national-level political legitimacy, the public health 
workers at the center of this dissertation fit well Adam Sheingate’s definition of the 
political entrepreneurs as “individuals whose creative acts have transformative effects 
on politics, policies, or institutions.”34 Working beyond both the scope of both 
congressional oversight and interest until the late 1920s, public health workers from 
the United States Public Health Service as well as the Rockefeller Foundation put in 
place the framework of a substantial and consequential shift in national public policy. 
Along with this, however, I hope to offer an important corrective, with 
significant comparative implications, to existing studies of debilitating disease and 
public health in the United States. The full extent of outside intervention in southern 
public health during the years between 1910 and 1950, and the central role of the 
federal government in the elimination of the region’s disease burden, has not 
previously been recognized. Indeed, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first study 
that documents the Public Health Service’s pre-Social Security Act efforts at fostering 
local public health infrastructure. 
In large part, this is a result of the different perspectives taken by those who 
study the history of science and students of American political development. Those 
who study the history of science are typically focused on questions about individual 
diseases and the scientists who investigated them. Important questions about the 
implementation of public health measures, the role of political institutions, and long-
                                                
34 Adam D. Sheingate, "Political Entrepreneurship, Institutional Change, and American Political 
Development," Studies in American Political Development 17(2003): p. 185. 
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term development of public health infrastructure are often left unanswered.35 By 
expanding the scope and time horizon of this study, I hope to show the 
interconnections between public health efforts aimed at combating hookworm, 
pellagra, and malaria and to highlight the slow-moving processes that resulted both in 
the elimination of these diseases and in the creation of an integrated nation-wide 
system of public health. 
 From a comparative perspective, the central role of public health efforts and 
infrastructure in the decline of hookworm, pellagra, and malaria in the American 
South may be viewed as an example of an instance where direct public health 
interventions were able to trump the social, economic, and environmental factors that 
led previously to the persistence of debilitating diseases. In the case of malaria, among 
the most serious public health problems facing the contemporary Third World, my 
emphasis on the importance of public health institutions is sharply at odds with the 
currently-accepted explanation of the disease’s decline. Margaret Humphreys, a 
leading scholar of the history of science, has argued that social change was the 
primary factor in the elimination of malaria in the South. Public health interventions, 
Humphreys maintains, did not play a central role in elimination of the disease. 
“Although New Deal programs included drainage projects to combat malaria,” she 
writes, “these were poorly planned and likely had little impact. More important were 
agricultural programs that paid landowners to take land out of production and other 
measures that resulted in the depopulation of the southern countryside.”36 
                                                
35 Where the implementation of public health measures has been discussed in depth, as in John Ettling’s 
authoritative study of the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm, The 
Germ of Laziness, the focus has been on an individual disease during a short period of time. The long-
term consequences of the Rockefeller hookworm intervention are hinted at but not fully developed in 
William A. Link’s excellent Paradox of Southern Progressivism. See John Ettling, The Germ of 
Laziness (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981); William A. Link, The Paradox 
of Southern Progressivism, 1880-1930, The Fred W. Morrison Series in Southern Studies (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1992). 
36 Margaret Humphreys, "How Four Once Common Diseases Were Eliminated from the American 
South," Health Affairs 28, no. 6 (2009): 1737. 
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 Following the Agricultural Adjustment Act, Humphreys argues in Malaria: 
Race, Poverty, and Public Health in the United States, malaria victims began to move 
away from endemic areas: “Once the sharecroppers moved away from the densest 
clouds of anopheles, the critical links in the continual malaria chain began to break 
down, one community at a time. Certainly other factors such as returning prosperity, 
drainage, pyrethrum sprays, and screening played their roles. But it was this removal 
of the malaria carrier/victim from the vicinity of the anopheles mosquito that probably 
had the largest effect on the decline in the plasmodium’s presence.”37 
 As I hope to show below, an understanding of the extent of the federal 
government’s public health capacity at the ground level leads to a more plausible 
explanation of malaria’s decline. To begin with, the malaria-endemic South was not 
depopulated during the 1930s.38 In Alabama, for instance, the thirty counties with the 
highest malaria mortality rate in 1930 experienced a total population growth of 38,240 
people between 1930 and 1940. This increase in population was paired with a 
substantial decline in malaria mortality within these counties over the decade, from 
25.8 deaths per 100,000 in 1930 to 12.9 deaths per 100,000 in 1940.39 Rather than 
rural depopulation caused by the Agricultural Adjustment Act, malaria’s decline in the 
United States was likely the consequence of massive public works drainage projects, 
conducted under the supervision of the Public Health Service, larvicide and oiling of 
                                                
37 ———, Malaria: Poverty, Race, and Public Health in the United States (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2001), p. 112. 
38 On the southern farm population during the 1930s, see for instance E.L. Langsford, "Over-All 
Adjustment in Southern Agriculture," Journal of Farm Economics 32, no. 4 (1950): p. 775. 
39 Calculated by the author using mortality data collected from Annual Report of the Alabama State 
Board of Health, (Montgomery), for 1930; Vital Statistics Bulletin, Alabama State Board of Health,  
(Montgomery). County population data for 1930 and 1940 may be found in the U.S. Census. See 
Minesota Population Center, National Historical Geographic Information System: Pre-Release Version 
0.1 (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 2004). In the short-run, the implications of malaria 
eradication are somewhat ambiguous. Eradication might cause those whose mobility has previously 
been limited by disease to seek a better life elsewhere; it might also cause outsiders to move to a 
previously malarial area or those who might have left to stay. My point here is simply that the decline in 
malaria does not appear to be an outcome of a decline in population. 
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anopheles breeding grounds, screening, and the implementation of the 1935 Social 
Security Act, which further consolidated county health boards as a platform for 
ensuring the elimination of diseases such as hookworm, pellagra, and malaria. 
 Though the implications of these findings are important, malaria control efforts 
in the contemporary Third World face several well-known obstacles. Anopheles 
gambiae, the primary malaria vector in sub-Saharan Africa, are the world’s most 
efficient transmitters of malaria. They have a strong preference for human blood meals 
and are not easily diverted to livestock. Meanwhile, consistently high temperatures 
ensure that malaria reproduces far more quickly in sub-Saharan Africa than it did in 
the United States and that there is no period during which transmission of the parasite 
is suspended. Beyond these qualifications, the adaptation of scientific knowledge to 
local conditions, practices, and attitudes, which occurred through a process of 
experimentation over a lengthy period of time, was an indispensable element of the 
success of public health workers in the southern United States. 
 
OVERVIEW 
The backbone of this dissertation is an analysis of the development of public 
health infrastructure in the American South between 1902, the year that hookworm 
was discovered to be endemic in the region, and 1950, the effective end of Harry 
Truman’s push for a national health insurance program. The first three chapters deal 
with hookworm, pellagra, and malaria, examining the emergence of practices and 
institutions aimed at fighting these diseases. The final three chapters examine the 
consolidation of these institutions, elimination of widespread debilitating disease from 
the South, and the friction that ultimately emerged between the South’s support for 
federal intervention in matters of public health and the desire of its leaders to retain 
local control over race relations. 
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Chapter 1, “‘Privies Are Cheaper Than Coffins,’” examines the origins of 
sustained outside intervention in southern public health. After establishing the 
widespread presence of hookworm in the region, the Public Health Service’s Charles 
Wardell Stiles began an impassioned one-man campaign to educate the people of the 
region about the disease. An almost complete lack of public health infrastructure 
helped to ensure that his efforts would have little effect. In 1909, however, Stiles was 
able to convince John D. Rockefeller to contribute $1 million to fighting hookworm 
disease in the region. Agents of the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission for the 
Eradication of Hookworm found that representing public health as an economic 
development project was an effective means of mobilizing local elites to support anti-
hookworm efforts. Though it achieved significant results, the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s initial public health intervention, a program of education and drug 
distribution through county dispensaries, ran up against the realities of local 
indifference and poverty. In response, public health workers were forced to develop a 
more sophisticated understanding of the disease, which accepted the reciprocal 
relationship between hookworm and poverty, and new strategies, centered on the 
creation of permanent county health boards, for combating it. 
Chapter 2, “Pellagra: ‘The Menace of Famine and Plague,’” explores the 
beginning of the transformation of the United States Public Health Service’s 
conception of its role in public health and the expansion of its research capacity in the 
face of the discovery that pellagra was widespread in the American South. At the time, 
the etiology of pellagra, a vitamin deficiency disorder, was not known. Scientists 
investigating the disease became trapped in a debate about its origins premised on the 
idea the disease was infectious, importing misleading ideas about race and disease 
from the popular discourse surrounding hookworm. Though Public Health Service 
officers established often cordial relationships with southern politicians and public 
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health workers, the PHS’s finding that the disease was the result of an inadequate food 
supply, interconnected with cotton monoculture and the southern political economy, 
proved highly controversial. When the PHS predicted an outbreak of pellagra and 
suggested federal intervention after cotton prices crashed in 1921, it prompted a noisy 
backlash from southern politicians, making clear the weak capacity of the PHS on the 
ground and precarious nature of its relationship with southern public health officials. 
Chapter 3, “‘Diseases Which Should Be Matters of History,’” analyzes the 
development of an active federal role in southern public health in the aftermath of 
World War I. In the years leading up to American entry into the war, federal public 
health workers developed a rudimentary capacity to assess and confront pressing 
public health concerns. When the construction of military bases in the southern United 
States required emergency federal intervention to fight malaria in areas surrounding 
bases, federal public health workers used the opportunity created by war to acquire the 
practical skills necessary for public health work in rural communities and to forge 
bonds with southern elites. When federal public health officials failed to convince 
Congress to expand these efforts following the end of the war, they used a pre-existing 
source of funding and loosely interpreted legislative language to pursue a federal-
state-county cooperative program with only shaky authorization from Congress. 
Following the 1927 flood of the Mississippi River, this program was expanded, 
gaining new legitimacy and funding. 
Chapters 4 and 5, “Depression, Drought, and Social Security” and “‘The 
Religion of Mankind’s Future,’” examine the consolidation of federal intervention in 
southern public health during the 1930s and the effects of outside interventions on 
hookworm, pellagra, and malaria. When a devastating drought overcame the lower 
Mississippi River valley in 1930, federal public health workers and their supporters in 
Congress were able to point to the federal response to the 1927 flood as a precedent 
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for how the federal government should respond. Funding for the Public Health 
Service’s federal-state-county cooperative program was greatly increased. In 1933, the 
Public Health Service began a close cooperative relationship with the New Deal public 
works agencies, supervising the construction of sanitary privies and large-scale 
drainage projects. In 1935, on the basis of southern support, the Public Health’s 
Service’s federal-state-county cooperative program was incorporated into the new 
Social Security Act. By the end of the decade, hookworm, pellagra, and malaria were 
near the point of total eradication. 
Chapter 6, “Southern Maladies,” deals with the paradoxical relationship 
between southern support for public health efforts and the desire of the region’s 
leaders to retain local autonomy in race relations. It details the emergence of the CDC 
out of the Public Health Service’s anti-malaria work during World War II as a 
coordinating institution for the national government’s local-level public health efforts, 
the expansion of federal efforts in the region in the form of federally-backed 
construction of racially segregated hospitals, and the role of southern politicians in the 
debate over national health insurance during the Truman administration. Finally, the 
concluding chapter offers an overview of the emergence of the “sunbelt South” out of 
a region once burdened by widespread debilitating disease and outlines significant 
factors in the successful development of southern public health infrastructure. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
“Privies Are Cheaper Than Coffins” 
 
 
 “Indications are not entirely lacking,” Dr. Charles Wardell Stiles reported to 
the Surgeon General in 1902 near the beginning of a survey of the southern United 
States, “that much of the trouble popularly attributed to ‘dirteating,’ ‘resin-chewing,’ 
and even some of the proverbial laziness of the poorer classes of the white population 
are in reality various manifestations of uncinariasis [hookworm].”40 Although the 
existence of hookworm disease in parts of Europe, Africa, and Asia had been well 
known for nearly half of a century, American medical professionals did not become 
aware of its prevalence in the South until Stiles’s 1902 tour of the region. 
A European-trained scientist working for the United States Department of 
Agriculture, Stiles had long given lectures at Johns Hopkins, Georgetown, and the 
Army Medical School urging students to consider hookworm infection as a potential 
cause when they encountered iron-deficiency anemia in tropical or sub-tropical 
climates.41 When, following the Spanish-American War, a former student and Army 
medical officer, Bailey K. Ashford, was stationed on the newly acquired island of 
Puerto Rico, he discovered that the disease was distributed widely amongst the 
island’s rural inhabitants. Inspired by Ashford’s finding, Stiles began his own 
research. 42 His initial finding, using samples from what was previously believed to be 
                                                
40 Charles Wardell Stiles, "Hook-Worm Disease in the South- Frequency of Infection by the Parasite 
(Uncinaria Americana) in Rural Districts," Public Health Reports 17, no. 43 (1902): p. 2434. 
41 ———, "Early History, in Part Esoteric, of the Hookworm (Uncinariasis) Campaign in Our Southern 
United States," The Journal of Parasitology 25, no. 4 (1939): p. 289. Stiles offers an important, if 
sometimes biased, account of the early stages of the hookworm campaign. 
42 On Ashford’s pioneering work treating hookworm, see Bailey K. Ashford and Pedro Gutierrez 
Igaravidez, Uncinariasis (Hookworm Disease) in Porto Rico, Senate Document No. 808 (Washington, 
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an isolated case in Texas and from Puerto Rico, was that the hookworms in question 
were a different species from those known to exist in Europe. Not yet aware that the 
parasite had originated in Africa, Stiles designated the new species Necator 
americanus. 
 Convinced that hookworm disease would prove as widespread in the American 
South as in nearby Puerto Rico, Stiles embarked from Washington, D.C. to conduct 
fieldwork in the region, making his way through Virginia, the Carolinas, Georgia, and 
Florida. His conclusions were stark. Hookworm, he came to believe, was “one of the 
most important factors in the inferior mental, physical, and financial condition of the 
poorer classes of the white population of the rural sand and piney woods districts 
which I visited.”43 
The disease, Stiles reported, represented an ongoing threat to the South’s 
economic livelihood, “resulting in loss in wages, loss in productive-ness of the farms, 
loss in the school attendance of the children, extra expenses for drugs and for 
physicians’ services, etc.” Its causes, moreover, were evident: “The heavy and 
frequent infections found are amply explained by the almost total absence of privies 
and closets on the farms visited. Defecation occurs at almost any place within a radius 
of 50 meters from the house or hut, and as a result the premises become heavily 
infested with the [hookworm] embryos.”44 
In time, Stiles’s efforts to publicize his discovery and show southerners how 
they might avoid hookworm infection would gain the attention of the John D. 
                                                                                                                                       
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1911). Whether Ashford or Stiles deserved credit for the discovery 
of hookworm in the new world remained an ongoing point of contention. See for instance The 
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43 Charles Wardell Stiles, Report Upon the Prevalence and Geographic Distribution of Hookworm 
Diseases (Uncinariasis or Anchylostomiasis) in the United States (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1903), p. 97. 
44 Stiles, "Hook-Worm Disease in the South." 
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Rockefeller philanthropy, laying the ground for a massive external intervention in 
southern public health. Revival-like gatherings, at which hookworm sufferers were 
publically diagnosed and then given hookworm purgatives to ingest at home, were the 
core feature of the initial Rockefeller intervention, which lasted from 1910 through the 
end of 1914. The limitations of this approach, however, caused agents of the 
Rockefeller Foundation to consider alternative, less dramatic, strategies of controlling 
hookworm and other southern diseases. 
Less than a decade after Rockefeller’s donation of $1 million to fight 
hookworm in 1909, the Rockefeller International Health Board was actively involved 
in the promotion of permanent local public health infrastructure throughout the South. 
By stressing the broad economic significance of public health work and the specific 
inhibiting effects of hookworm disease on the life prospects of southern whites, 
Rockefeller workers were able to convince county governments throughout the region 
to contribute matching funds to Rockefeller efforts and over time to assume 
responsibility for vital public health functions. Their attempts to generate local support 
for public health efforts and create the foundations of sustainable public health 
infrastructure were a crucial first step in limiting the burden of disease in the South. 
Ultimately, Stiles’s discovery proved the catalyst for a revolution that brought down 
not just hookworm, but also pellagra and malaria. 
 
 Though Stiles lacked a firm quantitative measure of the extent of hookworm 
infection in the South, the evidence he collected suggested that it was substantial.45 
Later surveys, conducted by the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission for the Eradication 
of Hookworm, confirmed his projections. Slightly less than forty percent of the 
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southern population, the Commission ultimately concluded, was likely infected with 
hookworm. The disease ranged throughout the South, from the Potomac to the Rio 
Grande, through the coastal plains, the piedmont, and the mountains, though it was 
particularly concentrated in sandy coastal areas. 
 Brought to the New World by infected West African slaves, the hookworm 
thrived in the South, where warm and sandy soil, poor sanitary conditions, and a 
paucity of shoes ensured continued transmission of the parasite. Deposited into the soil 
along with human feces, hookworm larvae entered humans through bare feet, 
eventually making their way to the intestines, where, depending on the number of 
worms present, they caused varying degrees of anemia. 
The impact on human and economic development in the region was 
devastating. Hookworm disease helped to ensure the South’s low literacy rates, low 
income, and low level of human capital in comparison to the North.46 The parasite 
stunted the growth and impaired the cognitive development of afflicted children, who 
appeared listless, experienced difficulty concentrating, and were less likely to attend 
school.47 Adult sufferers, depending on the degree of infection, were often extremely 
weak and unable to work productively. Economically marginalized and socially 
stigmatized, they were labeled “dirt-eaters” as a result of their propensity to develop 
pica, an overpowering appetite for dirt, chalk, and clay.48 
 
SOUTHERN PUBLIC HEALTH AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 20TH CENTURY 
 Though Stiles called for a “radical change” in the practice of public health in 
the South, aimed at educating physicians and citizens about the sanitary measures 
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necessary to prevent hookworm infection, state health departments proved ill-
equipped to confront the problem. Southern state health departments had been created, 
beginning in a wave during the 1870s, in response to epidemics of Yellow Fever and 
cholera.49 Primarily concerned with monitoring and attempting to stem the 
introduction of infectious diseases into their states, the boards typically had little or no 
coercive authority. Speaking in 1891, the president of the North Carolina Board of 
Health deplored “the lamentable fact that the Board of Health of North Carolina is still 
occupying the anomalous position which it occupied at its incipiency- a regularly 
organized Board without executive authority, appointed by the Legislature as an 
advisory Board on all matters pertaining to hygiene and the preservation of health. The 
services of such a Board are infrequently, one may say almost never, called upon, and 
we therefore have very little, if any, progress to report.”50 
The situation was less bleak in southern cities, where concentrated populations 
allowed for the implementation of basic public health measures. There, municipal 
officials were increasingly successful in responding to the threat of contaminated 
water supplies. Typhoid fever, spread by the contamination of drinking water with 
human feces, could be markedly reduced by the construction of city sewer systems. As 
Walter Troesken has argued, effectively combating typhoid required that southern 
cities not discriminate on the basis of race in providing access to sewers and clean 
drinking water.51 Despite the growing rigidity and codification of racial segregation at 
the turn-of-the century, urban blacks and whites, particularly in older southern cities, 
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lived in relatively close proximity. Given the circumstances, typhoid among blacks 
would quickly spread to whites; in addition, proximity often made it prohibitively 
difficult to avoid black residential areas when constructing sewer lines. As a means of 
reducing disease incidence and cross-racial “contamination,” “integrated” sewage 
systems held great appeal for urban public health reformers.52 
 In the construction of sewers, southern cities only barely trailed their northern 
counterparts.53 The South, however, was overwhelmingly rural.54 The North Carolina 
Board of Health, among the most competent in the region, remained largely unable to 
project its authority beyond the state’s scattered urban outposts. The collection of vital 
statistics, the foundation of modern public health work, was deemed impractical. “Our 
vital statistics,” the Board reported, “are necessarily partial and incomplete owing to 
the general character of our population, it being chiefly rural, with one-third of the 
whole negroes. We have made no attempt, therefore, to collect vital statistics except 
from cities and towns.”55 
Consequently, health officials were forced to speculate on rates of mortality, 
morbidity, and birth when prioritizing public health issues and designing policy. This 
was typical of southern public health during the years immediately following Stiles’s 
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finding that hookworm represented a substantial threat to the health and economic 
livelihood of the region. In 1902, the year of Stiles’s initial survey, no southern state 
had a system of collecting vital statistics deemed adequate by the federal government 
for inclusion in the Federal Death Registration Area. Kentucky, the first admitted, did 
not join the Registration Area until 1911. Increasingly aware of the disastrous effects 
of hookworm and other public health threats, such as pellagra and malaria, southern 
health officials had no reliable means of documenting and monitoring their intensity or 
geographic distribution.56 
Though state boards of health sometimes possessed rudimentary laboratory 
facilities, no southern state had a hygienic laboratory comparable to those that, in the 
North, tested water supplies and produced vaccines and anti-toxins until Florida 
created one in 1903. 57 Social movements pressing for public health reforms were 
almost entirely absent.58 Throughout the region, health authorities, poorly funded and 
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largely ignored by both politicians and communities, found it difficult or impossible to 
address clear threats to public health such as tuberculosis and smallpox.59 
The Secretary of the Kentucky Board of Health, expressing indignation at this 
situation, suggested that “the same proportionate sick and death rate among domestic 
animals from preventable disease would arouse popular clamor and cause earnest 
efforts to secure and enforce remedial legislation.” Despite “the warnings of the 
medical profession, this frightful annual morbidity and mortality is permitted with 
indifference, and authority and money for investigation are always provided 
grudgingly.”60 
While growing knowledge of bacteriology and the desire to respond to rapid 
urbanization had brought a revolution in public health first to Great Britain and then to 
the industrializing American North, turn-of-the century southern state and local 
governments largely lacked the bureaucratic capacity necessary to accurately identify 
public health problems, develop policy to confront public health issues, and implement 
policy programs. Public health infrastructure, including laboratories, means of 
collecting vital statistics, and the ability to inform the public about important public 
health threats, was underdeveloped. Across the South, counties lacked full-time public 
health officers, ensuring that public health measures were at best erratic and at worst 
non-existent. 
 
STILES, THE NEW SOUTH, AND POOR WHITE TRASH 
 Stiles’s findings drew national attention to the rural South’s dismal sanitary 
situation. Northern newspapers, taking the hookworm discovery to be something of a 
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joke, clumsily satirized its hypothesized effects on the South’s “poor whites.” The 
hookworm was referred to as “the lazy bug” or “the germ of laziness.” “No doubt,” the 
Denver Republican mockingly reported, “the lazy man’s respect for himself will go up 
amazingly, and self pity will also be in evidence when he realizes that he is in reality 
suffering from a disease.” 61 
Stiles himself, hoping to bring attention to the impact of hookworm on the 
South in any way possible, calibrated his criticism of the northern response based on 
his audience.62 “When you and I hear these often brilliant witticisms,” he later 
cautioned a reporter from the Washington Post, “it must be confessed, we may for a 
moment find it difficult to suppress a sickly smile, but that smile will be cut suddenly 
short as we recall experiences beside the sick bed, or death bed in the hovels on the 
one-horse farms.” Dr. Stiles, the Post reported, believed that the South’s poor whites 
were “not lazy, not ‘good-for-nothing,’ but unfortunate.” 63 
Speaking before a southern audience, however, Stiles was less forgiving: 
“Does it tend to elevate them [tenant whites] if we refer to them as ‘lazy’ and as ‘good 
for nothing?’ Would it not help them more if we could send to the chain gang people 
who indulge in that kind of pseudo-wit?”64 
 
Transferring from the Department of Agriculture to the United States Public 
Health Service, Stiles received permission from the Surgeon General to begin an 
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educational campaign in the South. Traveling across the region, Stiles lectured to state 
medical societies, groups of physicians, medical students, and civic groups. He gave 
presentations demonstrating how to identify hookworm under a microscope and 
stressed the importance of treatment for hookworm patients and the role of sanitation 
in preventing further infection.65 
At times, when speaking to members of the communities he sought to help, 
Stiles could appear overbearing and condescending.66 He regularly offended his 
audiences’ sense of propriety by insisting on the importance of sanitary privies in 
combating hookworm. On one occasion, Stiles recalled, the local sheriff “came to me 
and said that my talk had produced such public indignation that he felt it necessary to 
give me a bodyguard the rest of the time I was in that town!”67 Due to better sanitary 
conditions, Stiles found, children living in cotton mill towns were less likely to be 
infected with hookworm. Vocal in his belief that these children were better off than 
those on the farm, Stiles gained the lasting enmity of the anti-child labor movement.68 
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Over the course of several years, Stiles’s one-man publicity campaign helped 
to define hookworm disease and its victims in the regional and national imagination. 
Tapping into popular stereotypes of southern “poor white trash,” Stiles eagerly 
portrayed impoverished whites as the principal victims of hookworm disease.69 The 
discovery of hookworm disease, he suggested, offered an avenue for their 
rehabilitation into productive contributors to a new and more dynamic South. Over 
time, by linking the treatment of poor whites with the ideology of the New South, 
which imagined an industrializing South released from the indignity of second-class 
status within the national Union, Stiles developed a powerful argument in favor of 
organized action against hookworm. 
He offered a standard account of poor white origins: unable to afford 
plantations or slaves, they had been forced onto the South’s worst land and into 
competition with slave labor. “The old-time negro had a great contempt for the white 
man who could not own a slave, and this contempt culminated in the expression, ‘poor 
white trash.’” Degraded by competition with blacks, poor whites were looked upon 
with distrust and a lack of sympathy by economically advantaged whites, who adopted 
the prejudices of their former slaves.70 
Drawing attention to the role of hookworm disease in their economic plight, 
Stiles hoped to employ the sympathetic image of the diseased but redeemable poor 
white to rouse political backing for a more extensive campaign against the parasite. In 
meetings with groups of physicians, lectures throughout the South, and journal 
articles, Dr. Stiles effectively linked the presence of hookworm with the poor white 
stereotype and aspirations for southern economic development. “I believe that there 
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are millions of people in our Southern States who are affected by the hookworm who 
can be saved,” Stiles told the Washington Post in 1908. “Not saved from disease 
alone, but saved from that laziness which has given them the title of ‘shiftless’ and 
‘poor white trash.’” Hookworm, he continued, “causes much of the economical 
poverty of the States which are infested most with the germ which produces it.” 71 As a 
1909 article in McClure’s Magazine summarized Stiles’s argument, “Two million 
dollars will pay the whole bill for the cure of the South… and when the cure is 
complete, the South will take her place with the North and West in agricultural and 
industrial prosperity, for her two million sick whites will be two million able 
workers.”72 
 
 The flipside of constructing the victims of hookworm disease as “poor whites” 
was a portrayal of the disease, of West African origin, as fundamentally “African” and 
of black sufferers of hookworm as a “reservoir of disease.”73 Poor whites, by this 
account, were doubly the victims of southern blacks. Forced to compete economically, 
they were subject also to the ravages of tropical diseases imported from Africa along 
with the slaves.74 Here, Stiles’s arguments coincided with the racialist inclinations of 
the contemporary scientific mainstream, echoing the language used to discuss 
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tuberculosis and malaria. The poor health status of black Americans was, above all 
else, a threat to the health of whites.75 
 Like malaria, Stiles noted, hookworm had a greater physical effect on whites 
than blacks: “this fact… is one of great importance, for it points us to a conclusion 
from which there is no escape, namely, that the negro race, forms a great reservoir of 
supply for these infections.”76 Because the disease was less severe in blacks, Stiles 
maintained, they were able to continue working and less likely to seek treatment. 
Consequently, the disease would continue to be transferred to whites. 77 Speaking to 
the American Society for the Advancement of Science, Stiles stated plainly that the 
South’s hookworm problem resulted from “the fact that in the United States we are 
violating a law of nature; namely, in attempting to lodge different races of man side by 
side in the same area.”78 
 Driving home the ongoing black threat to public health in graphic language, 
Stiles appealed both to white paternalism and the potent fear of inter-racial 
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contamination.79 In an article detailing sanitary conditions among black and white 
southern tenant farmers, he maintained that “the absence of a privy at 55.2 per cent of 
the farm houses tabulated was not due to the ignorance of the tenants, but to the 
thoughtlessness and ignorance of the better educated white landlord.”80 For such men, 
Stiles argued, the imperatives of social responsibility, public health, and racial purity 
were in alignment. “One of the finest men in the world to meet,” Stiles wrote, the 
southern white landowner “would not think of eating at a table with a negro, but it 
does not seem to occur to him that he and his family daily run the risk of eating negro 
fecal material carried to their food by flies which have bred and fed in the nearby 
woods used by his tenants or servants in lieu of a privy.”81 
 Offering a clear portrait of the victims and perpetrators of hookworm disease, 
Stiles elaborated the implications of his understanding of the disease for the 
implementation of anti-hookworm public policy.82 Just as municipal governments 
across the South were learning that successfully combating typhoid fever meant 
providing adequate sewage systems for urban blacks as well as whites, Stiles argued 
that racial discrimination in the battle against hookworm could only serve to harm the 
health and well-being of white southerners. As long as disease was allowed to endure 
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among blacks, whites would remain in danger.83 The responsibility of white 
landowners, to black tenants as well as their own families, was unambiguous: “The 
white man who fails to recognize the important necessity of improving the sanitary 
conditions under which the negro is living fails to go to the root of the evil, and he 
unconsciously invites disease and death, especially to the women and children of his 
own race.”84 
 
 Beginning in early 1903, Stiles’s educational campaign helped to persuade a 
significant number of southern physicians and politicians that hookworm disease was 
acting as a check on the region’s human and economic development. He made a strong 
case for a large-scale effort to eliminate the blight of hookworm from southern life, 
detailing the necessary sanitary provisions and the importance of treating patients with 
thymol, the drug needed to purge hookworm from its victims’ intestines. Still, what 
political support he could muster did not readily translate into financial backing. State 
funding remained scarce. Although South Carolina Senator “Pitchfork” Ben Tillman 
expressed interest in securing congressional funding for an anti-hookworm initiative, 
the plan ultimately came to nothing.85 The control of hookworm was not seen as an 
issue that the federal government should become any further involved in than it 
already was. Later, promised financial support from a Richmond, Virginia 
businessman evaporated when the donor died unexpectedly before making the gift 
official.86 
                                                
83 Stiles, "The Medical Influence of the Negro in Connection with Anemia in the White, Address Given 
to the North Carolina Board of Health and State Medical Society, June 17, 1908," p. 28. “It is 
absolutely necessary,” Stiles urged the North Carolina Board of Health, “to avoid any distinction 
between the white and the negroes in this campaign of sanitary education.” See also Carter, "The 
Vampire of the South," p. 631. Marian Hamilton Carter, relying on Stiles’s work, advised the readers of 
McClure’s that “The one real hope of curing the white man lies in curing the black man.” 
84 Stiles, "The Medical Influence of the Negro in Connection with Anemia in the White, Address Given 
to the North Carolina Board of Health and State Medical Society, June 17, 1908," p. 28. 
85 ———, "Early History," p. 298. 
86 Ibid.: p. 300; Ettling, Germ of Laziness, p. 100-01. 
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Beyond its failure to prod either state governments or the federal government 
to develop a comprehensive program to respond to the hookworm problem, Stiles’s 
campaign had, by 1908, had almost no effect on the lives of the southern victims of 
hookworm. Across the region, many were unaware or only vaguely aware of the 
disease’s presence. Sanitary privies remained absent throughout much of the rural 
South, while medical treatment for hookworm remained rare. 87 Neither of these basic 
tools in the fight against hookworm disease garnered much popular support or interest. 
Even when aware that a drug capable of ridding them of hookworm was available, 
sufferers expressed little desire to swallow a poison that, improperly administered, 
could lead to grave illness and even death. Both public demand for a serious campaign 
against hookworm and the institutional basis for such a campaign were severely 
lacking. 
 
A chance encounter in 1908, however, offered Stiles the opportunity to make 
his case for a concerted effort to eliminate hookworm to men with the financial and 
organizational resources to help him make a serious attempt at achieving his goal.88 A 
recognized expert on southern living conditions, Stiles was asked to participate in 
President Theodore Roosevelt’s “Country Life Commission,” tasked with analyzing 
the status of rural life throughout the nation. Traveling through the South, Stiles shared 
a railway car with “Uncle” Henry Wallace, an influential voice in American 
agriculture, editor of Wallace’s Farmer, and grandfather of the future Vice President, 
                                                
87 Of 250,680 farm homes surveyed by the RSC between 1911-1914, fully 125,000 had no privy. See 
The Rockefeller Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm, Fifth Annual Report,  (1915), 
p. 13. 
88 My account of this incident follows Ettling, Germ of Laziness. Ettling follows Mark Sullivan, Our 
Times: The United States 1900-1925, vol. III (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930). See also 
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and Walter Hines Page, a well-connected native southerner and editor of the magazine 
World’s Work.89 While stopped at a railroad station, the three men noticed a 
disturbingly feeble man lounging on the platform. Wallace, alarmed by the man’s 
appearance, asked “What on earth is that?” Page nonchalantly replied that the man 
was a “poor white,” an unfortunate but common sight in the South. At this point, Stiles 
interjected, launching into a lecture on hookworm: “That man is a ‘dirt-eater.’ His 
condition is due to hookworm infection; he can be cured at a cost of about fifty cents 
for drugs, and in a few weeks’ time he can be turned into a useful man.”90 
Page was either unaware of Stiles’s work with hookworm or had not yet made 
the connection between the parasite, the profusion of visibly sick southerners, and the 
possibility that hookworm was inhibiting the southern economy. Stiles was happy to 
connect the dots. He explained what the hookworm was, how it was transmitted, and 
its devastating effects on human capital in the South. Treating hookworm, he told 
Page, was “simple, utterly inexpensive, and infallibly certain.” 91 Eager to endorse 
ideas likely to further the prospects for an economic and cultural resurgence in the 
South, Page found Stiles’s hookworm pitch irresistible. Following their conversation, 
he contacted friends involved in the growing philanthropic enterprises of Standard Oil 
founder John D. Rockefeller. 
The Rockefeller Foundation proved receptive to Page’s endorsement of Stiles’s 
call for an enlarged anti-hookworm effort. The Country Life Commission wrapped up 
its national tour with a reception at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York. There, 
Wallace Buttrick, secretary of Rockefeller’s General Education Board, which had 
earlier initiated a campaign to help fund public education in the South, approached 
                                                
89 A native of North Carolina, Page was a well-known New South booster and supporter of the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s public education efforts in the South. He later served as ambassador to Great 
Britain during the Wilson administration. 
90 Sullivan, Our Times: The United States 1900-1925, p. 320. 
91 Ibid., p. 323. This quotation is from Sullivan’s summary of the conversation. 
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Stiles and asked for a briefing on the hookworm problem. After talking late into the 
night with Stiles, Buttrick decided to arrange a meeting in New York City between 
Stiles, Simon Flexner, head of the Rockefeller Hospital for Medical Research, and 
Frederick Gates, who ran the Rockefeller Philanthropies.92 Fine-tuned over years of 
practice, Stiles’s presentation persuaded Flexner and Gates of the severity of the 
problem. Following some reflection and further investigation, and after persuading 
Rockefeller of the great good that could be done in his name, Gates informed Stiles 
that the Rockefeller Foundation would offer a large grant for the fight against 
hookworm in the South. 
 
THE ROCKEFELLER SANITARY COMMISSION FOR THE 
ERADICATION OF HOOKWORM 
On October 26, 1909, nearly seven years to the day after Stiles published his 
initial report on hookworm in the South, Rockefeller announced that he would donate 
$1 million to further the hookworm campaign. He invited twelve men, many already 
involved in Rockefeller medical research or active in the General Education Board, to 
help form the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm. 
Southern educational leaders were given prominent roles in the new Commission.93 It 
was hoped that by involving southerners the possibility of a negative reaction from 
southern leaders, newspapers, and general public could be avoided. 
 
Perhaps inevitably, however, there was a massive backlash.94 In part, this was 
because Rockefeller was an immensely unpopular individual and the motivation for 
his donation of such a large sum was unclear. More important was the symbolism of a 
                                                
92 Ibid., p. 324. 
93 Ettling, Germ of Laziness, p. 108. 
94 The response of southern leaders to the announcement of the Commission’s formation is described in 
detail in Ibid., p. 130. 
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rich northerner offering, through the grant of a shockingly large sum of money, to cure 
the South of its intestinal parasites. From its discovery, hookworm had been far more 
than a disease. In 1902 and 1903, northern mockery and derision had put southern 
leaders on the defensive. The new round of publicity that followed the announcement 
of Rockefeller’s gift ensured the politicization of the disease, and discussion of 
hookworm turned increasingly bitter and sectional. 
The northern press responded to the announcement of Rockefeller’s donation 
with a new wave of jokes about poor southern whites and the “Germ of Laziness.” In 
the South, the response was less jovial. Southern Methodist Bishop Warren Candler, 
brother of the inventor of Coca-Cola and soon to become the first chancellor of Emory 
University, loudly denounced the gift. “It is to be hoped,” Candler said, “that our 
people will not be taken in by Mr. Rockefeller’s vermifuge fund and hookworm 
commission. The habit of singling out the South for all sorts of reforms, remedies, and 
enlightenment is not for our benefit, and the too ready acceptance of these things on 
the part of some of our people is not to our credit.” For Candler, the sectional insult 
was unmistakable: “The South is represented to be filled with a wretched brood of dirt 
eaters. Who that knows the South can for a moment believe this?”95 
Other influential southerners, including Mississippi’s James Vardaman and 
North Carolina progressive Josephus Daniels, shared Candler’s initial hostility toward 
the Commission. “Candler and Daniels,” John Ettling suggests, “did not speak for 
most Southerners.” Nonetheless, their responses set a general tone that did not bode 
well. “Candler,” Ettling writes, “probably influenced Georgia’s Senator Hoke Smith to 
oppose and eventually defeat the bill in the United States Senate to charter the 
                                                
95 The Washington Post, “Insulted by Hookworm Gift,” November 2, 1909. 
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Rockefeller Foundation.” Meanwhile, in Texas, “Governor Thomas M. Campbell 
blocked all Commission activities for as long as he held office.”96 
 
In January 1910, the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of 
Hookworm set up offices in Washington, D.C. By the end of spring, relatively detailed 
surveys of the rate of hookworm infection were underway in counties across the 
South. Confronted with the defensive reaction of the southern press, the RSC worked 
hard to win over public opinion in the South to the anti-hookworm cause. The 
negativity of the press suggested that if it failed to do so the RSC would face 
significant, even debilitating, obstacles.97 As a first step, the Commission was 
organized in a manner intended to emphasize the importance of local people and 
institutions in fighting hookworm. “It was regarded as fundamental,” the RSC’s first 
annual report noted, “in the interest both of economy and of efficiency that the work 
be done as far as possible through existing agencies. Each state has its own system of 
public health, its own system of organized medicine, its own organized public press, 
its own system of public schools… These are established institutions rooted in the life 
and traditions of the people; to enlist these agencies in the accomplishment of the task 
is to insure the permanency of the work from the beginning.”98 Charles Wardell Stiles, 
previously the public face of the anti-hookworm fight, was appointed the 
Commission’s Scientific Secretary rather than its administrator, a decision intended to 
ensure that the RSC would have relatively full control over its own message.99 His 
                                                
96 ———, Germ of Laziness, p. 132-33. Although, according to Ettling, Candler came to recognize the 
worth of the hookworm campaign, he apparently continued to resent the involvement of Rockefeller. 
97 The Rockefeller Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm, Fifth Annual Report, p. 21. 
“Very few papers,” the RSC reported in a 1915 summary of its efforts to gain the support of the press, 
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98 The Rockefeller Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm Disease: Report of the 
Administrative Secretary,  (Washington, D.C.1910), p. 4. 
99 ———, Germ of Laziness, p. 111-12. 
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personal and idiosyncratic campaign was succeeded by an increasingly well-organized 
and bureaucratized effort. 
In its first year, the Commission achieved only limited success. While its 
surveys of hookworm infection validated Stiles’s earlier projections and helped to 
more fully document the extent of the problem, the Commission found it difficult to 
reach out to rural southerners, who were often wary of the claims made about 
hookworm disease. Committed to working through existing state health departments, 
the RSC’s directors quickly learned that they were generally disorganized, haphazard, 
and ineffectual institutions.100 
Hoping to gain a better perspective on the administrative challenges facing the 
anti-hookworm effort, Wickliffe Rose, the Tennessee educator appointed 
Administrative Secretary of the RSC, commissioned a study of the organization of 
public health activities in the eleven former Confederate states plus Kentucky.101 
Sensitive to the status of public health work in the states it hoped to help, the 
Commission developed a hybrid public-private mode of organization intended to 
strengthen the institutional underpinnings of public health in the South; ideally, the 
Commission’s leaders hoped to provide some basis for the future implementation of 
public health policy. In each state, the RSC chose a State Director of Sanitation who, 
while technically appointed to a position within the state department of health, was 
paid with funds from the Rockefeller donation. Field officers were similarly chosen by 
the RSC, given state appointments, and paid with Rockefeller money.102 Employing 
talented native southerners as field agents, it was hoped, would help the RSC to 
engage with potentially suspicious rural communities. 
                                                
100 Ibid., p. 118-19. 
101 See State Systems of Public Health in Twelve Southern States,  (Washington, D.C.: Rockefeller 
Sanitary Commission, 1911). On Rose’s background, see ———, Germ of Laziness, p. 115. 
102 Ettling, Germ of Laziness, p. 136-37. 
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By the end of 1911, the fundamental components of a successful drive against 
hookworm disease appeared increasingly clear to the leaders of the Rockefeller 
Sanitary Commission. The initial backlash against Rockefeller’s gift had largely 
faded. Popular indifference to the hookworm threat, however, proved a far more 
serious obstacle. In rural communities across the South, despite Stiles’s efforts, 
individuals were often unaware of hookworm disease. Accustomed to seeing 
hookworm sufferers in their daily lives, many who learned of the disease were 
resigned to its ill effects. As the campaign got underway, “the people did not know 
hookworm disease as a disease. The announcement of its prevalence they had not 
taken seriously. It was extremely difficult to induce them to be examined, and even 
more difficult to get them when found infected to consent to treatment.”103 
Early on, the schoolhouse emerged as one of the campaign’s primary 
institutional settings. Students represented a captive and easily accessible audience; 
educating them about hookworm and testing them for the disease, it was believed, 
would lay the foundation for a more sanitary South and draw attention to hookworm’s 
role in inhibiting children’s ability to learn.104 Pamphlets detailing the basics of proper 
sanitation and hookworm prevention were distributed to teachers, and students were 
instructed on the importance of wearing shoes and avoiding soil pollution if possible. 
Teachers and school boards, encouraged by the Rockefeller Commission, pushed for 
the installation of sanitary privies at schools. They quickly achieved real results: 
                                                
103 Rockefeller Sanitary Commission, Second Annual Report, p. 17. See also The Rockefeller Sanitary 
Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm Disease, Third Annual Report,  (1912), p. 102, “Letter 
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104 See Ettling, Germ of Laziness, p. 152. 
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beginning January 1, 1911, Virginia law required the construction of sanitary privies 
in all public schools.105 When the RSC deemed its early methods of surveying the 
distribution of hookworm disease ineffective, its leaders decided to base their 
estimates on surveys of a minimum of 200 school children, between eight and 
eighteen, per county.106 
 
Along with hookworm education in the schools, the dispensary system, first 
employed by a Mississippi physician in December 1910, proved an invaluable tool 
both for transforming public sentiment and actually providing treatment to hookworm 
patients. At its inception, the dispensary was conceived of as a means of providing 
care to a limited number of indigent patients. Already in Puerto Rico, American 
authorities had held large gatherings at which the hookworm purgative thymol was 
given to the infected rural inhabitants of the island. 107 The Rockefeller Sanitary 
Commission’s leaders, however, did not view this approach as workable. RSC director 
Wickliffe Rose, who had visited Puerto Rico, later admitted that “the State directors 
and I were strongly of the opinion that the people would not come to dispensaries for 
examination and treatment.”108 
                                                
105 See, for example, Rockefeller Sanitary Commission, Second Annual Report, p. 32, 35, 38, 41, 55, 61, 
65; The Rockefeller Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm, Fifth Annual Report, p. 22; 
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Far more important, the RSC believed, was the educational campaign centered 
in the schools. Soon, however, its organizers recognized the value of the Mississippi 
model, which made the diagnosis of disease and dispensing of medicine a social 
experience. When it was replicated across the South, the dispensary became a potent 
means of generating enthusiasm for the Rockefeller-backed fight against hookworm. 
By the end of 1914, dispensaries had been opened in 578 counties across the region.109 
Although the RSC’s leadership had not intended to use, let alone rely on, public 
dispensaries, the gatherings became the bedrock and most well-known aspect of the 
Rockefeller campaign. The RSC’s adaptability, and eagerness to embrace solutions 
that offered practical results, would prove to be of great benefit to the southern victims 
of hookworm. 
The dispensary itself was fairly simple. An RSC agent would designate five 
dispensary locations throughout a single county, opening each for one day a week over 
a six-week long period. Individuals and families traveled, often by foot, from across 
the county and from nearby counties to be examined for hookworm.110 Dispensary 
patients were asked to bring along stool samples; in some cases, they were diagnosed 
by appearance and symptoms. If they were found to have hookworm, they were given 
thymol and instructions for its use in purging the worms from their system. 
Since patients administered the thymol themselves, at home, the Commission 
was never entirely certain how many individuals had actually received treatment. If 
patients returned to the dispensary the next week and were found to still be infected, 
they were given an additional dose. In addition to offering examination and 
medication, dispensaries offered an array of visual material testifying to the benefits of 
ridding one’s self of the disease. Samples of the hookworm itself, stereopticon 
                                                
109 The Rockefeller Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm, Fifth Annual Report, p. 18. 
110 Rockefeller Sanitary Commission, Second Annual Report, p. 20. 
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presentations about the parasite, and before-and-after photographs of hookworm 
victims were provided by the Sanitary Commission.111 Confronted with visual 
evidence of the hookworm and its effects, dispensary attendees often became eager 
participants in the campaign, seeking treatment for themselves and, relieved of their 
burden, frequently spreading word of the dispensary’s virtues. 112 
 
Despite the power of the dispensaries to create popular enthusiasm for the fight 
against hookworm, their success was ultimately rooted in the Sanitary Commission’s 
ability to mobilize local elites in support of the campaign. There was always the 
possibility that, when a dispensary opened, the local community would fail to 
participate. Knowledge of how to treat hookworm, as Stiles had discovered, was 
difficult to translate into actual change on the ground in the face of popular 
indifference and unwillingness to engage with the arguments of medical professionals. 
A later Rockefeller manual on hookworm control, which relied on the southern 
experience as a blueprint for an international hookworm campaign, explained the 
obstacles confronting anti-hookworm work: “Although the problem of complete 
eradication seems simple on paper, it is not so in fact. Many difficulties arise to 
prevent working it out to the end. Virtually every difficulty, however, may be rightly 
attributed to one cause: lack of proper co-operation on the part of the people who are 
to be most benefited.”113 In the absence of community pressure, individuals might not 
show up for the dispensary. If they did attend, they might decide not to take treatment 
                                                
111 The Rockefeller Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm Disease, Third Annual 
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112 Ibid., p. 19. 
113 H.H. Howard, The Control of Hookworm Disease by the Intensive Method (New York: The 
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or to invest the time, money, and effort in improving the sanitary environment around 
their homes.114 
Before opening a dispensary, Sanitary Commission agents employed flattery, 
appeals to community spirit and the revitalizing ideology of the New South, and bare 
self interest to convince county medical societies, ministers, school boards, and 
community leaders to endorse the work of the sanitary commission in their county. 
Opening a dispensary, it was argued, would mean that communities bogged down by 
unproductive workers and sickness would be quickly transformed into communities 
capable of achieving significant economic growth.115 
Agents began by appealing to physicians. Doctors were approached by RSC 
representatives and persuaded to sign a petition in favor of a dispensary in their 
county. Next, the RSC asked for the endorsement of the county medical society.116 
Perhaps worried that physicians might view the Rockefeller effort as a threat to their 
own individual practices, the Commission sent letters informing physicians that, 
 
                                                
114 A report from Mississippi suggests the initial attitude of many towards taking thymol. Field Director 
Dr. Henry Boswell wrote to the State Director about a Thrasher, Mississippi woman who “was 
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Fourth Annual Report,  (Washington, D.C.1914), p. 88. 
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‘this thing means money in my pocket. Before I saw you I had to feed and clothe him and care for him 
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116 The Rockefeller Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm Disease, Third Annual 
Report, p. 17; Rockefeller Sanitary Commission, Second Annual Report, p. 19. 
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Table 1. The Rockefeller Sanitary Commission’s Dispensary Strategy, 1911-1914. 
 
1. Mass-mailing of educational literature; education in schools; educational 
efforts aimed at physicians (essentially an extension of Stiles’s educational 
campaign, ongoing alongside individual county campaigns). 
2. Hookworm infection survey, based on at least 250 county students. 
3. Elite Mobilization 
4. Appropriation of County Funds (an indicator of legitimacy) 
5. Publicity (through newspapers, public notices) 
6. Diagnosis of Hookworm Disease at the Dispensary 
7. Distribution of thymol (taken at home) 
8. Patient returns to dispensary, given more thymol if necessary 
9. Patient builds sanitary privy or improves existing privy 
Source: Adapted from the RSC Annual Reports, 1911-1914. 
 
following the operation of dispensary, “the people in many instances who previously 
seldom consulted physicians seek treatment from the regular practitioners… A 
wholesale drug house reports a great increase in the sale of thymol among the doctors 
in the counties where the dispensaries have been.”117 
 
After similarly courting the school board and prominent members of the 
community, and armed with letters detailing the transformative success of hookworm 
dispensaries in neighboring communities, the Rockefeller agent would present a 
petition to the county commissioners.118 Endorsed by physicians, the school board, 
and local elites, the petition requested the appropriation of county funds to aid in the 
hookworm campaign. Though county money helped to defray expenses, its value as a 
representation of community sentiment was viewed as far more crucial by the RSC: 
“The appropriation of county funds by the county commissioners carries with it a 
                                                
117 Rockefeller Sanitary Commission, Second Annual Report, p. 93-94. The Commission’s reports 
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ministers. 
118 Report of the Board of Health of the State of Mississippi, July1, 1911, to June 30, 13, “Letters from 
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moral weight which no appropriation of money from the outside could have; it is an 
official announcement to every citizen that hookworm infection is prevalent in the 
county; that it is a serious menace to the public welfare; that cooperation in this relief 
work is a public duty.”119 As the success of the dispensaries became widely known, 
counties began to appropriate funds on their own initiative and invite the Sanitary 
Commission to open dispensaries. 
After funding had been secured, local elites and ministers were enlisted to 
attend the dispensary along with their families and encourage others to visit.120 “With 
your influence in your section of the county,” a typical entreaty read, “you can render 
a lasting service to your people by setting an example in visiting the dispensary and 
taking your family. What you do the masses will do, and consequently on you and 
others of your position depends the success of the effort to bring health, happiness, 
and usefulness to those who, though diseased, have not the courage to take the lead in 
obtaining the free treatment they need.”121 Along with notices about the upcoming 
dispensary campaign in public spaces and the local press, the prodding of notables and 
religious figures was enough to induce many rural southerners to at least attend the 
dispensary.122 
 
 Ultimately, the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of 
Hookworm was in operation for only five years, from late 1909 through December 31, 
1914. The Commission neither eradicated hookworm from the South nor did it spend 
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the entire $1 million promised by John D. Rockefeller. Although the RSC failed to 
achieve Stiles’s goal of eliminating hookworm and transforming southern life, its 
impact, measured by its effect on hookworm, was substantial. When, in 1920, the 
Rockefeller International Health Board carried out a survey of hookworm infection in 
twelve southern counties, the Board found that “the average infection rate of 59.7 per 
cent which prevailed at the time of the initial survey in 1911 had been reduced to 21.7 
per cent.”123 This drop in rates of hookworm infection had long-term consequences for 
school attendance and literacy in the South. In areas of heavy hookworm infection at 
the beginning of the Rockefeller campaign, Hoyt Bleakley has shown, school 
attendance improved substantially in the wake of the campaign: a “county with a 1910 
infection rate of 50 percent experienced on average an increase of school enrollment 
of 4.5 percentage points, relative to a county with no infection problem.”124  
 
                                                
123 The Rockefeller Foundation International Health Board Seventh Annual Report, January 1, 1920- 
December 31, 1920,  (New York1921), p. 89. 
124 Bleakley, "Disease and Development," p. 381. 
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Figure 3. Reduction in rate of hookworm infection among schoolchildren in three 
southern counties. Source: IHB, 1922, p. 25, 26, 27. 
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Table 2. Number of Individuals Receiving Treatment Through the Dispensary 
Campaign, 1911- 1914.  
 
State 1911 1912 1913 1914 Total 
      
Alabama 15,389 9,113 8,077 10,941 43,520 
Arkansas 350 1,412 3,517 1,691 6,970 
Georgia 587 10,341 10,006 24,560 45,494 
Kentucky 0 6,353 13,491 18,072 37,916 
Louisiana 6,322 11,965 11,847 7,091 37,225 
Mississippi 10,578 37,358 17,751 8,232 73,919 
North Carolina 29,939 41,702 21,937 5,412 98,990 
South Carolina 2,437 21,154 11,066 3,754 38,411 
Tennessee 0 6,592 7,033 9,707 23,332 
Texas 0 4,298 9,032 4,160 17,490 
Virginia 619 5,632 6,557 4,301 17,109 
      
Total 66,221 155,920 120,314 97,921 440,376 
Source: Adapted From Rockefeller Sanitary Commission Annual Report for 1914, p. 41. 
 
 
Table 3. Number of Counties With Dispensary Completed, 1911-1914. 
 
State 
Number of 
Counties in 
State 1911 1912 1913 1914 Total 
       
Alabama 67 10 15 12 16 53 
Arkansas 75 1 2 12 28 43 
Georgia 148 1 18 21 26 66 
Kentucky 120 0 6 12 14 32 
Louisiana 64 5 10 20 14 49 
Mississippi 79 7 22 26 21 76 
North 
Carolina 100 16 38 38 7 99 
South 
Carolina 44 2 20 16 3 41 
Tennessee 96 0 12 15 16 43 
Texas* 75 0 4 20 21 45 
Virginia 100 3 8 13 7 31 
       
Total 968 45 155 205 173 578 
* Though there were 249 counties in Texas, the RSC only considered 75 to be within the “infected 
area.” 
Source: Adapted from Rockefeller Sanitary Commission Annual Report for 1914, p. 34, 16. 
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Table 4. Expenditures by County Governments on the Hookworm Campaign, by State 
and Year. 
 
State 1911 1912 1913 1914 Total 
      
Alabama $1,087 $975 $1,174 $1,334 $4,569 
Arkansas 50 132 1,461 2,679 4,322 
Georgia 89 1,886 2,493 3,683 8,151 
Kentucky 0 1,750 3,750 3,195 8,695 
Louisiana 503 1,613 2,838 3,060 8,013 
Mississippi 944 4,259 5,122 3,354 13,679 
North Carolina 3,432 8,161 7,789 2,297 21,679 
South Carolina 47 601 769 1,027 2,443 
Tennessee 0 743 1,500 2,937 5,180 
Texas 0 1,060 5,284 4,554 10,899 
Virginia 152 500 1,200 885 2,737 
      
Total $6,303 $21,679 $33,380 $29,004 $90,366 
Source: Adapted from Rockefeller Sanitary Commission Annual Report for 1914, p. 49. 
 
 
Table 5. Rockefeller Sanitary Commission Expenditures, by State and Year. 
 
State 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 Total 
       
Alabama $1,506 $10,278 $12,056 $13,890 $16,073 $53,802 
Arkansas 4,514 12,117 12,704 14,529 15,035 58,899 
Georgia 6,938 16,288 15,542 16,348 18,344 73,459 
Kentucky 0 0 14,760 19,569 19,574 53,903 
Louisiana 550 10,445 14,235 15,490 14,210 54,930 
Mississippi 6,641 17,093 19,739 20,769 20,606 84,848 
North 
Carolina 9,463 18,393 19,188 17,471 12,764 77,278 
South Carolina 4,068 10,794 14,460 15,792 15,268 60,382 
Tennessee 5,044 15,076 15,975 14,613 15,556 66,263 
Texas 0 0 3,960 12,627 13,255 29,843 
Virginia 8,627 14,844 13,926 14,462 14,557 66,416 
       
State Totals $47,351 $125,327 $156,544 $175,560 $175,241 $680,023 
       
Administration 20,223 21,349 27,200 23,694 25,398 117,865 
       
Overall Total $67,574 $146,677 $183,744 $199,254 $200,639 $797,888 
Source: Adapted from Rockefeller Sanitary Commission Annual Report for 1914, p. 50. 
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THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION AND 
LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE 
By operating through, and at the request of, state health departments, the RSC 
hoped to guarantee that some of the infrastructure needed for its campaign, including 
laboratories, means of collecting and distributing public health information, and 
connections between state departments of health and previously isolated counties, 
would not quickly evaporate. Acknowledging, in its final report, that hookworm 
disease remained a serious problem in the region, the RSC emphasized its role as an 
institution-builder in offering a charitably revised statement of its own initial goals: 
“In the inauguration of this work it was assumed that the Commission itself should not 
attempt the task of complete eradication; that the problem was one for the States 
themselves to work out through existing agencies; that the Commission could be 
helpful only in so far as it could aid the States in organizing their own forces and 
directing them to the work to be done.”125 
Though it was an exaggeration to claim that institution-building had been the 
RSC’s central focus at the onset of the hookworm campaign, it became an increasingly 
important goal as the long-term nature of the hookworm problem became evident. 
Beginning in 1913, the Commission had developed an “intensive plan” for combating 
hookworm that centered on the creation of more permanent county health agencies 
capable of achieving greater penetration into isolated rural communities. On Knot’s 
Island, a community off of the northeastern North Carolina coast, the RSC examined 
all but seven of 567 citizens. Ninety-three, the Commission found, were infected. 
Through treatment and the construction of sanitary privies, the Commission attempted 
to wholly eradicate hookworm from the small island. In the next year, the RSC 
                                                
125 The Rockefeller Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm, Fifth Annual Report, p. 9. 
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extended the intensive plan to additional locations in Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Louisiana.126 
After experimenting with different modes of organization, the Commission 
determined that, in each county, the intensive plan should be arranged around a central 
office that “keeps financial records, distributes publicity material, makes microscopic 
examinations, tabulates on specially prepared blanks detailed statistics of the house-to-
house sanitary survey, and prepares local maps on which are shown the homes, roads, 
streams, school houses, churches, and other features pertinent to the work.” This 
institutional presence would be augmented by a team of health inspectors who “visit 
the people, inspect their premises, and urge changes necessary to provide each family 
with a latrine of a type approved by the State Board of Health.” Under these 
circumstances, it was found, lasting improvements could be made in a community’s 
disease environment.127 These initial steps would lay the ground for the systematic 
monitoring of disease in the community. Beyond lowering the incidence of hookworm 
disease, data showed that, because of the widespread construction of sanitary privies 
where the intensive plan had been put into action, significant reductions had occurred 
in the incidence of typhoid, dysentery, and diarrhea.128 
When the RSC was dissolved at the end of 1914, much of its high level staff 
and some of its activities were folded into the Rockefeller Foundation’s International 
Health Board, which had embarked on an international effort to fight hookworm 
disease. Discontinuing the dispensary campaign in the South, the International Health 
Board took the creation of permanent institutions of public health, modeled on the 
                                                
126 The Rockefeller Foundation International Health Board, Third Annual Report, January 1, 1916- 
December 31, 1916, p. 33; Link, Paradox of Southern Progressivism, p. 216; The Rockefeller Sanitary 
Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm, Fifth Annual Report, p. 51. 
127 The Rockefeller Foundation International Health Board, Third Annual Report, January 1, 1916- 
December 31, 1916, p. 33, 35. 
128 Ibid., p. 37-38. 
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organizational structure of the intensive plan, to be its central task in the region. From 
the onset, the IHB expressed confidence in the future of southern public health. “A 
movement is under way,” the Board reported in 1917, “to develop the county force 
into a permanent department of health, ultimately to be maintained with state and 
county funds, and to assume responsibility not only for the completion of the work of 
hookworm control but for the advancement of other measures pertaining to public 
health.” 129 Systemization and bureaucratization of local public health operations, 
rather than wholesale “eradication,” was now, in practice, where money from the 
Rockefeller Foundation would be directed. 
North Carolina, where the intensive plan had first been implemented, served as 
a model for the cooperative development of county health departments. In ten rural 
counties, the International Health Board, the State of North Carolina, and the county 
governments agreed, over a three-year period, to shift total control of public health 
work from the IHB to new county health departments.130 Initially, county governments 
agreed to take on 50 percent of the cost of operations, while the IHB and the State 
covered the remainder. Over time, the county and state would accept more financial 
responsibility, eventually covering all costs themselves. 131 The success of the 
emerging county health departments, like the earlier success of the dispensary 
campaign, soon led to embrace of the IHB’s plan by counties across the South.132 By 
1917, the intensive method was being implemented, to a greater or lesser extent, in 
100 communities across the region.133 
                                                
129 Ibid., p. 31. 
130 Ibid., p. 38. 
131 Ibid., p. 40; The Rockefeller Foundation International Health Board, Fifth Annual Report, January 
1, 1918- December 31, 1918,  (New York1919), p. 36; State Board of Health of North Carolina 
Biennial Report, Seventeenth Biennial Report, 1917-19, p. 29. 
132 The Rockefeller Foundation International Health Board, Third Annual Report, January 1, 1916- 
December 31, 1916, p. 43- 44; Report of the Board of Health of the State of Mississippi, July 1, 1917, to 
June 30, 19, p. 8, 10; Link, Paradox of Southern Progressivism, p. 219, 20. 
133 Rockefeller Foundation International Health Board, Fourth Annual Report, January 1, 1917- 
December 31, 1917,  (New York1918), p. 81. 
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Increasingly attuned to the prominence of malaria in the lives of southerners, 
the IHB expanded its activities to include collaboration with state governments and the 
United States Public Health Service in pioneering malaria control efforts in select 
southern communities.134 In support of both the intensive plan and malaria programs, 
the Rockefeller Foundation continued to pour substantial sums of money into the 
region: in 1916, IHB spent a total of $102,062 on public health work in the South; in 
1920, it spent approximately $257,671.135 
 
The growing bureaucratization of public health, organized at the county level, 
represented a major improvement upon the dispensary campaign. Although the 
Rockefeller Sanitary Commission worked hard in recruiting local elites to the cause 
and attempting to appeal to local sentiment, the communities that the Commission 
hoped to transform through the dispensary and educational campaigns were, as it 
turned out, largely impenetrable even to agents chosen by the RSC for their familiarity 
with the manners, expectations, and folkways of the rural South. While local elites 
could provide a bridge between the RSC men and the hookworm victims they hoped 
to help, the time-constrained activities of the Commission could have little effect on 
the underlying cause of hookworm disease, the deep-seated poverty and low standard 
of living in the rural South.136 
                                                
134 On malaria control in Arkansas and Mississippi, see The Rockefeller Foundation International 
Health Board, Fifth Annual Report, January 1, 1918- December 31, 1918, p. 124-38. See also State 
Board of Health of North Carolina Biennial Report, December 1, 1920 - June 30, 22, published 23, p. 
17. 
135The Rockefeller Foundation International Health Board, Third Annual Report, January 1, 1916- 
December 31, 1916, p. 227; The Rockefeller Foundation International Health Board Seventh Annual 
Report, January 1, 1920- December 31, 1920, p. 132, 33.  In 1916, $47,565.09 of this was on 
hookworm and another $54,496.97 was on attempts to eradicate malaria from communities in Arkansas 
and Mississippi. In 1920, $136,019.07 went to hookworm, and $121,652.24 to malaria. A small part of 
the money counted in the 1920 hookworm figure went to administrative costs for efforts in Kansas, 
New Mexico, and West Virginia. Overall administrative costs for hookworm that year were $6,032.20. 
136 On the effectiveness of county health departments compared to earlier “campaigns” against 
particular diseases see, for instance, Report of the Board of Health of the State of Mississippi, July 1, 
1925 to June 30, 27, p. 7, 71. On the importance of forging lasting and personal links with communities 
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Sanitary conditions on southern farms guaranteed that treatment alone would 
prove ineffective. Though children were accustomed, and often enjoyed, going 
shoeless during the warmer months of the year, asking their parents to provide them 
with shoes where both cash and credit were scarce only highlighted the poverty that 
had allowed the disease to become so entrenched. As a result of both economic 
constraints and deeply-engrained habits, many southerners failed to follow the RSC’s 
strong suggestion to build sanitary privies. During his time traveling through the 
South, Stiles had found “a great popular prejudice in rural districts against privies. The 
point of view was that not only were they unpleasant places but that nature’s way of 
disposing of excreta was to expose it to the rays of the sun or to hide it in the 
brush.”137 
In 1910, along with the United States Public Health Service’s Norman Roberts 
and Leslie Lumsden, Stiles had helped to create a blueprint for the “L.R.S.” sanitary 
privy.138 Despite the widespread distribution of instructions for the L.R.S. privy and an 
educational campaign that both praised the virtues of the privy and portrayed soil 
pollution as a sin against both God and community, many were reluctant to take the 
time to build one.139 Reporting on the apparent success of the hookworm campaign 
                                                                                                                                       
and community leaders through county health departments, see also Report of the Board of Health of 
the State of Mississippi, July 1, 1917 to June 30, 19, p. 8, 126, 129; Vance, Human Geography of the 
South, p. 386.  
137 Stiles, "Early History," p. 298. 
138 Norman Roberts L.L. Lumsden, and Charles Wardell Stiles, "Preliminary Note on a Simple and 
Inexpensive Apparatus for Use in Safe Disposal of Night Soil," Public Health Reports 25, no. 45 
(1910). 
139 The Rockefeller Foundation International Health Board, Third Annual Report, January 1, 1916- 
December 31, 1916, p. 42. Building sanitary privies, the Rockefeller International Health Board noted 
in 1917, “demands of the population itself a positive contribution. In most cases it requires the purchase 
of building material and the expenditure of time and energy to build latrines. More than this, it 
necessitates the arousing of a sanitary sense and a change of personal habits that will lead the people to 
use and maintain the latrines once built, and calls for more intimate contact with the people, more 
persistent and protracted effort, and a more marked faculty of leadership by the director in charge.” See 
also The Rockefeller Foundation International Health Board, Fifth Annual Report, January 1, 1918- 
December 31, 1918, p. 91. On the role of religion in the dispensary campaign, see Ettling, Germ of 
Laziness. Ettling argues that aspects of the dispensary campaign mirrored, and perhaps were modeled 
on, the American evangelical revival tradition. Stiles cites Deuteronomy as evidence that God frowns 
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Figure 4. “An L.R.S. privy with an ordinary vinegar barrel used as a liquefying tank 
and an iron pot for effluent tank.” Source: Lumsden, Stiles, and Freeman, Public 
Health Bulletin No. 68, Safe Disposal of Human Excreta at Unsewered Homes (1915), 
p. 21. 
 
in South Carolina in 1912, the state’s Director of Rural Sanitation noted that “The only 
discouraging aspect of the work is the great difficulty of getting people to stop soil 
pollution, by using sanitary privies, which, after all, are much cheaper than coffins.”140 
                                                                                                                                       
upon soil pollution in Charles Wardell Stiles, Soil Pollution as a Cause of Ground-Itch, Hookworm 
Diease (Ground-Itch Anemia), and Dirt Eating (Washington, D.C.: The Rockefeller Sanitary 
Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm Disease, 1910), p. 6. 
140 Annual Report of the State Board of Health of South Carolina, Thirty-Third Annual Report, for the 
Fiscal Year 1912, published 13, p. 24. 
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Sensitive to the failures of the RSC, the Rockefeller International Health Board 
placed the transformation of community sentiment towards sanitary privies at the heart 
of its plan for building a new basis for southern public health. The IHB-sponsored 
nascent departments of health, more firmly rooted in their communities than the 
“whirlwind” dispensary campaigns and mass-mailings of privy-building literature, 
actively developed tactics for directing the energy of southerners towards the growth 
of “privy pride.”141 Following the lead of International Health Board intensive plans in 
Mississippi, local newspapers across the region published a list of “heads of families 
who had brought their latrines up to the standard approved by the state board of 
health.”142 Along with, or in place of, this, health departments posted “a large, 
carefully prepared map giving the location of every home… in a conspicuous place in 
the community. As each householder completed the sanitary program a ring was 
drawn around the dot on the map which indicated his home. The map became a topic 
of conversation. As the scales tipped in favor of those who had completed the work of 
sanitation, further delay for the remaining families became increasingly 
embarrassing.”143 
                                                
141 The Rockefeller Foundation International Health Board, Fifth Annual Report, January 1, 1918- 
December 31, 1918, p. 120. On the intensive plan in comparison to the dispensaries, see Report of the 
Board of Health of the State of Mississippi, July 1, 1917 to June 30, 19, p. 8. Report of the Board of 
Health of the State of Mississippi, July1, 1925 to June 30, 27, p. 71. The intensive plan, the Mississippi 
State Board of Health reported in 1919, “marked an epoch in the development of the health work of the 
state. [The campaigns] were carried on in such a way as to create new ideals among the people in health 
standards and they have been effective in standardizing the county organization for health work… The 
prevention of disease means to a considerable extent the shaping of the social fabric of a people.” 
142 The Rockefeller Foundation International Health Board, Third Annual Report, January 1, 1916- 
December 31, 1916, p. 36; The Rockefeller Foundation International Health Board, Fifth Annual 
Report, January 1, 1918- December 31, 1918, p. 121. 
143 The Rockefeller Foundation International Health Board, Third Annual Report, January 1, 1916- 
December 31, 1916, p. 36; The Rockefeller Foundation International Health Board, Fifth Annual 
Report, January 1, 1918- December 31, 1918, p. 121. 
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Figure 5. “Extract from Hattiesburg, Miss., Tribune, giving list of homes in Forrest 
county at which improved latrines have been built.” Source: International Health 
Board, Third Annual Report, covering 1916, p. 37. 
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Figure 6. Publicly Posted Map. Detail of “Vinegar Bend community, Pearl River 
county, Mississippi, showing method of gaining cooperation in intensive community 
work. The dark circles indicate homes at which improved latrines have been built.” 
Source: International Health Board, Third Annual Report, covering 1916, p. 39. 
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SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE, LOCAL PRACTICE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 
Reflecting on the experience of his own individual campaign against 
hookworm and the Rockefeller effort that followed on its heels, Charles Wardell Stiles 
touched on the challenges that confront public health interventions at the nexus of 
scientific knowledge and local knowledge. “Probably the most difficult problem in 
public health work,” Stiles wrote, “is to put into practical application the theoretical 
knowledge we possess which can be utilized to reduce unnecessary death, suffering, 
and disease, and to increase health and happiness.”144 Judged by its ability to adapt the 
medical knowledge it possessed to local circumstances, the Rockefeller effort was, in 
many ways, a success. 
Confronted with initially hostile elites, an indifferent and generally 
uncooperative target population, and little pre-existing institutional basis for an attack 
on hookworm disease, the RSC employed scientific knowledge and a strong appeal to 
local interests and aspirations to persuade politicians, newspapermen, preachers, 
landowners, and others to support the campaign. Relying on well-established local 
folkways and stereotypes, particularly the image of the degraded and lazy poor white, 
the RSC convinced community members with influence that a concerted effort at 
treating hookworm disease would lead to a revitalization of the local economy and 
ultimately to a rebirth of the South as a full and equal partner in the national Union. 
Poor whites, it was argued, could be transformed into the industrious base of a new 
and vibrant economy. The result was the authorization of local funding by county 
commissioners, an indicator of legitimacy, and widespread participation in the 
dispensary campaign. Over the course of the next decade, the precedent set by the 
RSC and the International Health Board, centered on cooperation between local elites 
and outside supporters of public health reform, would be followed by the United 
                                                
144 Stiles, "Early History," p. 300. 
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States Public Health Service, helping to spread the framework of a new system of 
public health throughout the region. 
The vision of southern economic revitalization that Stiles and the RSC relied 
on imagined a new white South, but continued political and economic subordination 
for southern blacks. Rather than being portrayed as potential contributors to a new 
South, blacks were vilified as carriers of a debilitating disease and as a threat to the 
economic prosperity of poor whites. The racial logic of the treatment of hookworm 
suggested that white hookworm sufferers could only be saved if blacks were also rid 
of the disease. Were blacks to remain a “reservoir” of hookworm, living and working 
in close proximity to whites, the community would remain in danger. The 
consequences of this approach to the problem of hookworm among blacks during the 
dispensary campaign, unfortunately, are not clear. Dispensaries were held for both 
black and white southerners, and there is evidence that outreach efforts were made to 
black schools. The RSC’s annual reports, along with the corresponding state reports, 
however, are almost entirely race neutral.145 As a consequence, we do not know 
whether the dispensary campaign and school educational and sanitary efforts 
disproportionately catered to whites.146 
The International Health Board’s intensive plan, however, unambiguously 
attempted to improve sanitary conditions regardless of race. In mapping entire 
                                                
145 “From this distance in time and with the figures [Administrative Secretary Wickliffe] Rose and his 
field workers left us,” John Ettling finds, “it is impossible to estimate the number of Southern blacks 
examined and treated by agents of the Sanitary Commission.” See Ettling, Germ of Laziness, p. 176. 
The state health reports tend to follow, almost to the word, those of the RSC. 
146 The Rockefeller Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm, Fifth Annual Report, p. 
114, 12; The Rockefeller Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm Disease, Fourth 
Annual Report, p. 80. Photographs of dispensaries include both all-white dispensaries and all-black 
dispensaries. In 1914, Virginia reported that “102 privies were built at rural colored schools in the 
twenty-five counties which now have a colored rural school supervisor.” Mississippi reported that 
“much emphasis has been placed on lecturing to the colored schools during the present year.” Charles 
Wardell Stiles, as RSC Scientific Secretary, continued to mention the possibility that whites were 
ingesting the fecal matter of blacks. See The Rockefeller Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of 
Hookworm, Fifth Annual Report, p. 125. 
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communities, house by house, the IHB made evident the close proximity of black and 
white southerners and the importance of including blacks in any meaningful attempt to 
rid the community of hookworm. Both black and white houses were visited during the 
intensive plan stage of the development of county health bureaucracies and included in 
the efforts of the IHB to pressure households to build sanitary privies.147 In lists of 
privy improvements printed in newspapers and maintained in the records of nascent 
county boards, individual households are listed according to race. 
A report on cooperative IHB and County activities in Mississippi suggests the 
potentially coercive nature of a visit from a white county health worker to a black 
family. “The persuasive method of approach was used almost without exception,” 
wrote the state’s director of rural sanitation, “although in a few instances it was found 
ineffective, in the case of foreign and negro populations. In such cases the field 
director and his staff told the people summarily what they were expected to do in the 
way of installing the necessary sanitary latrines.”148 The logic of hookworm disease 
continued to ensure that those who sought to redeem its white victims would view 
black public health as an unavoidable aspect of community public health. 
The growing bureaucratization of southern public health, and its new emphasis 
on transforming the disease environment at the county level, highlighted major shifts 
in thought about the relationship between poverty and disease. The equation of the 
poor white archetype with severe ill health, pioneered by Charles Wardell Stiles, 
became ubiquitous through the efforts of both the national media and the Rockefeller 
 
                                                
147 Report of the Board of Health of the State of Mississippi, June 1, 1913, to June 30, 15, p. 32-33; The 
Rockefeller Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm, Fifth Annual Report, p. 96-97, 100. 
Maps of the Eatongrove Sanitary District in Mississippi and Salemburg community in North Carolina, 
representative of those used during the intensive plan, indicate whether blacks or whites live in a home 
as well as hookworm infection per household and type of privy. The maps also indicate privy 
improvements in the homes of both races. 
148 Report of the Board of Health of the State of Mississippi, July 1, 1917, to June 30, 19, p. 87. 
“Foreign” apparently refers to French speakers. 
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Figure 7. “Intensive Plan” map detailing improvements in hookworm incidence and 
privy quality as well as race of the household, Philadelphus Community, North 
Carolina. Source: RSC Annual Report for 1914. 
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Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm. In detailing the effects of the 
“lazy bug” on southerners, newspapers reinforced northern perceptions of southern 
distinctiveness and linked them with the idea of a diseased an inhospitable region. In 
persuading local elites to cooperate with the anti-hookworm effort, the RSC ensured 
their sensitivity to the role of disease in shaping the prospects of their own 
communities. 
While Stiles and then the RSC portrayed hookworm as a discrete and easily 
solvable scientific issue, the disease was deeply interconnected with a larger social and 
economic environment that could not be meaningfully addressed through the short-
lived dispensary campaigns. Rather than confronting the reciprocal relationship 
between the parasite and poverty, the RSC had maintained that erasing hookworm 
from the South would also erase poverty, and the “poor white” class, from the 
region.149 Even significant improvements in the incidence of the disease, however, 
tended to illuminate ongoing obstacles to public health such as the inability to afford 
shoes and lack of access to sanitary privies. By re-directing its efforts towards the 
formation of permanent county-level public health bureaucracies, the International 
Health Board suggested a more sophisticated, environmental, approach to the problem 
of hookworm disease in the South. Rather than sweeping in and cleansing a 
community of hookworm disease, the IHB would help to foster the foundations of an 
approach to public health that would consider disease within the context of the 
community. 
 
Where the dispensary campaign had relied on individuals, encouraged by 
community leaders, to seek out treatment, the intensive plan required nascent county 
                                                
149 On the RSC’s “reductionist, biomedical” interpretation of hookworm disease, see Stephen J. Kunitz, 
"Hookworm and Pellagra: Exemplary Diseases in the New South," Journal of Health and Social 
Behavior 29, no. 2 (1988). 
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health boards to actively seek out individuals and households. The implementation of 
procedures for collecting vital statistics ensured that county health officers could use 
surveillance of disease rates and sanitary conditions to better understand a 
community’s public health problems. Far more intrusive on personal privacy than the 
dispensary campaign, these measures were also far more effective. During the 
dispensary campaigns, individuals who avoided visiting the dispensary, refused to take 
thymol, or did not build sanitary privies were largely invisible to the Rockefeller 
Sanitary Commission and the state governments that it worked through. With the 
growth of county health boards and effective record-keeping, non-compliance became 
visible to the local government; through newspapers and publicly posted maps of 
privy construction, it also became visible to the community. Public exposure of non-
compliance emerged as a useful means of pressuring individuals to take treatment and 
build sanitary privies. 
However halting and incomplete their actions, southern states began, as a 
consequence of the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission and International Health 
Board’s efforts, to consider public health an important government function. 
Emphasizing the accurate measurement of local disease rates, the fostering of 
relationships between the department and the community, and prevention rather than 
eradication, county health departments represented a distinct improvement in state 
capacity to deal with issues of public health. In an echo of the arguments of Stiles and 
the RSC, investment in public health was increasingly viewed as an investment in the 
economic and human development of the community, state, and region. Where county 
governments could raise the funds to match the states and the International Health 
Board, they typically did.
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By 1920, eleven years after the beginning of the Rockefeller Sanitary 
Commission’s anti-hookworm campaign, the International Health Board could report 
that “the foundation has been laid in these states for a tax-supported health service, 
state and local, which may be depended upon in the end for the control of hookworm 
and other preventable diseases.”150  
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Active Full-Time County Health Boards in the South, 1909-1930. Source: 
Adapted from Public Health Bulletin No. 222: History of County Health 
Organizations. 
                                                
150 The Rockefeller Foundation International Health Board Seventh Annual Report, January 1, 1920- 
December 31, 1920. See also The Rockefeller Foundation International Health Board, Fifth Annual 
Report, January 1, 1918- December 31, 1918, p. 36; Vance, Human Geography of the South, p. 384, 
85-86; Link, Paradox of Southern Progressivism, p. 222; Tindall, Emergence of the New South, p. 281; 
Milton I. Roemer Frederick D. Mott, Rural Health and Medical Care (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
Inc., 1948), p. 339. “The achievement,” Rupert Vance wrote in 1932 of the hookworm campaign’s 
legacy, “was a social no less than a scientific triumph. A lack of interest and organization for public 
health was met and overcome. Although the South may not realize the debt, it is largely to the early 
Rockefeller campaigns that the section owes its present county public health organization.” 
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State and county appropriations to fund new county health departments and 
state-wide programs indicate the depth of change. In 1910, the eleven southern states 
where the RSC ran anti-hookworm campaigns appropriated a total of $255,395 to their 
state boards of health; by 1920, the total was $1,735,359.151  
 
 
Once established, moreover, county health boards tended to become 
permanent. Throughout the 1920s, with the ongoing financial support of the 
International Health Board, southern counties hired full-time public health officers and 
laid the foundations of a new and more bureaucratic practice of southern public health.  
 
 
Table 7. Percentage of Rural Population Served by a Full-Time County or District 
Health Officer, 1923-1929. 
 
 1923 1925 1927 1929 
     
Alabama 36.0% 43.9 53.4 79 
Arkansas 0.0 0.0 5.8 39 
Florida 0.0 0.0 6.9 7 
Georgia 16.5 17.6 20.9 27 
Kentucky 8.9 8.0 8.7 35 
Louisiana 16.3 18.6 20.0 54 
Mississippi 22.1 15.8 25.8 41 
North Carolina 39.8 45.2 49.3 53 
Oklahoma 1.3 10.7 17.7 19 
South Carolina 19.7 35.4 42.7 50 
Tennessee 8.5 14.0 23.9 36 
Texas 5.2 3.4 4.3 4 
Virginia 16.7 18.8 21.3 24 
     
United States as a 
whole 11.6 13.9 16.6 23 
Source: Adapted from Lumsden, “Extent of Rural Health Service,” 1923, 1925, 1927, 1929. 
 
                                                
151 The Rockefeller Foundation International Health Board Seventh Annual Report, January 1, 1920- 
December 31, 1920, p. 134. 
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In the aftermath of World War I, the Public Health Service initiated a program, 
discussed below, broadly similar to the Rockefeller Foundation’s, helping to expand 
and further cement the IHB’s gains. In Public Health Service studies of rural public 
health during the 1920s, southern states would routinely lead the nation in the 
percentage of their population served by a full-time county health officer.152 
It was a measure of the region’s ongoing poor health and poverty, however, 
that the growth of rural health programs in the South outpaced that of any other 
region. The region’s significant public health challenges, including hookworm, 
pellagra, and malaria, often ensured poor health status even for those served by a full-
time health officer. Despite the successes of the hookworm campaign and prospect of 
progress represented by the scattered new full-time county health departments, lack of 
access to health care facilities and personnel, inability to collect accurate vital 
statistics, and other obstacles to individual and community well-being remained 
significant challenges throughout the region.
                                                
152 See L. L. Lumsden, "Extent of Rural Health Service in the United States, 1921-1925," Public Health 
Reports 40, no. 19 (1925); L.L Lumsden, "Extent of Rural Health Service in the United States, 1925-
1929," Public Health Reports 1, no. 44 (1929). Lumsden, who collaborated with Stiles in designing the 
federal government’s standard sanitary privy design and later ran the United States Public Health 
Service’s rural county health department initiative, published yearly studies of the status of rural public 
health beginning in 1923. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Pellagra: “The Menace of Famine and 
Plague” 
 
 
Pellagra, first identified in Spanish and Italian peasants during the 18th century, 
was not believed to exist in the United States. In the Spring of 1902, however, a 
Georgia farmer came into the office of Dr. Henry Harris complaining of “loss of 
appetite, thirst, and a feeling of malaise,” symptoms of an illness that had afflicted him 
every spring for the past fifteen years. Within six to eight weeks, he would become 
“entirely unfit for labor of any kind. At these times he suffers to an extraordinary 
degree from melancholia, and freely asserts that he would much prefer death than to 
live on in his diseased condition.” 
The disease’s external manifestations were equally painful: “In the Spring, at 
the time when he begins his labors in the fields, his hands and arms and dorsal 
surfaces of his feet become greatly inflamed, blisters form in considerable numbers, 
followed by the formation of scabs in the affected areas.” The farmer, Dr. Harris 
believed, had pellagra. “If this be a genuine example of the disease,” he wrote, “it is 
the first case of the kind that has ever been reported in the United States.”153 As in the 
                                                
153 Annual Report of the Georgia State Board of Health, January 1, 1908, p. 44-46, 49-50; Elizabeth W. 
Etheridge, The Butterfly Caste: A Social History of Pellagra in the South (Westport, Conneticut: 
Greenwood Publishing Company, 1972), p. 3. Beginning with Paul de Kruif’s 1928 classic Hunger 
Fighters, the work and personality of Joseph Goldberger, who demonstrated that pellagra was a dietary 
deficiency disease, have provided the basis for an extensive literature on the history of pellagra. As an 
introduction to this literature, see Paul DeKruif, Hunger Fighters (New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
Company, 1928); Alan M. Kraut, Goldberger's War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2003); Jon M. 
Harkness, "Prisoners and Pellagra," Public Health Reports III(1996); Harry M. Marks, 
"Epidemiologists Explain Pellagra: Gender, Race, and Political Economy in the Work of Edgar 
Sydenstricker," Journal of the History of Medicine 58, no. January 2003 (2003); Daphne A. Roe, A 
Plague of Corn: The Social History of Pellagra (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973); Robert 
Parsons, Trail to Light: A Biography of Joseph Goldberger (Indianapolis: Bobbs- Merrill, 1943). The 
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case of hookworm disease, American physicians were not taught to look for it in their 
patients. To the few who heard of Harris’s patient, the case appeared to be either a 
fluke or a misdiagnosis. 154 In 1906, however, George Searcy, an Alabama physician, 
recognized pellagra among the patients at Alabama’s Mount Vernon Insane Hospital. 
When his findings were published in the Journal of the American Medical Association 
the next year, medical professionals across the South had little difficulty recognizing 
the disease’s disturbing symptoms, dermatitis, dementia, and diarrhea, in their 
patients.155 
 
Like hookworm, pellagra made life and work difficult for its victims. In its 
early stages, signs of pellagra “include lassitude, weakness, loss of appetite, mild 
digestive disturbances and psychiatric or emotional distress (anxiety, irritability and 
depression).”156 Diarrhea contributes to feelings of weakness and discomfort. In time, 
symmetrical patterns of dermatitis appear on victims’ skin. Patients find it increasingly 
difficult to work or concentrate. Eventually, “fatigue and insomnia progress to 
encephalopathy characterized by confusion, memory loss, and psychosis… As 
pellagra advances, patients become disoriented, confused and delirious, then stuporous 
and comatose, and finally die.”157 
Because pellagra’s existence in the American South was established in the 
wake of the discovery of hookworm and also afflicted poor rural southerners, some 
                                                                                                                                       
studies by Etheridge and Roe are the most comprehensive, with Etheridge focusing on the disease in the 
southern United States and Roe taking a more global perspective. In a recent article, Harry Marks 
explores the role of race and gender in the work of Goldberger’s close associate Edgar Sydenstricker. 
154 Roe, A Plague of Corn, p. 30; Transactions of the Seventh Annual Conference of State and 
Territorial Health Officers with the United States Public Health and Marine-Hospital Service, Held 
June 2, 1909 in Washington, D.C.,  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1910), p. 67; 
Etheridge, Butterfly Caste, p. 4. 
155 Etheridge, Butterfly Caste, p. 4; George H. Searcy, "An Epidemic of Acute Pellagra," Journal of the 
American Medical Association 49, no. 1 (1907): p. 37.  
156 Juraj Hegyi, "Pellagra: Dermatitis, Dementia, and Diarrhea," p. 2. 
157 Ibid.: p. 3. 
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speculated that there might be a connection between the two diseases. “Pellagra and 
hookworm,” the Washington Post reported, “travel hand in hand. Where the former is 
found there also may be found the latter, in many cases burrowing his way to the vitals 
of the patient. Until the hookworm is routed, the successful treatment of pellagra is 
useless to attempt.”158 
Apparently a “cousin to the hookworm,” researchers assumed that pellagra was 
also an infectious disease.159 In time, the study of the pellagra became entangled in a 
debate over whether the disease stemmed from bacteria growing on spoiled corn or 
some other source of infection. Although statistics collected by the Census Bureau 
eventually showed that pellagra disproportionately affected southern blacks and 
women, some physicians believed early on that blacks were relatively immune. 
Information collected by the Public Health Service officer in charge of investigating 
the disease appeared to show that the disease was more prevalent among whites than 
among blacks, while the Census Bureau’s mortality statistics did not include any 
southern states until the addition of Kentucky in 1911.160 
In 1912, the chairman of North Carolina’s Commission on Pellagra felt 
confident in drawing a connection between the role of race in pellagra and hookworm. 
Hookworm, he wrote, was a predisposing factor in the development of pellagra. More 
resistant to hookworm than whites, he argued, blacks were also less likely to contract 
                                                
158 The Washington Post, “Cousin to the Hookworm: Pellagra Theory Presented to Conference of 
Experts,” November 4, 1909. 
159 For an elaboration of the argument that the infectious paradigm of understanding disease fostered 
misunderstanding of pellagra and then resistance to the finding that it was a dietary deficiency disease, 
see Chris Leslie, "'Fighting an Unseen Enemy': The Infectious Paradigm in the Conquest of Pellagra," 
Journal of Medical Humanities 23, no. 3-4 (2002). But see also Kunitz, "Hookworm and Pellagra: 
Exemplary Diseases in the New South."  
160 “It should be remembered,” the Census Bureau’s report for 1913 advised, “that the majority of the 
deaths from pellagra occur in nonregistration localities.” See Mortality Statistics, 1913: Fourteenth 
Annual Report,  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1915), p. 27. 
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pellagra. Meanwhile, as a result of disease, “the white man is often unable to work 
from physical infirmity.”161 
Beginning in 1914, however, the work of Public Health Service officer Joseph 
Goldberger, operating with an expanded federal mandate and funding for research into 
“interstate” diseases, started to reveal the true nature of pellagra. A dietary deficiency 
disease, Goldberger argued, pellagra was a consequence of the restricted diet of 
southerners living within areas of intense cotton and tobacco monoculture. Where 
hookworm could be portrayed, however inaccurately, as a disease capable of speedy 
elimination through medication and a few sanitary measures, such as wearing shoes 
and constructing sanitary privies, Goldberger’s analysis of pellagra ultimately 
highlighted the failings of the region’s political economic system. Despite the growth 
of knowledge about the causes of the disease and means of treating it, pellagra 
appeared an intractable aspect of southern life. By the early 1920s, the Public Health 
Service felt confident in making predictions about when economic conditions might 
exacerbate it; its recommendations of an increase in mixed agriculture and a well-
balanced diet, however, could have little impact in the face of cotton’s dominance of 
southern farming. 
 
THE DISPUTED ETIOLOGY OF PELLAGRA 
As in Spain and Italy, the Americans most likely to develop pellagra were 
those who subsisted on a monotonous diet heavy in corn. That this diet had some 
relationship to the disease seemed apparent. Cesare Lombroso, a leading Italian expert 
on the disease, had argued that spoiled corn caused pellagra; this theory swiftly 
                                                
161 Edward Jenner Wood, A Treatise on Pellagra: For the General Practitioner (New York: D. 
Appleton and Company, 1912), p. 130. 
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became dominant in the United States.162 Dr. Charles Dana, a New York psychiatrist, 
explained the Lombrosian understanding of the disease: “The peasants [of northern 
Italy] are forced to live on inferior grades of Indian corn, the product of poorly 
cultivated ground, sown late and harvested before maturity. Frequently it has been 
stored in a green state, and when sent to the mills there is a fungus growth on it, which 
is thought to be chiefly conducive to this form of insanity [pellagra].” Pellagra’s 
sudden appearance, to many, appeared to be linked to changes in the way that corn 
was harvested in the American Midwest.163  
Despite widespread initial acceptance of Lombroso’s theory, alternative 
explanations quickly emerged. Dr. J.H. Taylor, speaking at the National Conference of 
Pellagra held in South Carolina in 1908, offered an early dissent. Though corn was 
eaten in cities and towns as well as the countryside, pellagra was almost exclusively a 
rural disease. Though members of families lived in the same household “under 
identical food conditions, often only one is attacked, the other remaining absolutely 
free of symptoms.” The spoiled corn theory, he argued, could not account for the 
manifestly seasonal nature of the disease, which lay dormant throughout the winter 
and emerged again annually during the spring. Beyond this, the disease’s geographic 
concentration appeared incompatible with the Lombrosian approach: there were large 
parts of the globe where pellagra was “rampant,” but corn was neither “grown nor 
                                                
162 Transactions of National Conference on Pellagra: Held under the Auspices of the State Board of 
Health of South Carolina at the State Hospital for the Insane, October 29th, 1908,  (Coumbia, S.C.: The 
State Co. Printers, 1909), p. 13; C.H. Lavinder, "The Theory of the Parasitic Origin of Pellagra," Public 
Health Reports 25, no. 22 (1910). Influenced by Lombroso, Dr. Searcy had dealt with pellagra at the 
Mount Vernon Insane Hospital by changing the patients’ diet: “As soon as the nature of the disease was 
determined and the true cause suspected the patients were taken off corn bread and grits and wheat 
bread and potatoes substituted.” See Searcy, "An Epidemic of Acute Pellagra," p. 37. 
163 The New York Times,  (New York), “New Kind of Mania Appears in South: Dr. Dana, Alienist, Says 
It Came from Provinces in the North of Italy,” December 2, 1908. On the secondary theory that new 
methods of harvesting corn were resulting in the growth of fungus, see Transactions of National 
Conference on Pellagra, John McCampbell, “A Theory as to the Cause of the Recent Appearance in 
this Country of Pellagra,” p. 25-27; Transactions of the Seventh Annual Conference of State and 
Territorial Health Officers with the United States Public Health and Marine-Hospital Service, Held 
June 2, 1909 in Washington, D.C., p. 71. 
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eaten, while on the other hand, there are large areas where this cereal is the principal 
article of diet, with all its fungi and bacteria, but pellagra is unknown.”164 
Some American pellagra researchers, taking these concerns into consideration, 
argued that the disease was the result of an unknown infectious agent, possibly 
transmitted by protozoa carried by flies.165 This theory emerged as the most popular 
alternative to the spoiled corn theory. While pellagra continued to ravage the cotton 
belt, professional medicine appeared incapable of offering effective solutions to the 
problem. In 1913, Dr. C.H. Lavinder, the Public Health Service officer in charge of 
the federal investigation into the causes of pellagra, summarized the development of 
scientific knowledge of the disease in recent years: “The literature of pellagra 
continues to increase in volume, but our actual knowledge of the nature of the disease 
still leaves much, very much, to be desired. The etiology of pellagra remains in 
obscurity. The Italian school continues to ring changes on the corn theory, while the 
American school seems largely inclined to regard pellagra as an infectious disease of 
some undetermined nature.”166 Lavinder’s own investigation, which had taken him 
throughout the American South and on fact-finding trips to northern Italy, suggested 
that the two competing camps were nowhere near reaching a resolution. 
 
                                                
164 Transactions of National Conference on Pellagra, J.H. Taylor, “The Protozoan Theory of Pellagra,” 
p. 20-25. 
165 Joseph Goldberger, "The Cause and Prevention of Pellagra," in Goldberger on Pellagra, ed. Milton 
Terris (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), p. 25, originally published in Public 
Health Reports, vol. 29, no. 37 (September 11, 1914), 2354-57; C.H. Lavinder, "Pellagra: Brief 
Comments on Our Present Knowledge of the Disease," Public Health Reports 28, no. 47 (1913). See 
also The New York Times, “More Causes of Pellagra,” October 9, 1909, “The Cause of Pellagra,” June 
19, 10, “Put Pellagra Cases in South at 50,000: First Study of Commission in One County Shows that 
Disease is not Decreasing,” December 3, 12. 
166 Lavinder, "Pellagra: Brief Comments on Our Present Knowledge of the Disease," p. 2461. 
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INSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS OF EXPANDED FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE 
SOUTH’S PELLAGRA PROBLEM 
 
Placed under the direction of Dr. Joseph Goldberger in April 1914, the Public 
Health Service’s investigation took on new life. A childhood immigrant from the 
Austrio-Hungarian Empire who had grown up in New York City, Goldberger was 
considered a rising star within the Public Health Service. An astute observer of 
individuals and society, he was well prepared to deal with southern public health 
workers, physicians, and politicians; he had spent time in Texas and Louisiana 
combating yellow fever and then dengue fever and married a woman from New 
Orleans. 
Goldberger’s personal qualities were buttressed by an enlargement of the 
Public Health Service’s mandate and a corresponding growth in funding. It is worth 
briefly reviewing the history of the Public Health Service in order to better understand 
the institutional and constitutional context in which he operated. The Marine Hospital 
Service, the institutional precursor of the Public Health Service, had been founded in 
1798 as a means of providing health care, based on a tax on sailors, for seaman 
entering American ports.167 Connected to the system of federal customs houses, the 
Marine Hospital Service was housed within the Department of the Treasury. After 
1871, when the Service was reorganized under the direction of Dr. John Maynard 
Woodworth, former chief medical officer to General William Tecumseh Sherman, the 
Service’s organization mirrored that of the military. Its career corps of commissioned 
physicians “were required to wear a regulation uniform when on duty, and the general 
                                                
167 Ronald Hamowy, Government and Public Health in America (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 
2007), p. 23; Laurence F. Schmeckebier, The Public Health Service: Its History, Activities and 
Organization, Service Monographs of the United States Government (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1923), p. 2. 
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discipline and administration of the hospitals were modeled on military lines.” The 
Service’s “Supervising Surgeon” was renamed the Surgeon General.168 
Beginning in the last decade of the nineteenth century, Congress had granted 
increasing authority to the Service, which had previously been almost solely 
concerned with running the federal marine hospitals. In the wake of the massive 
Yellow Fever outbreak of 1878, which took around 20,000 lives throughout the lower 
Mississippi valley, and a short-lived national quarantine under a hastily created 
“National Board of Health,” the Service acquired a degree of control over quarantine. 
Nonetheless, its authority was tenuous and states and municipalities continued to exert 
control over entry into their own ports.169 In 1890, the Service was granted power, 
when deemed necessary by the president, to attempt to control the interstate spread of 
cholera, yellow fever, smallpox, and plague. The Surgeon General was tasked with 
developing regulations to prevent the movement of these diseases, enforceable through 
fine or imprisonment. 170 
That same year, the Marine Hospital Service took control of inspections of 
immigrants at Ellis Island; in 1891, this authority was extended to all ports of entry in 
the United States.171 The final step in this phase of growth came in 1893, when a new 
national quarantine law was designed with the intention of gradually ensuring that the 
Marine Hospital Service fully controlled all interstate and international quarantines. 
                                                
168 Hamowy, Government and Public Health in America, p. 24; Schmeckebier, Public Health Service, 
p. 9. The quotation is from Schmeckbier. 
169 Beginning in New Orleans, the 1878 epidemic ultimately killed 4,046 in the crescent city and 5,150 
in Memphis, the two cities worst hit. The disease ranged as far north as St. Louis and Cincinnati. The 
Marine Hospital Service gained control over the weak national quarantine following four years of 
control by the National Board of Health, created in response to the outbreak. Schmeckebier, Public 
Health Service, p. 10; Margaret Warner, "Local Control Versus National Interest: The Debate over 
Southern Public Health, 1878-1884," The Journal of Southern History 50, no. 3 (1984).  
170 James A. Tobey, The National Government and Public Health (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 
1926), p. 88; Schmeckebier, Public Health Service, p. 16-17, 19. 
171 Tobey, National Government and Public Health, p. 89; Bess Furman, A Profile of the United States 
Public Health Service, 1798-1948 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health Education, and 
Welfare, National Institutes of Health, National Library of Medicine, 1973), p. 206. 
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With the cooperation of the states, the Service began to assume authority over locally-
operated quarantine facilities.172 Most clearly in dealing with international health 
threats, but more and more in instances where the potential interstate spread of disease 
was concerned, the federal government began to assume a direct role in public health 
matters.173 In 1902, the Marine Hospital Service was renamed the Public Health and 
Marine Hospital Service, reflecting the expansion of its role over the preceding 
decade. 
 
Throughout this period, during which Dr. Charles Wardell Stiles began his 
campaign against hookworm disease, federal authority in public health matters outside 
of ports of entry to the United States was largely investigative and educational. “These 
investigations,” Surgeon General Walter Wyman wrote in 1910, “are usually made at 
the request of state health authorities.” Public health was viewed as a police power, 
left to the states under the 10th Amendment to the Constitution. Although the police 
power of the states ensured their central role in the provision of public health services, 
Wyman noted, “Without question, it is the right and duty of the General Government 
to engage in the most thorough scientific investigations, to collect all possible 
statistics, and to publish [and] broadcast important sanitary and hygienic 
information.”174 In large part, Charles Wardell Stiles had needed the support of a 
private philanthropy in fighting hookworm because active public health interventions 
                                                
172 Tobey, National Government and Public Health, p. 91; Walter Wyman, "The Present Organization 
and Work for the Protection of Health in the United States," Public Health Reports 25, no. 38 (1910): p. 
1306.“It would probably have been impossible to pass a law prohibiting states from maintaining 
quarantine stations,” Tobey wrote in 1926, “and the best results were thus obtained by allowing the 
states to surrender their quarantine functions from time to time as they realized the advantages of the 
national system.” 
173 See Wyman, "The Present Organization and Work for the Protection of Health in the United States." 
174 Ibid.: p. 1307-09. 
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at the local level were viewed as beyond the appropriate role of the federal 
government. 
While the Public Health Service continued to view its investigative actions as 
dependent on the consent of the states, reforms beginning in 1912 substantially 
increased both the perceived legitimacy and the institutional underpinnings of federal 
intervention in public health. President William Howard Taft, taking office in 1909, 
had advocated the centralization of federal public health functions within an expanded 
Public Health Service or new health department.175 Speaking at the Carolina-Georgia 
Fair in Augusta, Georgia, Taft offered the powerful Department of Agriculture as a 
worthy model: “Now, it is true that the health of the citizens is directly committed to 
the States, but it is also true that the question of agriculture is committed by the 
Constitution directly to the States. Nevertheless, the Agricultural Department has 
found much that with the means at its command it can do to assist the agriculture of 
the country.” Under the direction of a federal health agency, Taft argued, massive 
strides in the science of agriculture made in the previous decades could be mirrored 
“with respect to sanitation.” The benefits of such an agency would be particularly 
significant for the South, he told the crowd, “for as you reach nearer to the tropics the 
danger of the spread of diseases is much greater.”176 
In Congress, Oklahoma Senator Robert Owen, backed by the progressive 
Committee of One Hundred on National Health Care, proposed the consolidation of all 
federal health activities in one cabinet-level public health department.177 Speaking in 
the spring of 1910, as the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission was beginning its survey 
                                                
175 See The New York Times, “A Federal Health Bureau,” December 9, 1910. 
176 William Howard Taft, "Sanitation and Health of the South: Remarks at the Georgia-Carolina Fair, 
Augusta, Georgia, November 8, 1909," in The Collected Works of William Howard Taft, ed. David H. 
Burton (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2002), p. 334-35. 
177 Schmeckebier, Public Health Service, p. 35; Hamowy, Government and Public Health in America, 
p. 27; The New York Times, “Scientists Favor U.S. Health Bureau: Many Organizations Join in 
Indorsing the Bill Introduced by Senator Owen,” April 18, 1910. 
 87 
of the southern states, he suggested that hookworm disease posed a serious threat to 
the region and reasonable target of federal action. Although, Senator Owen argued, 
hookworm was preventable and could be cured for around a dollar per person, “the 
prevalence of the disease is denied, prejudices and lack of learning stand in the way of 
speedy restoration of thousands, and the voice of the men who know the habits, life, 
history, and remedy for hookworm carries with it little power or authority to heal the 
unlearned patients.”178 Owen’s plan faced opposition from a variety of sources, 
including practitioners of alternative medical practices and federal bureaucracies such 
as the Department of Agriculture, which sought to retain control of the enforcement of 
the Pure Food and Drugs Act.179 
Ultimately, President Taft and Senator Owen, who were not wholly in 
agreement on the specifics of how a national public health agency would function, 
were unable to garner the support for the expansion and centralization of public health 
functions that both thought necessary. Nonetheless, their efforts helped to set in 
motion a gradual expansion of the Public Health Service’s institutional capacity. In 
1912, Taft signed legislation jettisoning the mention of marine hospitals from the 
Service’s name, expanding its jurisdiction, and increasing pay for its officers. 
Studiously avoiding infringement of states’ rights, the Public Health Service’s new 
enabling legislation granted it a vague authority to “study and investigate the diseases 
                                                
178 The Washington Post, “Might Prolong Life: Senator Owen Urges Federal Health Department Bill,” 
March 25, 1910. 
179 Speaking before the American Public Health Association in 1914, Galveston, Texas physician M.L. 
Graves reflected on the potential conflict between states’ rights and the likely benefits of the Owen bill: 
“For myself, born and raised in the South, and impregnated with the ideas of State Rights, I am firmly 
convinced that when it comes to sufficient and efficient protection of the public health it will require the 
powers of the National Government to do it. Political myths and party shibboleths should no longer be 
permitted to retard our progress and cause such enormous waste of valuable lives and the economic loss 
from preventable illness and death.” See Committee on Public Health and National Quarantine United 
States Congress, Proposed Department of Public Health, Hearings before the United States Senate 
Committee on Public Health and National Quarantine, Sixty-First Congress, Second Session 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1910); M.L. Graves, "Practical Remedial Measures 
for the Improvement of Hygienic Conditions of the Negroes in the South," American Journal of Public 
Health 5, no. 3 (1915): p. 214. 
 88 
of man and conditions influencing the propagation and spread thereof, including 
sanitation and sewage and the pollution either directly or indirectly of the navigable 
streams and lakes of the United States.” Public Health Service officers welcomed the 
bill, which they interpreted broadly. According to that year’s Surgeon General’s 
report, the authorization marked “a new epoch in the history of the health activities of 
the Federal Government, and it is believed [that the bill] clearly recognizes the Public 
Health Service as the central health agency in the Nation.” 180 
 
The apparent enlargement of the PHS’s authority was confirmed and given 
teeth by the Sundry Civil Appropriations Act for the 1914 fiscal year, which 
appropriated $200,000 for Public Health Service field investigations.181 In eastern 
Kentucky, and later in the mountains of Virginia, West Virginia, and Tennessee, the 
Service began surveying and treating people for Trachoma, an infectious eye disease 
that was widespread in southern Appalachia.182 Increasingly, the PHS paid attention to 
the prevalence of malaria throughout much of the South, conducting surveys and in a 
few locations cooperating with the Rockefeller International Health Board in 
conducting demonstrations in malaria control. 
Along with the general appropriation for field investigations, the Sundry Civil 
Appropriations Act set aside an additional $47,000 for the Service to operate a new 
pellagra hospital in Spartanburg, South Carolina.183 The Spartanburg area, dominated 
by the cotton textile industry, had emerged as a center of pellagra research as a result 
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of the welcoming nature of local mill owners, who were eager to rid their workers of a 
disease that, as it advanced, could leave them weak, unproductive, or incapable of 
working. 
The Thompson-McFadden Commission, a privately endowed inquiry into the 
causes of pellagra, had been active in the area for years. Local mill workers, its 
scientists found, were surprisingly receptive to outsiders who hoped to help rid their 
communities of the disease. The New York Times reported that the Thompson-
McFadden researchers had been “led to expect that a minute inquiry into the lives and 
habits of the mill hands would meet with resentment or even determined opposition. 
On the contrary, they were received with courtesy wherever their inquiries led them, 
and in only a few instances was there a display of reticence. All of the afflicted, or 
likely to become afflicted, realized the importance of the investigation and the serious 
menace to their health unless the pellagra problem was solved within a comparatively 
brief period.”184 
 
GOLDBERGER: OBSERVATION AND EXPERIMENTATION 
Relaying his initial observations to the Surgeon General in July 1914, Dr. 
Goldberger cited English pellagra expert Louis Sambon’s claim that, in Italy, “long 
experience has taught that there is no danger whatever of transmission from the sick to 
the healthy in any collective dwelling within urban precincts.”185 What he had seen in 
the South, Goldberger noted, strongly supported the conclusion that pellagra was not, 
as many American scientists believed, a contagious disease. In institutional settings, 
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such as state asylums, nurses and attendants were often surrounded by the disease. 
Nonetheless, they appeared “uniformly to be immune.”186 Only the patients developed 
pellagra. 
Side-stepping the debate over whether pellagra resulted from spoiled corn or 
some undiscovered infectious agent, Goldberger called attention to the predominance 
of the rural poor among the afflicted. “What important difference,” Goldberger asked, 
“is there between the elements of poverty in our slums and those of poverty in rural 
dwellers?” The difference, he concluded, was one of diet: “studies of urban and rural 
dietaries have shown that on the whole the very poor of cities have a more varied diet, 
than the poor in rural sections.”187 Rather than exposure to an infectious agent or 
spoiled corn, Goldberger speculated that rural southerners developed pellagra as a 
result of a missing element in their diets. In state asylums, where nurses and attendants 
were immune and the patients pellagrous, all received their food from the same source. 
Nonetheless, Goldberger noticed, it was “the attendants, the nurses, who got the nice 
cuts of meat, the glasses of milk.”188 
 
During the summer of 1914, Goldberger collected data and observed cases of 
pellagra in preparation for experimental testing of the dietary hypothesis. At two 
orphanages in Jackson, Mississippi, Goldberger, assisted by other PHS officers, 
compiled information on diet as well as pellagra incidence. Establishing a trusting 
relationship with the orphans and paying close attention to their habits, Goldberger 
became aware of disparities in their diets across age ranges. The younger children, he 
found, were given a few glasses of milk each day. Older children, meanwhile, were 
assigned chores and, as a reward, given additional meat. Moreover, some of the older 
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children confessed, they stole milk and meat when they could. Children between the 
ages of six and twelve, too old to be given additional milk and too young for chores, 
were the most likely to develop pellagra.189 
In September, the Public Health Service began to supplement diets at both 
orphanages, providing the children and staff with a new menu heavy in protein-rich 
foods. Though the PHS-approved menu continued to include carbohydrate-rich 
southern fare such as corn bread and syrup, its prominence was greatly reduced in 
favor of fresh meat, beans, milk, and eggs. Oatmeal was substituted for grits at 
breakfast in the hopes that this would encourage milk consumption.190 
In spring, when pellagra typically reemerged, the orphans appeared healthy. By 
the early summer of 1915, when cases of pellagra would have been approaching full 
bloom, the results of Goldberger’s orphanage study were clear. In one orphanage, 
where 67 children given the new diet had developed pellagra the year before, the 
disease did not recur in a single case. Among ninety-nine other children and adults 
resident, no one else developed pellagra. In the second orphanage, with 105 previous 
cases of pellagra, only one child developed the disease again in the spring of 1915.191 
A similar study, using two groups of inmates at the Georgia State Sanitarium, white 
women and black women, produced the same results: there were no recurrences of 
pellagra among either group.192 
 
As his success in preventing pellagra in the orphanages was becoming clear, 
Goldberger began an attempt to induce pellagra in previously healthy individuals. 
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Relying on his friendly relationship with Mississippi State Board of Health secretary 
Dr. E.H. Galloway, Goldberger was able to persuade Governor Earl Brewer to allow 
him access to inmates at Mississippi’s Rankin Prison Farm. He proposed to “test the 
possibility of producing pellagra in previously healthy men by feeding [them] a one 
side sided, monotonous, principally cereal diet of the type found in previous studies to 
be associated with a high incidence of pellagra.” Governor Brewer agreed to offer 
pardons to twelve inmates in return for their “voluntary” participation in the study. 193 
For Goldberger, the Rankin Prison Farm was an ideal setting for studying 
pellagra. Located in sparsely populated Rankin County, eight miles east of Jackson, 
the farm was largely self-sufficient, producing food for inmates as well as cash crops. 
Its population was made up entirely of adult white men, the “race, sex, and age group” 
which “judging by the available data with respect to incidence… would seem to be 
least susceptible to the disease.”194 The prisoners’ typical diet, moreover, appeared to 
be of high quality. Although pellagra was “fairly prevalent” in surrounding Rankin 
County, Goldberger noted, “no case of the disease had been observed on the farm.”195 
Inducing pellagra among white male adults in an environment previously free of 
pellagra, Goldberger believed, would prove particularly persuasive to those skeptical 
of his dietary theory. For good measure, Goldberger decided to attempt to bring on the 
disease during August or September, “a season when the incidence and the prevalence 
of the disease were normally on the decline.”196 
Beginning on February 4, 1915, twelve prisoners, ranging from age twenty-
four to fifty and including “six who were serving life terms for murder, one a life term 
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for criminal assault” and others serving “terms for manslaughter, bigamy, and 
embezzlement,” were kept under close observation for nearly two months, in order to 
ensure that none had a pre-existing case of pellagra. During this period, the prisoners 
worked the fields and ate the same diet as other prisoners.197 One member of the 
“pellagra squad” attempted to escape and was replaced by a prisoner from the general 
population who had also been under observation. 
The pellagra squad was housed in conditions far superior to those of the 
general inmate population. In the areas where the general population was housed, the 
screening of windows and doors was “incomplete and defective, so that flies and 
mosquitoes had easy access to these quarters.” Their quarters “were inadequately 
looked after and were for the most part dirty and vermin infested.” Over the course of 
Goldberger’s study, “a number of rather sharp attacks of malaria were observed” 
among the general inmate population. While the living quarters of the general 
population offered optimal conditions for the spread of disease, “the quarters of the 
volunteers were regularly and thoroughly cleaned.” In addition, they were provided 
with clean bedding and undergarments. 198 Ensuring a sanitary environment, 
Goldberger hoped to show that pellagra was not the result of filth or outside infection. 
 
On April 19, the prisoners began their new diet. One prisoner, who developed 
an unrelated illness, was later released from the group, leaving eleven subjects. The 
diet consisted entirely of “white wheat flour, corn (maize) meal, hominy grits, 
cornstarch, white rice, granulated cane sugar, cane sirup, sweet potatoes, pork fat, 
cabbage, collards, turnips, turnip greens, and coffee.”199 Most of the food came from 
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the prison’s general supply. Because of the long-standing belief that spoiled corn was 
responsible for pellagra, however, Goldberger and his Public Health Service assistants 
“provided the best quality of both meal and hominy grits obtainable on the local 
market.” The same high quality corn products were provided to the prisoners in the 
general population, who acted as a control group for the study.200 Although atypical in 
its extreme monotony, the prisoners’ diet was essentially an exaggerated form of the 
familiar southern “meat, molasses, and maize” regimen.201 They continued to work, 
though with longer breaks and shorter hours, until they became unable to near the end 
of the experiment. 
After being pardoned and released, one of the prisoners, W.H. English, related 
his experience at Rankin Farm to a reporter in a New Orleans hotel. Weak and 
despondent, he told the reporter he had “been through a thousand hells.” Accepting 
Governor Brewer’s offer of a pardon had resulted in “nine months of torture.” “For the 
first few months,” English explained, “I felt only lazy and stupid… After the first 
three months, I never had a good night’s sleep. It was more of a stupor, accompanied 
by unnatural parching of the skin and occasional sweats.” Near the end of the 
experiment, he became “so weak… that I wouldn’t hardly move… My skin became 
saffron and felt like it was going to crack. We were told to play cards and exercise, but 
did not have the ambition to do it.”202 
Six of the eleven prisoners, Dr. Goldberger reported, had developed 
unmistakable cases of pellagra, which by convention could only be diagnosed 
following the eruption of skin lesions. A team of medical experts confirmed the 
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diagnosis. 203 Although the remaining inmates had not yet developed lesions when the 
experiment was concluded, they exhibited other characteristic symptoms of pellagra. 
“In other words,” Goldberger wrote, “we are of the opinion that every one of the 
volunteers developed pellagra, six or seven with skin lesions and four or five 
without.”204 
The “volunteers” themselves were eager to escape from Goldberger’s 
supervision. Like others afflicted with pellagra, the inmates developed severe 
melancholy and were prone to suicidal thoughts. “Several of us tried suicide during 
the last few months,” English told the reporter, “but we were watched night and day. 
At any time I would have gladly welcomed a bullet.” At least two members of the 
pellagra squad submitted written requests to return to their cells and life sentences. 
Although the Public Health Service and the State of Mississippi offered to provide the 
prisoners a balanced diet following the end of the experiment in order to remedy their 
pellagra, none of the eleven prisoners who made it through the experiment accepted. 
English himself had left immediately for New Orleans and was headed for California: 
“We all just wanted to get away from the scene of our torture.” 205 
Though Goldberger was now confident that he had established “the controlling 
influence of diet in both the prevention and the causation” of pellagra, other students 
of the disease were far from convinced.206 In Mississippi, newspapers heralded 
Goldberger as a local hero. The State Board of Health began an educational program 
based on his recommendation of a diet containing more animal proteins, and he was 
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Figure 9. Mississippi State Board of Health dietary advice, circa 1916, based on 
acceptance of Goldberger’s findings. Source: Mississippi State Board of Health 
Report, June 1st, 1915 to June 30th, 1917, p. 308. 
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made an honorary member of the Jackson Rotary Club. 207 When the Southern Medical 
Association met the week after Goldberger announced his results, however, a 
discussion of pellagra quickly deteriorated into “a sounding board for a vitriolic attack 
on Goldberger, who was not present.”208 
 
RACE, EPIDEMIOLOGY, AND PELLAGRA 
Disputed by proponents of both the spoiled corn theory and the unknown 
infectious agent theory, Goldberger’s results also contradicted those of the well-
regarded Thompson-McFadden Commission, which had reported that pellagra was 
indeed an infectious disease. Basing its conclusions on data gathered in the largely 
white mill towns surrounding Spartanburg, South Carolina, the Commission’s report 
had caused many southern physicians to focus again on the potential connections 
between pellagra and hookworm disease.209 Although Census Bureau statistics seemed 
to show that pellagra disproportionately affected southern blacks and women, the 
Commission’s findings muddied the picture. Within Spartanburg County, the 
commission reported, 45 whites per 10,000 inhabitants were afflicted with the disease, 
while only 9.5 per 10,000 blacks were afflicted. “In other words, while whites are 
present in the population in the proportion of two whites to one negro, there are ten 
white pellagrins to one negro pellagrin.” The meaning of this information was left 
unclear. To the Commission, the relative absence of pellagra among Spartanburg 
County blacks appeared to be related to their absence in the county’s mill towns, 
                                                
207 Etheridge, Butterfly Caste, p. 97-98. 
208 Ibid., p. 98. 
209 E. Mack Parrish, "Epidemiology of Pellagra," Texas State Journal of Medicine XII(1916); William 
Heiskell and Thompson Daederick, Loyd Oscar, The Endemic Diseases of the Southern States 
(Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders Company, 1916), p. 289. 
 98 
which the Commission believed were the sites of unsanitary conditions that fostered 
the spread of pellagra. 210 
Even before the Thompson-McFadden Commission’s report, prominent 
physicians had offered support for the idea that blacks were less likely to develop 
pellagra than whites. Because no southern state was included within the Census 
Bureau’s death registration area until Kentucky achieved adequate vital statistics 
reporting in 1911, early information on pellagra incidence was extremely unreliable. 
Attempting to clarify the underlying facts of the disease, Dr. C.H. Lavinder, the PHS 
officer in charge of pellagra investigations before Goldberger, had collected statistics 
during 1912 that, he believed, indicated that pellagra was largely a white disease. 
Based on a survey of physicians in eight southern states, conducted by mail, Lavinder 
found 2,924 white male cases of pellagra, 931 black male cases, 6,857 white female 
cases, and 3,117 black female cases from 1907 through 1911. In October 1912, he 
presented his findings at the meeting of the National Association for the Study of 
Pellagra in Columbia, South Carolina and published them in the Public Health 
Service’s Public Health Reports.211 
 “It has been thought by many,” Lavinder explained, “that in the South negro 
females have been the worst sufferers from pellagra. But here in a total of nearly 
14,000 cases, reported from States many of which have a large negro population, we 
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Figure 10. Prominence of Blacks Among Mississippi Pellagra Victims . Source: 
Mississippi State Board of Health Report, June 1st, 1915 to June 30th, 1917, p. 338. 
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find that the white females outnumber the negro females and the white males 
outnumber the negro males.” “This shows the folly,” he concluded, “of trying to make 
generalizations on a small number of cases, as has been done hereto-fore.”212 
Lavinder’s conclusions were severely flawed. Although only twenty-five 
percent of the physicians who had received his request for information responded, he 
expressed confidence that “not withstanding faulty methods, I believe the returns give 
us a fairly accurate idea of the extent and prevalence of pellagra in the United 
States.”213 Although the relative prevalence of pellagra among blacks and whites could 
not be determined, even with the most reliable data, without adjusting the number of 
cases according to the proportion of blacks and whites in a given state or area, 
Lavinder presented and interpreted his data unadjusted. He did not address the 
possibility that blacks might be less likely to seek or have access to a physician when 
they came down with pellagra. 
The same year, Dr. Edward Jenner Wood, Chairman of the North Carolina 
State Board of Health’s Pellagra Commission suggested that relative black immunity 
was related to black resistance to hookworm. “I am inclined to think,” Wood wrote, 
“that the difference [in pellagra incidence] is due to the fact that, as Stiles has shown 
so often, the negro is not so susceptible to hookworm disease as the white, and, in fact, 
hookworm disease in the negro race is counted a rare condition. Pellagra shows a 
strong tendency to attach itself to a victim of any chronic disease whose resistance is 
                                                
212 Lavinder, "The Prevalence and Geographic Distribution of Pellagra in the United States," p. 2078. 
Writing in 1911, Lavinder had noted that “although statistics are scant, it seems undoubted that there is 
a marked preponderance of females and, in the Southern States, negro females. With regard to race and 
nationality there is observed no especial immunity or predisposition. It has been said in a general way 
that the negro of the Southern United States is a marked sufferer from the disease; but here again 
statistics are lacking [italics in original].” See C.H. Lavinder, "The Salient Epidemiological Features of 
Pellagra," Public Health Reports 26, no. 39 (1911): p. 1463-64. 
213 Lavinder, "The Prevalence and Geographic Distribution of Pellagra in the United States," p. 2077. 
 101 
lowered, and this is especially true of hookworm disease. It is also a fact that the negro 
in the South is usually better conditioned than the poor white.”214 
Now, the Thompson-McFadden Commission’s report reinforced the idea of 
black resistance to the disease. “Generally speaking,” one study of southern diseases 
asserted, employing data from the Commission and other sources, “pellagra is 
commoner in the white race than in the negro.”215 Virginia physician Beverly Tucker 
wrote that “the Thompson-McFadden Pellagra Commission found that in many of the 
southern states the whites were affected three or four times to the negro’s once, and in 
no state, not even in Mississippi, where the negro population predominates, was 
pellagra as frequent among the negroes.”216 
Texas physician E. Mack Parrish, a critic of Goldberger’s work, outlined the 
apparent connection between black susceptibility to hookworm and to pellagra: “If the 
negro is less susceptible to soil infections, by reason of the character of his skin and 
his long residence in the tropics, we might expect the negro to be less susceptible to 
pellagra, as we find he is.” Goldberger’s dietary hypothesis, he argued, was 
inconsistent with black resistance to pellagra: “surely it will not be found that negroes 
are better nourished than whites.” 217 
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Though Goldberger had hoped, by inducing pellagra in healthy white men at 
Rankin Farm, to add additional weight to his dietary argument, even the seemingly 
straightforward premise that white men were the least likely to develop the disease 
found doubters within the confused and fragmented national discussion of pellagra. 
While misleading, however, the claim that blacks were less susceptible to pellagra 
than whites ultimately had little impact. Aware that the disease had first been observed 
in Spain, France, and Italy, few were willing to blame the prevalence of pellagra on 
southern blacks. As Harry Marks has argued, the general debate over the causes of 
pellagra, however confused, was, given the context, surprisingly race neutral.218 
 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PELLAGRA 
Despite the antagonism that greeted his work, Goldberger continued to refine 
his understanding of the relationship between nutrition and pellagra. Employing the 
statistical expertise of his Public Health Service colleague Dr. Edgar Sydenstricker, 
who had a background in labor economics, Goldberger began to assemble 
comprehensive data on diet and the incidence of pellagra in seven South Carolina mill 
villages.219 Each village investigated was within easy reach of the Public Health 
Service’s pellagra hospital in Spartanburg. Moreover, the villages “had previously 
been studied more or less intensively by the Thompson- McFadden Commission, with 
whose results we thought our own would therefore be more directly comparable than 
if our work were done elsewhere.”220 Operating within the same area, Goldberger 
                                                
218 Marks, "Epidemiologists Explain Pellagra: Gender, Race, and Political Economy in the Work of 
Edgar Sydenstricker," particularly p. 35-36. “Across the political spectrum,” writes Marks, “it seemed 
difficult to talk of disease in the South without invoking race... For the most part, however, pellagra was 
not such a race-identified disease.”  
219 On Sydenstricker’s background and for a critique of his methodology see Ibid. 
220 Joseph Goldberger, "A Study of the Relation of Diet to Pellagra Incidence in Seven Textile-Mill 
Communities of South Carolina in 1916," p. 139-40. 
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hoped to disprove the Commission’s finding that the disease was infectious.221 Well 
aware of the higher proportion of black southerners afflicted with pellagra, Goldberger 
was nonetheless comfortable with pursuing his research in mill towns that were almost 
entirely white. Indeed, he likely viewed this situation as an advantage, since he 
believed that “racial customs and habits” probably played a role in diet. The “few 
Negro families” living in the mill villages were excluded from the study.222 
 
“At first,” Goldberger found, “considerable reluctance was displayed by some 
of the people in speaking of any condition which they believed or suspected to be 
pellagrous; but, as we became better known to the village people, this reserve in large 
measure disappeared.” Ultimately, residents kept the PHS team informed of new cases 
of pellagra and local doctors agreed to cooperate with the study. Most instances of the 
disease, the researchers soon learned, were not reported to physicians. 223 Accurately 
determining the diet of such a large group of individuals, a potentially serious 
challenge to Goldberger’s research, was simplified by the choice of mill villages for 
the study. Nearly every family obtained the majority of its food from mill company 
stores, which, in turn, provided Goldberger and Sydenstricker with detailed records of 
each purchase.224 
Given the results of his previous work, Goldberger was not surprised to find 
that the principal difference between families with cases of pellagra and those without 
                                                
221 See J.F. Siler, Pellagra: First Progress Report of the Thompson-Mcfadden Pellagra Commission of 
the New York Post-Graduate School and Hospital, p. 15; The New York Times, “Pellagra Called 
Infectious Disease: Thompson-McFadden Commission Discounts Maize Theory and Blames Stable 
Fly,” March 15, 1914. “Pellagra,” the commission found, “is in all probability a specific infectious 
disease communicable from person to person by means at present unkown.” The commission also 
rejected the possibility that pellagra was caused by spoiled corn.  
222 Joseph Goldberger, "A Study of the Relation of Diet to Pellagra Incidence in Seven Textile-Mill 
Communities of South Carolina in 1916," p. 139, 40. “Racial customs and habits” apparently refers to 
the possibility that black southerners might be culturally inclined to a diet more likely than that of white 
southerners to induce pellagra. 
223 Ibid., p. 140-41. 
224 Ibid., p. 147. 
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was the presence of animal protein in the diets of those without the disease. 
Demonstrating that both pellagrous and non-pellagrous households ate corn products 
from the same sources in similar quantities, Goldberger and Sydenstricker’s mill 
village studies offered additional support for Goldberger’s claim, also endorsed by the 
Thompson-McFadden Commission, that spoiled corn was not the cause of pellagra.225 
In contrast to the Commission, though, Goldberger and Sydenstricker found that there 
was no consistent correlation between a town’s sanitary condition and the incidence of 
pellagra, casting doubt on some theories of the transmission of pellagra.226 Even more 
importantly, the new data suggested that the victims of pellagra were not only victims 
of poverty, but also victims of location and political economy. In some mill towns, 
poor residents remained entirely free of the disease while, in others, the disease ran 
rampant. 
 
In the years following the Civil War, cotton monoculture had spread far 
beyond the confines of the antebellum cotton belt. The abolition of slavery, the 
antebellum basis for credit and strategies of wealth accumulation in the region, 
resulted in the emergence of sharecropping and other new modes of credit, which 
ultimately gave lenders increased leverage over what crops were grown. 227  Cotton 
was viewed as a trustworthy investment, leading to the demise of truck farming and 
mixed agriculture throughout much of the South. 228 In the western reaches of the 
                                                
225 Ibid., p. 188. 
226 G.A. Wheeler Joseph Goldberger, Edgar Sydenstricker, R.E. Tarbett, "A Study of the Relation of 
Factors of a Sanitary Character to Pellagra Incidence in Seven Cotton-Mill Villages of South Carolina 
in 1916," in Goldberger on Pellagra, ed. Milton Terris (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1964). 
227 Wright, Old South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy since the Civil War, p. 87-88; 
Sutch, One Kind of Freedom, p. 159-60. For a detailed description of credit practices in the postbellum 
American South, see Harold D. Woodman, "King Cotton and His Retainers,"  (Lexington: University of 
Kentucky Press, 1968). 
228 On the massive decline of food output in the postbellum cotton belt, see Sutch, One Kind of 
Freedom, p. 151-52. The steady decline of cotton prices, increased competition from other cotton-
exporting nations, and expansion of regional production put a severe strain on the southern economy. C. 
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South as well as long-dormant cotton regions in the east, plantations and small farms 
began to devote more land to cotton cultivation.229 Upland regions previously engaged 
in mixed agriculture were drawn into the market economy by the postbellum 
infiltration of railroads and soon became the site of an expanding cotton culture. 
Steven Hahn has termed the processes that drew southern farmers deeper into the grip 
of cotton monoculture the “vortex of the cotton economy.”230 The relative prominence 
of cotton monoculture in the areas surrounding the mill towns, Goldberger and 
Sydenstricker came to argue, was the defining factor in their susceptibility to pellagra. 
In a comparative study of two towns, one with high levels of pellagra and one 
free of the disease, Goldberger, Sydenstricker, and their associates compiled 
information on retail grocery establishments, fresh-meat markets, availability of 
produce from nearby farms, ownership of livestock, as well as information on 
agricultural activity in the countryside. The land surrounding the pellagrous village, 
they found, “was planted principally in cotton, and relatively little diversification in 
crops existed. Truck farming on any considerable scale was not engaged in. Few beef 
cattle were raised and milk cows apparently were usually not more than sufficient to 
supply the household needs of the farmers.” These conditions, Goldberger noted, 
“seemed rather typical of the cotton areas in South Carolina. Cotton was the 
predominant crop; all other products were incidental.”231 
 
                                                                                                                                       
Vann Woodward argued that, excepting other factors, “The threefold revolution in labor, land tenure, 
and credit, together with the heritage of military defeat and pillage, would have been enough to keep 
generations of Southern farmers in a slough of depression.” See C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the 
New South: 1877-1913, ed. Wendell Holmes Stephenson and E. Merton Coulter, 10 vols., vol. IX, A 
History of the South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2005), p. 185.  
229 Wright, Old South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy since the Civil War, p. 34-35. 
230 See Hahn, "Roots of Southern Populism." 
231 G.A. Wheeler Joseph Goldberger, and Edgar Sydenstricker, "A Study of the Relation of Family 
Income and Other Economic Factors to Pellagra Incidence in Seven Cotton-Mill Villages of South 
Carolina in 1916," in Goldberger on Pellagra, ed. Milton Terris (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1964), p. 253-54. 
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Table 8. Food Availability. Indicated “by the proportion of households with family 
incomes under the average of the contrasted villages purchasing the specified articles 
from nearby farms,” May 16-30, 1916. 
 
 Non-Pellagrous Village   Pellagrous Village  
 
Avg. 
Quantity 
per 
household 
purchasing Households Purchasing  
Avg. 
Quantity 
per 
household 
purchasing Households Purchasing 
Article Purchased Number 
% of Total 
Households  Number 
% of Total 
Households 
        
Fresh Milk 22.5 qts. 24 51  29.3 qts. 3 4.5 
Butter 3.4 lbs. 23 49  4 lbs 1 1.5 
Eggs 2.9 doz. 19 40.5  6 doz. 1 1.5 
Fresh Vegetables …. 31 66  …. 1 1.5 
Fresh Fruit …. 8 17  …. 0 0 
Poultry 4 lbs 1 2.1  3 lbs 1 1.5 
Any of the Above 
Articles …. 40 83.3  …. 6 9 
None …. 8 16.7  …. 61 91 
  
Source: Adapted from Goldberger, “Relation of Family Income and Other Economic Factors to 
Pellagra Incidence,” p. 254. 
 
The village without pellagra, meanwhile, “was exceptional for South Carolina 
in that a considerable amount of diversified farming was carried on… Cotton was a 
relatively less important crop, and beef cattle, swine, poultry, and milk cows seemed 
much more abundant… Apparently greater emphasis was given to gardens, and the 
amount of truck produced was noticeably larger.” Nestled within the foothills of the 
Blue Ridge Mountains, the land surrounding the pellagra-free village was “quite 
rolling and even hilly… and thus not so well suited to cotton growing.” More isolated 
than the other village, its residents nonetheless had access to fresh meat and produce 
from the surrounding countryside and were, consequently, free from pellagra.232 
Though his conclusions were based on data from only two small southern towns, 
Goldberger suggested that an analogous difference in food availability, rooted in 
                                                
232 Ibid., p. 254-55. The pellagrous village, Goldberger noted, had to compete with the city of 
Spartanburg for meat and produce. 
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cotton monoculture, likely accounted for the concentration of pellagra in the southern 
United States.233 
A political economic disease, Goldberger recognized that pellagra might prove 
extremely difficult to dislodge from the cotton South. He expressed little hope of 
either alleviating the poverty of pellagra sufferers or transforming the agricultural 
practices that surrounded them. Though a campaign to publicize the relationship 
between mono-crop agriculture and pellagra might, optimistically, result in an increase 
in home gardens for growing protein-rich legumes, the political-economic 
underpinnings of the disease appeared, to Goldberger, insurmountable. Until a cure 
other than the wholesale transformation of the southern economy was discovered, 
pellagra would likely continue to be an aspect of life for many poor southerners. 
Fluctuations in the fortunes of cotton farmers, moreover, could quickly result in 
devastating reductions in access to meat and dairy in areas where these products were 
already scarce and pellagra was only barely held at bay.234 
 
NO WORKABLE SOLUTION 
The implications of Goldberger’s analysis were soon borne out. Riding the 
post-World War boom in agricultural prices, southern farmers planted what would 
become 13,440,000 bales of cotton in 1920, the largest crop in years. Despite high 
expectations, however, the year’s investment quickly became a liability. On July 15, 
1920, middling cotton traded at an average of 41.20 cents a pound in New York. By 
                                                
233 “It is readily conceivable,” wrote Goldberger, “that analogous differences may exist between areas 
of great extent such as there is reason to believe actually is the case between the northern and southern 
part of the United States. This difference is probably an important factor… in the notable inequality in 
the incidence of the disease in these two sections of the country.” See Ibid., p. 263, 64. See also Vance, 
Human Geography of the South, p. 438. 
234 See Joseph Goldberger, "A Study of the Relation of Family Income and Other Economic Factors to 
Pellagra Incidence in Seven Cotton-Mill Villages of South Carolina in 1916," p. 264-65. 
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December 15th, the price per pound had dropped to only 15.68 cents.235 Cotton’s 
dramatic collapse had immediate effects on southern public health.  Writing in the fall 
of 1920, Goldberger emphasized the ongoing relationship between crop prices and the 
incidence of pellagra. A substantial outbreak of pellagra, Goldberger argued, “may 
again be observed in the spring of 1921 if the present depression, especially in the 
price of cotton and cotton-textile manufacturing, continues.”236 
 By the summer, it was clear that Goldberger had been correct. Tightening 
credit severely constrained the ability of rural southerners to obtain meat and dairy 
products, resulting in “a markedly increasing prevalence of the disease in many 
localities.” Though the information available to the Public Health Service was 
incomplete, it seemed “probable that the number of cases will be more than double 
what they were last year (1920) in the localities for which information is at hand.” 237 
In one Spartanburg County cotton mill village, the Public Service later reported, “the 
economic depression was followed in 1921 by an increase in pellagra incidence… of 
approximately 150 per cent over the incidence in 1920.”238 
Hoping to draw attention to the pellagra outbreak, the Public Health Service 
released a statement that, along with attempting to explain the relationship between 
pellagra and the southern cotton economy, requested congressional funding for 
immediate relief in the region. The only alternative, Goldberger explained to the New 
York Times, was a shift away from the prevailing southern system of mono-crop 
agriculture: farmers would need to be persuaded to “diversify their crops, or at any 
                                                
235 Arthur S. Link, "The Federal Reserve Policy and the Agricultural Depression of 1920-1921," 
Agricultural History 20, no. 3 (1946): p. 166. 
236 G.A. Wheeler Joseph Goldberger, and Edgar Sydenstricker, "A Study of the Relation of Family 
Income and Other Economic Factors to Pellagra Incidence in Seven Cotton-Mill Villages of South 
Carolina in 1916," in Goldberger on Pellagra, ed. Milton Terris (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1920), p. 263. Originally published in Public Health Reports, vol. 35, no. 46 
(November 12, 1920). 
237 "Economic Depression and Pellagra Incidence," Public Health Reports 36, no. 27 (1921). 
238 Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service of the United States for the 
Fiscal Year 1922,  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1922), p. 26. 
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rate to plant kitchen gardens and to keep pigs, hens, and possibly a milk cow.”239 
Southern politicians and public health workers, the Times reported, were aware of the 
severity of the crisis and eager to receive federal aid.240 Disastrously, however, the 
Public Health Service’s plea for more funding, a coordinated state and federal effort to 
set up clinics and provide adequate food in plantation stores, and help from the Red 
Cross was followed by an inflammatory open letter to the Surgeon General from 
President Warren G. Harding.241 
“I have been greatly concerned,” the President wrote, “to note the public 
statement from the Public Health Service as to the menace of pellagra and condition of 
at least semi-famine in a large section of the cotton belt… Famine and plague are 
words almost foreign to our American vocabulary, save as we have learned their 
meaning in connection with the afflictions of lands less favored and toward which our 
people have so many times displayed large and generous charity.” The President 
requested a full investigation and expressed his belief that “immediate and effective 
measures of amelioration are manifestly demanded if conditions even approximate the 
gravity suggested by the Public Health report. It is unthinkable that we should delay 
for a single day the institution of such measures.” 242 
Though Harding’s message represented an earnest acknowledgement of the 
need to confront a serious and growing problem, it resulted in a noisy and bitter 
backlash against federal intervention by southern politicians and public health 
workers. From Texas to Virginia, local public health officials, including those who 
                                                
239 The New York Times, “Plague Threatens 100,000 Victims in the Cotton Belt: Tenant Farmers, Half-
Starved by Crop Failure, Face Scourge of Pellagra,” July 25, 1921. 
240 Ibid. 
241 Etheridge, Butterfly Caste, p. 147, 49. 
242 See The New York Times, “Orders Relief for Pellagra Victims: Harding Asks Public Health Service 
for Full Report on Cotton Belt Conditions,” July 26, 1921. Harding was alerted to the increase in 
pellagra by reading a New York Times article based on Goldberger’s report. See also The Washington 
Post, “Asks Famine Inquiry: Harding Calls for Health Service and Red Cross to Aid South,” July 26, 
1921. 
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had recently agreed with the Public Health Service’s unabashedly dire assessment, 
denounced Harding’s statement, denying “any unusual number of cases of pellagra, or 
that ‘semi-famine,’ or any economic condition resembling it existed.”243 In Georgia, 
the state senate introduced and unanimously passed a resolution “denouncing the 
reports and asserting that Georgia was not affected by this disease to any appreciable 
extent.” Both Alabama and Virginia claimed that incidence of pellagra had decreased 
in comparison with the previous year.244  
In Congress, southern representatives demanded an investigation into the 
Public Health Service report. South Carolina Representative James Byrnes wrote 
President Harding to assure him that the people of the South were not “menaced with 
famine and are not seeking charity.” Allowing that “pellagra may have increased in 
some one or in several States,” Byrnes hoped that, when the President learned of the 
true situation in the South, he would rescind his earlier statement about “famine and 
plague” and “take appropriate action toward the officials who by misrepresenting 
conditions mislead you into making the statement.”245 
Despite the growing hostility of southern officials to outside help, serious 
offers of assistance emerged in the wake of the PHS announcement. From Chicago, 
the president of the Institute of American Meatpackers wrote to the Surgeon General 
to propose a donation: “Realizing the probable value of a proper quantity of high-
grade proteins in preventing and curing pellagra, the packing industry will be glad to 
donate for use through the Public Health Service… 20,000 pounds of meats; these 
                                                
243 The New York Times, “South Resents Federal Alarm Over Pellagra: Cotton Belt Authorities Declare 
There is No Occasion For Government Aid,” July 27, 1921. See also The New York Times, “Surprise in 
Washington: No Reason Seen to Withdraw Statements on the Situation,” July 27, 1921; The 
Washington Post, “Pellagra Reports Rouse Ire of South: State Officials Deny That Disease Will Spread 
to 100,000 in Cotton Belt,” July 27, 1921. 
244 The New York Times, “South Resents Federal Alarm Over Pellagra: Cotton Belt Authorities Declare 
There is No Occasion For Government Aid,” July 27, 1921; Vance, Human Geography of the South, p. 
438-39. 
245 The New York Times, “Wants Refutation of Pellagra Scare: Byrnes Asks Harding to Go On with 
Investigation and to Punish Federal Officials,” July 31, 1921. 
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meats to be carefully selected by the industry’s scientific experts on nutrition on the 
basis of their adaptability to pellagra patients.”246 The Borden Milk Company, 
meanwhile, offered “to furnish without charge condensed milk for use in combating 
the disease.”247 Although his plan would likely have proven difficult to implement, 
Goldberger outlined an ambitious scheme for getting meat and fresh milk to the 
victims of pellagra.248 
For many southern leaders, Goldberger’s straightforward explanation of the 
disease’s causes cast the region in an unacceptably harsh light. Looking back on the 
southern response to the Public Health Service’s 1921 overtures in 1932, University of 
North Carolina sociologist Rupert Vance noted that “publicity concerning pellagra, 
just as that concerning hookworm, has been deeply resented by the South.” The 
reaction of southern elites to the statements of the Public Health Service and President 
Harding, in Vance’s view, was unsurprising: “It is not necessary to credit this 
resentment to any excessive provincialism. It is natural and to be expected in all 
diseases implying low social and economic standards. To say that an ailment indicates 
ignorance, filth, poverty, or undernourishment of an area has never been known to 
provoke a lively outpouring of gratitude.”249 
 
Faced with concerted opposition from the political representatives of the 
people it sought to help, the Public Health Service was soon forced to drop its 
proposal for a large-scale federal response to the crisis. Southern politicians and public 
health officials rejected offers of private aid, maintaining that they were perfectly 
capable of handling what pellagra existed in the region on their own. The weak 
                                                
246 Ibid. 
247 Etheridge, Butterfly Caste, p. 160. 
248 Ibid., p. 150. 
249 Vance, Human Geography of the South, p. 438-39. 
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capacity of the Public Health Service to deliver services on the ground, along with the 
precarious nature of its growing relationships with southern politicians and public 
health authorities, was clearly illuminated. 
Despite a growing capacity to investigate disease, monitor its incidence to 
some degree, and, in the case of pellagra, accurately predict its upswing, the Public 
Health Service proved unable to meaningfully deal with the outbreak of pellagra when 
it attempted to act. Political opposition, institutional weakness, and, crucially, the 
interconnections between pellagra and the southern economy, rendered the Service a 
bystander. Within six years, however, when the Mississippi River and its tributaries 
flooded, creating a public health emergency in the lower Mississippi valley, 
Goldberger would be prepared with a more workable remedy to the problem of 
pellagra. Although Goldberger remained critical of the southern political economy, the 
experience of 1921 made it clear that emphasizing the role of poverty and deprivation 
in fueling southern pellagra incidence might easily prove counterproductive. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
“Diseases Which Should Be Matters of 
History” 
 
 
American entry into World War I made the South’s daunting public health 
problems an issue of national concern. Though most essential war industries were 
located in the industrial North, a large number of military encampments, unavoidably, 
were in the South. 250 Although the Rockefeller International Health Board continued 
to expand its effort to promote the creation of county health departments within the 
South, endemic malaria, weak or non-existent public health capacity, and poor 
sanitation represented serious and unmistakable threats to the health of soldiers 
stationed in the region.251 
Already equipped with a tentative plan for addressing wartime public health 
concerns in the event that the United States entered the war, the Public Health Service 
was placed by executive order and an act of Congress in charge of “extra-cantonment 
zones,” areas of intensive public health work surrounding army camps that, “because 
of means of communication, transportation, origin of food stuffs, or any other factor, 
[have] a bearing either directly or indirectly upon the state of the health and bodily 
welfare of the troops.”252 By the end of the war, the Public Health Service controlled 
                                                
250 See Benjamin S. Warren and Charles F. Bolduan, "War Activities of the United States Public Health 
Service," Public Health Reports 34, no. 23 (1919): p. 1247-48, 51-52. 
251 Ibid.: p. 1245. 
252 J.A. Watkins, "Extra-Cantonment Zone Sanitation, Camp Shelby, near Hattiesburg, Miss," Public 
Health Reports 32, no. 51 (1917): p. 2149; Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health 
Service of the United States for the Fiscal Year 1918,  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1918), p. 103. See also Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service of the 
United States for the Fiscal Year 1919,  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1919), p. 86-
87. This quotation is from PHS Officer J.A. Watkins. The PHS began planning in February 1917, two 
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forty-eight extra-cantonment zones, eleven in the North and thirty-seven in the 
South.253 Hopeful that they could build upon the successes of wartime cooperation 
between the federal government, states, and counties, Public Health Service Officers 
lobbied for an expansion of the Service’s role and funding for an ongoing program to 
develop county health departments similar to that of the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
International Health Board. Although the Public Health Service failed to secure 
authorization and appropriation for a county health program on the scale initially 
envisioned, its officers relied on a pre-existing source of funding, designated for ill-
defined “studies and demonstration in rural sanitation,” to continue the small-scale 
program that grew out of the wartime extra-cantonment zones, refining public health 
techniques and laying the groundwork for ongoing collaboration between the Public 
Health Service and state and county governments. In the aftermath of the massive 
1927 flood of the lower Mississippi river valley, Public Health Service officers were 
able to convince members of the executive branch and the Congress to support an 
expansion of this program throughout the flooded area. The implementation of new 
public health measures helped public health workers to cultivate local support for their 
efforts. In time, this support would provide the basis for further expansion of the 
program and of the federal government’s authority in local-level public health efforts. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
months before the U.S. entered the war, “On account of the very strained relations existing between the 
United States and certain other countries.” 
253 Bolduan, "War Activities of the United States Public Health Service," p. 1247-48. The PHS 
conducted surveys of sanitary conditions in at least twelve plants producing explosives for the war 
effort. The PHS also supervised sanitary conditions at the explosives plant in Nitro, West Virginia, 
examining potential employees, vaccinating workers, providing medical care, engaging in a variety of 
sanitations efforts, and attempting to reduce occupational health hazards. See ———, "War Activities 
of the United States Public Health Service," p. 1252-55. 
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PUBLIC HEALTH EFFORTS IN EXTRA-CANTONMENT ZONES 
The Camp Shelby Extra-Cantonment Zone, surrounding Hattiesburg, 
Mississippi, was typical of Public Health Service operations in the region.254 Within 
the military encampment itself, the Army handled sanitation. Surrounding it, the PHS 
took control of a fourteen county area with a population of approximately 239,000. 
The Rockefeller International Health Board had recently operated in three counties 
within the extra-cantonment zone, ensuring a pre-existing degree of administrative 
capacity that the Service was able to expand upon. Still, active public health work 
remained fairly rudimentary. Although “an admirable percentage of the registered 
physicians reported the cases of communicable diseases occurring in their practices, 
the reports were made only once a month.” Hookworm incidence had been reduced as 
a result of the International Health Board’s work, and many of the rural communities 
surrounding Camp Shelby had, compared with much of the region, relatively high 
levels of access to sanitary privies. 255 
Nonetheless, the underlying poor health of the extra-cantonment zone was 
inescapable: PHS sanitary engineer Joseph A. LePrince reported that “Malaria prevails 
in the area in which Hattiesburg and Camp Shelby are situated. Anopheles are easily 
found, and conditions at present are favorable to the spread of this disease. The 
situation is serious.”256 The influx of civilian workers, “each with a span of mules or 
team of horses,” into the area surrounding the military encampment compounded the 
pre-existing situation. Overwhelming local resources, workers lived in makeshift 
                                                
254 For a summary of PHS work in all extra-cantonment zones, see Annual Report of the Surgeon 
General of the Public Health Service of the United States for the Fiscal Year 1918, p. 103-60; Annual 
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1919, p. 86-106. A description of extra-cantonment activities near Little Rock, Arkansas, accompanied 
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255 Watkins, "Extra-Cantonment Zone Sanitation, Camp Shelby, near Hattiesburg, Miss," p. 2153; 
Report of the Board of Health of the State of Mississippi, June 1st, 1915 to June 30th, 17, p. 36, 43, 47. 
256 Watkins, "Extra-Cantonment Zone Sanitation, Camp Shelby, near Hattiesburg, Miss," p. 2151. 
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settlements with little access to safe water or sanitary privies, presenting “a sanitary 
problem of major importance.” In Hattiesburg, the “sudden and comparatively great 
increase in population… placed so great a strain upon public utilities, such as gas, 
water, electricity; the sewerage, garbage, and refuse collection system; streets, public 
buildings, toilets, etc., that existing facilities proved entirely inadequate to meet these 
unusual demands.”257 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. “The area around Camp Shelby under special health administration.” 
Source: Watkins, “Extra-Cantonment Zone Sanitation,” p. 2150. 
Note: The area surrounding Gulfport and Biloxi was subsequently made an 
independent Extra-Cantonment Zone. 
                                                
257 Ibid.: p. 2153. 
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Because of uncertainty about the constitutionality of federal health activities at 
the local level, PHS Officer J.A. Watkins was “made the legally authorized agent of 
the State board of health of the State of Mississippi, and, by executive action of this 
board, [was] delegated all legal authority possessed by the State board of health under 
existing laws of the State of Mississippi.” Watkins divided the extra-cantonment zone 
into three parts. In Zone 3, the outermost zone, the PHS monitored food products 
entering Zone 1, collected vital statistics, and attempted to gain the cooperation of 
local physicians. Zone 2 encircled Zone 1, and included “surrounding small towns, 
railroad stations, lumber-mill settlements, and farming centers within one day’s usual 
foot or vehicle travel.” PHS activities in this zone were similar to those in Zone 3, but 
were carried out more exhaustively. 258 
Zone 1, the highest priority, was “an area surrounding the camp site and not 
less than one mile wide at any point.” To the north of the encampment, it spanned 
eleven miles in width and encompassed the town of Hattiesburg. Within this area, the 
PHS proactively confronted pressing public health concerns. Legally absorbed into the 
state public health apparatus, PHS officers enjoyed no greater authority as agents of 
the federal government during wartime than county health officers. Although they 
found existing public health laws “defective,” officers attempted to obtain “desired 
conditions by appeal to civic pride and patriotism and by other means,” rather than 
attempt to get the state legislature or counties to pass new legislation, “to which there 
might possibly be objection, with lack of cooperation, and of which there certainly 
would be much ignorance.”259 
After assuming control, the Public Health Service conducted a house-to-house 
survey of sanitary conditions within Zone 1. Following this, property owners were 
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issued notices asking them “to install a sanitary can in surface privies on their 
premises.” Local restaurants, often filthy and unscreened against mosquitoes, were 
subjected to routine inspection. The cooperation of railroad companies, PHS Officer 
Watkins reported, made it “possible to provide adequate toilet facilities at most of the 
railroad stations.” Though most local physicians were already contributing to the 
collection of vital statistics, the PHS, backed by an executive order from the State 
Board of Health, developed a system for effectively monitoring day-to-day morbidity 
and mortality within the extra-cantonment zone. Particularly in Zones 1 and 2, local 
physicians cooperated in providing daily reports via “mail, telephone, or telegraph, 
depending upon the importance of the matter.” 260 
 
The local population, PHS officers found, was largely unresponsive to the 
upsurge in public health activity. An important obstacle “was the lack of a general 
public sentiment in favor of better public health conditions and the absence of 
knowledge on the part of the community as to the necessity for the acquisition and 
maintenance of a rigid control and for the adoption of measures for the prevention of 
the spread of communicable disease.” Although “the more educated and cultured 
residents of this area appreciated the need for sanitary improvements, the bulk of the 
population did not.” 261 
What public health regulations were in effect had often previously gone un-
enforced. Restrictive measures such as quarantine, which the PHS hoped to use to 
protect soldiers from disease, proved particularly problematic to implement. When an 
outbreak of measles occurred in the area surrounding Camp Shelby soon after the PHS 
took control, community resistance to PHS measures became widespread and overt. 
                                                
260 Ibid.: p. 2156. On morbidity reporting in extra-cantonments zones, see also Bolduan, "War Activities 
of the United States Public Health Service," p. 1250. 
261 Watkins, "Extra-Cantonment Zone Sanitation, Camp Shelby, near Hattiesburg, Miss," p. 2154. 
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Attempts to evade the quarantine were “almost universal.” “There seemed to be a 
general impression that these laws, having never in the past been enforced,” need not 
be enforced “at the present time.” Frustrated public health workers found it difficult to 
convince extra-cantonment residents that “the rules and regulations pertaining to 
public health were in fact not only necessary under existing conditions, but aimed 
toward the permanent good of the community.”262 
 
The need to control malaria was the primary reason for the concentration of 
wartime extra-cantonment zones in the South. Malaria infection had been an important 
problem for soldiers stationed in the South during the Spanish-American War, and 
PHS surveys in the years before American entry into World War I had documented the 
extent of the problem in the region.263 
Once a threat to health throughout the nation, malaria had long since receded 
from most of the northern states in the wake of nineteenth century improvements in 
economic and sanitary conditions.264 Shorter winters, swampy land, and unscreened 
windows, among other factors, enabled the disease to persist in many parts of the 
South. It was particularly severe in the coastal plain, lower Mississippi Valley, and 
western Florida.265 Despite growing knowledge of engineering measures capable of 
robbing mosquitoes of their breeding grounds, public health officials had done little to 
address malaria. “There are few diseases,” Assistant Surgeon General John Trask 
                                                
262 Ibid.: p. 2155. 
263 J.A. LePrince, "Mosquito Control About Cantonments and Shipyards," Public Health Reports 34, 
no. 12 (1919): p. 547; Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service of the United 
States for the Fiscal Year 1917,  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917), p. 19; Annual 
Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service of the United States for the Fiscal Year 
1916,  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1916), p. 19-20. 
264 On the retreat of the disease in the border areas of Indiana, Maryland, Missouri, Kentucky, and 
Virginia, see Kenneth F. Maxcy, "The Distribution of Malaria in the United States as Indicated by 
Mortality Reports," Public Health Reports 38, no. 21 (1923): p. 1136. 
265 Ibid.: p. 1128, 34. 
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reported in 1916, “to which health departments have given so little attention.”266 
Southerners, he believed, had become overly accustomed to malaria’s presence. While 
“an exotic disease which threatens invasion or an occasional malady of which little is 
known will arouse a general clamor,” Trask noted, “ailments which are widely 
prevalent and are thoroughly understood receive the most meager attention.”267 
Before their work in the extra-cantonment zones, PHS officers had gained 
some first hand experience in fighting the disease. In Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina, 
with funding supplied by local textile mill operators, Public Health Service officers 
had led a successful anti-malaria campaign during 1914. Directed by Service officers, 
local workers dug ditches, oiled lakes, and removed blockages from streams. At the 
end of the effort, the PHS reported, “the manager of Roanoke Rapids Mills stated that 
at no time has labor been more efficient and sufficient, attendance more steady, and 
sickness less, and that the returns for the contribution of $1,000 of this one mill were 
more than gained in one month’s… operation of the mill.” A similar effort, backed by 
a local lumber company, was undertaken in Electric Mills, Mississippi.268 
During 1916, the Public Health Service and the Rockefeller International 
Health Board had carried out cooperative experiments in malaria control measures at 
two locations in Arkansas, providing the Service with additional practical experience 
                                                
266 John W. Trask, "Malaria: A Public Health and Economic Problem in the United States," Public 
Health Reports 31, no. 51 (1916): p. 3447. 
267 Ibid.: p. 3445-46. For an explanation of the lack of malaria control efforts that largely blames 
northern indifference, see Public Health Bulletin No. 105: Transactions of the Seventeenth Annual 
Conference of State and Territorial Health Officers with the United States Public Health Service, Held 
at Washington, D.C. June 4 and 5, 1919.,  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1920), 
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of the history of malaria in the United States, see Humphreys, Malaria. 
268 See R.H. von Ezdorf, "Demonstrations of Malaria Control," Public Health Reports 31, no. 10 
(1916). Dr. T.M.W. Long, employed as a health officer by Roanoke Rapids Mills, was instrumental in 
the Roanoke demonstration project. Though the Public Health Service carried out numerous surveys of 
malaria and advised county officials in Mississippi, Missouri, Texas, and Virginia on malaria-control 
methods, Roanoke Rapids represented the Service’s most direct and sustained intervention in the 
southern malaria problem outside of its cooperative work with the International Health Board. PHS 
involvement in Electric Mills, Mississippi was less extensive. 
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in coordinating with local governments to control the disease.269 Along with the PHS’s 
early field demonstrations and surveys, leading Public Health Service officers had 
been involved in the efforts of the U.S. Army’s William Gorgas to protect workers in 
the Panama Canal Zone. PHS sanitary engineer Joseph A. LePrince, in control of anti-
malaria efforts in the extra-cantonment zones, had been General Gorgas’s “right hand” 
first in Havana and then in the Panama Canal Zone. LePrince’s 1915 book, Mosquito 
Control in Panama, was “to remain a bible for mosquito control workers for many 
years.”270 Although little had been done to confront the problem of malaria in the 
American South before 1917, the PHS possessed much of the expertise necessary to 
begin to control the disease in limited areas such as the extra-cantonment zones. 
In the Camp Shelby extra-cantonment zone, the Public Health Service hired 
workers to drain mosquito breeding areas, remove obstacles from waterways, and 
channel and clean ditches. “Oiling operations were carried on, using a truck on which 
was mounted a 200-gallon tank for the general distribution of oil, and by trained 
negroes supplied with knapsack sprayers.”271 The Service’s success in limiting malaria 
transmission during the war was significant: in 1919, Hattiesburg physicians reported 
a nearly 90 percent reduction of malaria incidence in the area.272 Overall, the PHS 
concluded that its wartime malaria control programs resulted in the elimination of 
anopheles mosquito breeding from over 1,2000 square miles.273 
                                                
269 Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service of the United States for the 
Fiscal Year 1917, p. 20; The Rockefeller Foundation International Health Board, Third Annual Report, 
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Table 9. “Extra-Cantonment Areas in which antimalarial work was conducted; the 
total number of miles of territory under supervision in each extra-cantonment zone, as 
well as the number of mile of ditches dug, rechanneled, relined, cleared, etc…” 
 
Extra-
Cantonment Area 
Area Con-
trolled (Mi.2) 
Ditches Dug 
(Miles) 
Reclined, 
Cleared (Miles) Oil Used (Gal.) 
Alexandria, LA 57 51.25 257 26,558 
Alexandria, VA 20 1.7 28.1 3,610 
Americus, GA 13.5 22.5 0 12,200 
Anniston, AL 50 128 0 12,000 
Atlanta, GA 50 128 0 12,000 
Augusta, GA 25 169 0 30,000 
Ayer, Mass. 4.5 9.5 0 3,000 
Charleston, SC 50 50.5 54.5 10,000 
Chattanooga, TN 55 20 0 10,000 
Columbia, SC 25 276 0 23,323 
Columbus, GA 14.5 18.7 0 8,210 
Englewood, NJ 11.5 26 0 Furnished by Army 
Fayettville, NC 28 53.6 0 2,000 
Fort Worth, TX 38 11.3 100 7,000 
Greenville, SC 25 20 46 1,585 
Gulfport, MS 27 105.8 129.2 16,600 
Hattiesburg, MS 28.5 117 29 52,000 
Houston, TX 35 87 14.5 10,200 
Jackson, MS 9 65 0 Furnished Locally 
Jacksonville, FL 12 106 0 2,500 
Lake Charles, LA 15 11 18 2,500 
Little Rock, AR 65 252 0 75,732 
Lonoke, AR 12 76 0 10,345 
Louisville, KY 75 52 0 1,500 
Macon, GA 26 92 35.5 39,132 
Millington, TN 16 6 30 30,000 
Montgomery, AL 85 129 177 23,260 
Muscle Shoals, AL 57 11.1 35.7 14,500 
Nashville, TN Control exercised within city/area about Old Hickory powder plant 
Newport News,VA 50 50 110 15,000 
Odenton, MD 20 17.7 16.3 Furnished by Army 
Petersburg, VA 10 32 74 763 
Portsmouth, VA 23.3 71 65.3 1,830 
Raleigh, NC 16 22.9 67.7 10,000 
San Antonio, TX 52 4.3 70 650 
Spartanburg, SC 20 12.8 45 5,000 
Waco, TX 72 7.8 0 1,372 
West Point, MS 20 37 0 8,000 
Wilmington, NC 15 37.23 17.56 0 
Total 1,227.80 2,441.68 1,420.36 289,754 
Source: Surgeon General’s Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1919, p. 102. 
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Throughout the South, the Public Health Service found local governments 
happy to cooperate in anti-malaria efforts. Southern towns, “as well as the counties in 
which they are located, contributed liberally toward mosquito-control measures in 
order to protect our military forces and make camp life pleasant for our sailors and 
soldiers.”  “The support given by the public of the South and the officials who 
represent them, even in the relatively poor and sparsely settled districts” the PHS 
concluded, “deserves highest commendation.” Railroad corporations, similarly, “gave 
strong support and willingly did such drainage work as was requested.”274 
For communities and businesses constrained by the unwillingness of outsiders 
to expose themselves to malaria and the severe effects of the disease on worker 
productivity, the economic benefits of permanent mosquito control through 
engineering often represented a compelling reason to cooperate with the PHS.275 
Corporations, PHS sanitary engineer LePrince reported, “are fully aware that an 
absence of mosquitoes has an important bearing on the availability and efficiency of 
skilled and unskilled labor as well as on the proper development of real-estate values.” 
In an argument that was quickly becoming commonplace, LePrince maintained 
that “it often costs a community, and the citizens of it personally, much more to 
support a mosquito nuisance than to eliminate it.” “The president of a large association 
of cotton-mill interests,” he continued, “has stated that the elimination of mosquitoes 
near the mill properties has paid a higher return on the money expended than any other 
investment that the corporation has ever made.”276 Malaria control efforts in coastal 
                                                
274 LePrince, "Mosquito Control About Cantonments and Shipyards," p. 552; Annual Report of the 
Surgeon General of the Public Health Service of the United States for the Fiscal Year 1919, p. 93. 
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Mississippi, LePrince predicted, would soon make “the local advantages of that 
residential area… more apparent to the public at large. It is now the longest known 
stretch of our southern seacoast practically free from the malaria-conveying mosquito, 
and without doubt this far-sighted, progressive, and patriotic policy [of local financial 
support] will soon pay well as a financial investment, as it has done in many instances 
elsewhere.”277 
 
THE LEVER RURAL HEALTH BILL: “INTERSTATE” DISEASE, 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE 
Like the Rockefeller Foundation before it, the Public Health Service learned 
from experience the ongoing nature of “the problem of rural sanitation” and came to 
recognize the need for permanent public health infrastructure. Already at the forefront 
of research into diseases such as pellagra and malaria, members of the Service 
perceived an opportunity retain and even expand the PHS role in rural sanitation once 
the demand for an emergency effort had passed. During the war, cooperation and 
funding from local governments proved crucial to the success of public health efforts 
in the extra-cantonment zones. In some counties, a special appropriation from 
Congress for “special studies of and demonstration work in rural sanitation,” 
originally intended to fund sanitary surveys and temporary demonstration projects in 
disease control, had been used to help secure local matching funds for projects such as 
                                                
277 Ibid.: p. 548. Elsewhere, LePrince wrote that, as northerners who had witnessed the containment of 
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Journal 13, no. 6 (1920). 
 125 
the construction of sanitary privies.278 Achieving noticeable results and stimulating 
local interest in public health, Public Health Service officers came to believe that 
wartime cooperation between the federal government, states, and counties could be 
extended into peacetime in a federal program for promoting the growth of county 
health departments similar to that of the International Health Board.279  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the war, PHS officers began to push openly for 
an expanded federal government role in public health at the local level. With the 
support of the American Conference of State and Provincial Health Authorities, the 
American Public Health Association, and a few sympathetic members of Congress, the 
PHS offered a strong critique of the overall lack of coordination in American public 
health. During the war, movement of troops, civilian populations, and the need to 
quickly establish partnerships between local officials, the Public Health Service, and 
the Red Cross had exposed grave weaknesses in the existing system. The “Spanish” 
influenza pandemic, ongoing during the winter of 1918-1919, further highlighted the 
need for coordination between state, federal, and local authorities. In addition, some 
health-related functions, notably the collection of mortality statistics and regulation of 
                                                
278 Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service of the United States for the 
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food and drugs, remained under the control of federal agencies other than the Public 
Health Service. President Wilson, PHS officers noted, had acknowledged the potential 
danger of this situation. Recognizing that “unless some plan of effective coordination 
was devised, there would be much duplication and waste of effort in this important 
field,” Wilson had issued an executive order in July 1918 placing the PHS in charge of 
all non-military federal public health functions.280 A return to the status quo might 
mean that the nation would be unprepared the next time it faced an unanticipated 
health emergency. 
Little over a week after the war’s end, the Public Health Service’s leaders 
signaled their intentions. “It seems essential at this time,” Treasury Secretary William 
McAdoo, President Wilson’s son-in-law and the Surgeon General’s immediate 
superior, wrote Wilson on November 21, 1918, “that the Federal Government assume 
some measure of leadership in aiding and stimulating States, counties, and 
municipalities in improving their sanitary conditions, especially as the Public Health 
Service in its work of supervising sanitary conditions in extra cantonment and 
industrial areas has greatly extended and crystallized its experience in the best 
measures for improving the sanitary conditions of communities.” “While the war has 
revealed the deplorable conditions of the public health and has accentuated the need of 
corrective measures,” McAdoo continued, “these conditions have not changed since 
the signing of the armistice, and the need for their correction is just as great, if not 
greater than ever.” 281 
On December 3rd, the Public Health Service presented its plan for an expanded 
post-war federal presence in public health to the Congress. Relying on the experience 
                                                
280 Bolduan, "War Activities of the United States Public Health Service," p. 1244; B.S. Warren, 
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of the PHS in coordinating with local officials during the war, part of the Service’s 
plan called for “Federal aid extension for establishment and maintenance of adequate 
county health organizations,” dependent on a matching funds formula similar to that of 
the Rockefeller International Health Board. The county and state would provide half 
of the money, and the federal government the rest. Federal expertise would be 
employed in the development of county health practices, and, following the pattern of 
legal integration of federal and state roles adopted during the war, the county health 
officer would be appointed “as field agent of the Public Health Service at [a] nominal 
salary.” The rudiments of an integrated national public health system, resting on 
county health boards, would be built from the bottom up. The Public Health Service 
would act as an initial source of funding, a source of practical expertise, and a 
clearinghouse for state and national health data. 282 
Dr. Leslie Lumsden, the native Virginian who had been in charge of 
cooperative extra-cantonment work funded with the PHS’s “rural sanitation” 
appropriation during the war, explained the necessity of a more permanent program to 
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on December 10th in words 
reminiscent of the earlier findings of the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission: “We have 
concluded, that what is needed is not one whirlwind campaign- after which the people 
are left to forget the teaching- but a persistent campaign, and to have this it is 
necessary to have in the county a permanent health organization, directed by a man 
there with proper knowledge and proper qualifications to do the work, to look after the 
health interests of the community.”283 
 
                                                
282 Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service of the United States for the 
Fiscal Year 1919, p. 18. 
283 Rural Sanitation: Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House 
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In Congress, South Carolina Representative Asbury Lever, the Chairman of the 
House Agriculture Committee, was eager to expand upon wartime sanitary 
improvements in his home state and to continue the flow of federal resources into the 
South. Lever followed up on the PHS initiative by introducing a bill modeled on the 
Service’s proposal for federal grants-in-aid in support of county health work.284 A 
driving force behind the 1914 Smith-Lever Agricultural Extension Act, which 
“provided for a ‘cooperative’ effort between the federal government and state land-
grant universities to carry practical scientific information about farming and home 
economics to farm families,” Representative Lever embraced the PHS’s contention 
that the lack of public health capacity in rural America could be addressed through a 
similar cooperative program.285 His proposed Rural Health Act would authorize an 
initial appropriation of $250,000 for cooperative health work, which would in time 
grow to $1 million a year.286 The federal government’s role in protecting health in the 
wartime extra-cantonment zones, if the Lever bill passed, would be expanded into a 
permanent role in the development of county health services.287 
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Attempting to justify the creeping expansion of the Public Health Service’s 
activities and persuade Congress to support its cooperative county health plan, PHS 
officers emphasized the “interstate” nature of disease, the retarding economic effects 
of endemic disease, and the impact of ill health on the ability of the nation to raise an 
army in time of war. 
Disease, high-ranking PHS officers maintained, was an interstate matter, 
inherently of interest to the federal government. Speaking before the Birmingham, 
Alabama Civic League, Assistant Surgeon General Benjamin Warren made the case 
against the functional separation of federal and state power. “A case of typhoid fever 
in a remote rural district of Alabama,” Warren argued, “is a matter of joint interest to 
the county, State, and Federal health authorities. The typhoid germ does not recognize 
county or State lines and may find its way into intra and interstate traffic and cause the 
loss of many human lives and the expenditure of large sums of State and Federal 
funds.” The nation’s disorganized public health activities, he concluded, needed to be 
integrated. “The rational procedure would be to form the partnership [of county, state, 
and federal health agencies] and prevent or control all preventable diseases at the 
source.”288 
Well-developed over the course of the hookworm campaign, the economic 
rationale for public health measures gained additional prominence as a result of the 
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apparent positive economic impact of anti-malaria programs in the wartime extra-
cantonment zones. Getting rid of disease, PHS officers confidently explained, would 
more than pay for itself through improvements in worker productivity. “It may be 
safely stated,” Assistant Surgeon General Warren maintained, “that if Alabama would 
free itself from malaria the increase in the taxable values of the State would meet all 
the expenses.”289 
The prevention of malaria, Dr. Leslie Lumsden told an Agriculture Committee 
hearing on Representative Lever’s Rural Health Act, “is tremendously important to the 
agricultural interests of this country. A man with chronic malaria, though able to keep 
going, only goes at half-speed.” “There have been various estimates of how much 
malaria costs in the way of decreasing producing power in the infected districts. The 
annual loss in this country from malaria and typhoid fever alone has been estimated at 
$900,000,000.” 290 Surgeon General Rupert Blue, speaking before the sympathetic 
American Public Health Association, explained that endemic malaria in the South 
“interferes, to an extent but little appreciated, with the economic development of the 
nation.”291 
Data collected by the Public Health Service in the preceding years gave weight 
to these claims. “Recent surveys in the South,” the Service reported in March, “show 
that the crop yield by plantations where malaria prevails is only a fraction of what it 
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normally should be. Just at the time when the crops need most attention, chills and 
fever keep a large number of laborers from work.” Fairly straightforward control 
measures, such as oiling and drainage, would quickly benefit malarious southern 
communities. In areas where lumber companies had initiated anti-malaria measures, 
there had been “a marked increase in the output of lumber with practically the same 
overhead charges.” 
Before the Civil War, the widespread presence of malaria had often been called 
upon as justification for the enslavement of blacks, who, it was argued, were better 
suited to work in malarial conditions than whites. Now, longstanding beliefs about the 
relationship between malaria and race were deployed to justify public health 
interventions likely to benefit all southerners. The economic prosperity of southern 
whites, the PHS report on malaria concluded, was particularly constrained by the 
geography of malaria. “There is practically no instance known,” the Service found, “of 
a white community thriving where malaria seriously prevails.”292 
Assistant Surgeon General Henry Rose Carter, a veteran of the yellow fever 
and malaria control efforts in Havana and Panama, Nobel Prize nominee, and leading 
figure in the Service’s anti-malarial efforts, elaborated this point. While whites had 
been able to prosper in Yellow Fever-stricken cities such as Havana and New Orleans, 
they were incapable of flourishing where malaria prevailed: “I defy you to show me 
one single place inhabited by white people where malaria seriously prevails which is 
prosperous. It does not exist. It eliminates the white population and leaves a sparse 
settlement of blacks, whom we find extremely backward and ignorant, partly from 
their segregation and partly from the fact that practically all their childhood, when 
                                                
292 "Malaria: A Serious Health Problem of Nation-Wide Concern," p. 545. 
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they should be at school, is spent shaking with chills. It ruins a community.”293 
Controlling malaria would open large parts of the South to further settlement and 
allow white southerners to make the most of the region’s natural resources. 
Beyond the increasingly undeniable economic effects of disease, the recent 
military draft had made clear the effects of ill health on the nation’s military 
preparedness. The Service’s plan for its own post-war expansion, as presented to 
Congress, placed this issue front and center. The urgency of the nation’s health 
problems, the proposal’s introduction plausibly maintained, was “indicated by the fact 
that in the recent draft over 34 per cent of all registrants were rejected by examining 
boards on account of physical defects and diseases.”294 
 Military officials had quickly noticed that southern troops appeared more 
susceptible to contagious diseases than those from the rest of the nation. Rates of 
disease varied vastly among camps, and army officials soon determined that “high 
disease and death rates were almost exclusively confined to troops from the Southern 
States.” In part, this was because southern troops, who came largely from rural areas, 
had not been exposed to the respiratory ailments carried by troops from the urban 
North. Beyond this, the Army’s Surgeon General reported, “Southern troops appear 
                                                
293 Ibid.: “Malaria: Its Importance, National and State Problems Involved,” p. 42. Carter also served on 
the Rockefeller Foundation’s Yellow Fever Commission. In 1938, the PHS named a new laboratory 
dedicated to malaria control in Savannah, Georgia after Carter, who died in 1925. 
294 Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service of the United States for the 
Fiscal Year 1919, p. 17. The Rockefeller Foundation, similarly, pointed to the severe effects of disease 
evidenced during the war. In 1919, the Rockefeller International Health Board reported that the 
“examinations for hookworm disease made among United States soldiers confirmed in a striking way 
the Board’s experience of the past few years, and demonstrated that even light hookworm infections are 
of great importance. Judged by the Benet-Simon [a test of cognitive ability] and other tests, many full-
grown soldiers who harbored comparatively few hookworms had the mentality of persons only twelve 
years of age. The mentality of 10,000 white men at Camp Travis who harbored the disease was about 
33 per cent below normal. Negroes were infected quite as frequently as whites, but they appeared to be 
relatively immune to the serious effects of the disease and did not show the same predisposition to other 
diseases or the same reduction in mentality.” See The Rockefeller Foundation International Health 
Board, Fifth Annual Report, January 1, 1918- December 31, 1918, p. 31. A newspaper account of this 
finding may be found in The New York Times, “Draft Army Proved Hookworm A Blight,” November 
28, 1919. 
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physically less robust than those from other sections, doubtless due in part to the 
widespread dissemination among them of such debilitating diseases as hookworm, 
malaria, and pellagra.” Already weakened by disease, southern troops proved 
“relatively less familiar with the fundamental elements of personal hygiene and 
sanitation than are those from other sections of the country.”295 
 
Dr. Leslie Lumsden, writing in November 1919, summarized both the scope of 
the problem and the rationale for federal intervention by tying together rural health, 
the health of the nation, and military preparedness: “The cross section of our health 
conditions, furnished by the physical examination of the draftees, presents evidence 
which should be convincing even to the most obtuse that we- and by ‘we’ I mean the 
individual, the community, and the local, State, and National Governments- have 
seriously and fearfully neglected the most important factor in our national 
development- our human power.” 
Poor sanitary conditions in the rural areas of one state, Lumsden wrote, “are, 
through commerce and otherwise, a menace to contiguous States especially; and, on 
account of modern transportation facilities, a menace to the whole country. Having 
such an important bearing on the character of farm products shipped from one State to 
others, and having such an important bearing on the ability of our whole Nation to 
raise and maintain armies for the common defense, the problem of rural sanitation 
appears to be one with which the National Government under constitutional authority 
may deal, and one with which the National Government from a standpoint of general 
welfare should deal.”296 
 
                                                
295 Report of the Surgeon General, U.S. Army, to the Secretary of War, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 
1918,  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1918), p. 280-81. 
296 Lumsden, "Rural Hygiene," p. 2524-24. 
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Despite high hopes, the Lever Rural Health Bill did not move quickly through 
Congress. Though members of the Public Health Service and other supporters of the 
bill, such as prominent North Carolina health officer Dr. Watson Rankin, appeared 
before Representative Lever’s Agriculture Committee in February 1919 and received a 
generally warm reception, the end of the war found Congress eager to cut back 
government spending and programs, rather than expand them. In June, Dr. Rankin 
urged his fellow state health officers, gathered for their annual conference with the 
Public Health Service in Washington, to take the time to lobby their senators and 
congressmen on behalf of the bill.297 
Rather than rallying the nation’s collected health officers to the cause of 
cooperative rural sanitation, however, Rankin’s speech prompted Dr. Eugene Kelley, 
health commissioner of Massachusetts, to remind his colleagues of sectional 
differences in the need for federal help in public health work. While he personally 
supported the bill, Kelley told his fellow health officers, he understood why his state’s 
political representatives were unlikely to back it in Congress. “To be perfectly frank 
between ourselves,” he continued, “there are some States that are not financially 
benefited from this act. My state is one them. We stand to lose. Practically all the other 
large industrial States are in the same position… You can not expect and it is not 
human nature to expect [urban and industrial states] to get highly enthusiastic over the 
principles contained in the Lever Bill.”298 
Ohio’s public health commissioner, Dr. Allen Freeman, who had served as the 
director of the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission’s anti-hookworm effort in Virginia 
before moving to Ohio, acknowledged and attempted to justify the apparent sectional 
                                                
297 Public Health Bulletin No. 105: Transactions of the Seventeenth Annual Conference of State and 
Territorial Health Officers with the United States Public Health Service, Held at Washington, D.C. 
June 4 and 5, 1919., “Report of Committee on Rural Sanitation,” p. 15. 
298 Ibid., p. 16. 
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nature of the Rural Health Act.299 “So far as Federal Aid is concerned,” Freeman told 
his fellow state health officers, “I think we can get along in Ohio without it.” Still, he 
realized, “having worked a large part of my time in the South, that a Federal subsidy 
supplemented by a State subsidy is of the greatest value in stimulating the progress of 
the work.” 
“There are many counties in the South,” Freeman continued, “whose economic 
condition is such as to make it wholly impossible for them, without some sort of aid, 
to sustain an adequate health administration.” Following up on the argument of PHS 
Officer J.W. Schereshewsky, who had responded to Dr. Kelley of Massachusetts’s 
comments by reasserting the Service’s stance that disease incidence in any one state 
inevitably affected all others, Dr. Freeman attempted to bolster the claim that the Rural 
Health Act would benefit the entire nation: “it is not a question of north or south. 
Rhode Island and South Carolina and Ohio and Texas are all tied together in the same 
bag, and we are going to progress in sanitation as in every other line just so far as we 
progress together.”300 Federal money would head south, but it would do so for the 
benefit of the nation. 
Hoping to patch over the evident differences among his colleagues, Colorado’s 
health officer launched into a speech detailing the interconnectivity of urban and rural 
America, including mention that a grapefruit he had eaten for breakfast “a week or two 
ago” in New York City “was doubtless raised in a grapefruit grove in a rural district in 
Florida,” while the butter on his toast “probably came from a rural district in Illinois.” 
Despite his best efforts, however, the southern tilt of the legislation remained 
                                                
299 Ettling, Germ of Laziness, p. 136. After leading one of the nation’s leading state departments of 
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unmistakable. Although other parts of the nation, particularly the West, were likely to 
benefit from federal intervention in local public health matters, it was the southern 
United States where the public health threat was most severe, and it was the southern 
United States where local governments were least capable of confronting threats to 
public health. 
 
THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE’S RURAL 
COOPERATIVE INITIATIVE 
While the Lever Rural Health Act stalled in Congress, Public Health Service 
officers did what they could to keep their relationships with state and county 
governments alive. Using money from the $150,000 wartime appropriation for 
“studies and demonstrations in rural sanitation,” rural sanitation director Dr. Leslie 
Lumsden and his subordinates continued to pursue cooperative projects with local 
public health authorities after the war’s end in November 1918. Granted during the 
preceding summer, this money was also being used to fund ongoing studies of 
malaria.301 It seemed increasingly unlikely, however, that the hoped-for Rural Health 
Act would be passed in time for the upcoming fiscal year, which would begin in July 
1919. The Sundry Civil Bill for Fiscal Year 1920, which contained the ongoing 
appropriation for “rural sanitation,” was delayed long enough that uncertain PHS 
officers found it difficult to plan for even a limited federal-state-county cooperative 
program. Worse, when the appropriation came, in July 1919, it became evident that 
PHS expansion into cooperative rural health projects was slated to become a victim of 
post-war retrenchment. The appropriation for “studies in rural sanitation,” which 
                                                
301 See Hearings before Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations in Charge of Sundry 
Civil Bill for 1919,  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1918), p. 248. 
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Service officers had hoped might be as high as $500,000, had been reduced to only 
$50,000.302 
“On account of the reduction in the appropriation,” a somewhat irritated Leslie 
Lumsden wrote, “the work in a considerable number of areas in which it was yielding 
excellent results had to be discontinued.”303 Nonetheless, receiving any appropriation 
was something of a victory. The end of the war and absence of an unambiguous 
mandate, such as passage of the Lever Rural Health Bill, from Congress, cast some 
doubt on the legitimacy of the Public Health Service’s ongoing cooperative initiative. 
Beginning in 1914, the “rural sanitation” appropriation had been used to survey 
sanitary conditions in rural areas throughout the United States. Intended to be national 
in scope, the PHS effort surveyed seven southern counties and eight counties outside 
of the region.304 Following American entry into the war, however, this appropriation 
was transformed into a means for pursuing cooperative programs almost exclusively in 
southern extra-cantonment zones. 305 
                                                
302 Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service of the United States for the 
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Questioning Surgeon General Rupert Blue and Assistant Surgeon General J.W. 
Schereschewsky in the summer of 1918, South Carolina Representative James Byrnes 
noted that the appropriation for rural sanitation did not appear to be being used for its 
original purpose: “Then, you have really abandoned the idea of investigating the 
questions of rural sanitation, and have been using this fund in extra-cantonment 
work?”306 Although the Service had secured far less money than it had hoped for to 
pursue the new initiative and possessed at best a vague mandate from a largely 
indifferent Congress, the PHS had not been forced to completely abandon the rural 
health efforts pioneered during the war.307 
 
Leslie Lumsden’s experiences in and dedication to rural health work made him 
a strong advocate for the continuation of the precarious PHS cooperative program. 
Along with the Public Health Service’s Norman Roberts and Charles Wardell Stiles, 
Dr. Lumsden had helped to design the “L.R.S.” sanitary privy, the model for privy 
construction employed by the Rockefeller Foundation, state health boards, and the 
Public Health Service in anti-hookworm and anti-typhoid efforts.308 During 1911, in a 
pioneering PHS demonstration effort in Yakima County, Washington, Lumsden had 
helped to create one of the nation’s first full-time county health departments. Since 
then, the Yakima health department had flourished, and a county once ravaged by 
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typhoid was now comparatively healthy.309 Having next supervised surveys of sanitary 
conditions in rural America and then supervised federal-county cooperative 
agreements during the war, Lumsden was intensely, and perhaps surprisingly, 
optimistic about the potential for good represented by federal money and expertise. 
In many rural communities, he believed, individuals were simply unaware of 
the role that unsanitary conditions played in causing disease. Speaking before the 
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Lumsden detailed conditions 
in one southern county surveyed by the Public Health Service. Seventy-three percent 
of the homes were “without a toilet of any kind. Grown women went to the brush or 
behind the barn to respond to the calls of nature. The matter was left on the surface of 
the ground; flies had immediate access to it… It was left there, and if some one on the 
place happened to be a carrier of the hookworm the eggs were left there to develop 
into the infective stage of the worm, which might crawl into the skin of the bare hand 
or bare foot that came along.” 
“This was a county of good people,” he told the committee, “the salt of the 
earth, people who were intelligent about most things that concerned them; good 
farmers among them, raising good crops, but they didn’t know about the essential 
principles of home sanitation. They had never heard of them.” Revolutionary advances 
in scientific knowledge of the diseases that plagued the county, such as hookworm, 
typhoid, and malaria, had not yet reached its residents. This county, Lumsden 
reported, was typical of much of rural America. Asked why their neighbors had 
developed typhoid fever, he continued, the “answers varied from ‘The Lord sends it’ 
                                                
309 On the significance of the work in Yakima from the perspective of Lumsden, see John Ferrell and 
Pauline Mead, Public Health Bulletin No. 222: History of County Health Organizations in the United 
States, 1908-33 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1936), p. 2-4. 
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to ‘the devil brings it,’ and between those two extremes we had almost every 
conceivable answer in canvassing 100,000 homes in different parts of the country.”310 
Lumsden viewed an understanding of local conditions as crucial for the 
success of public health work. Ideally employing as health officer a “properly 
qualified man” from the county, who “knows the people and knows the general 
conditions,” Lumsden believed that Public Health Service-backed health departments 
would be able to gain the trust of local communities and persuade residents to begin 
altering their daily habits and living conditions. After rural residents experienced the 
good that could come from public health interventions such as anti-malaria work, he 
explained, they “realize that the money they pay in taxes for a real health adviser is a 
good investment.”311 Ultimately, the worth of federally-stimulated county health 
departments would be measured by their ability to prevent, rather than treat, disease: 
“The object of this whole business is to teach the people what they can do to protect 
themselves against disease so they will not have diseases which are common and 
which should be matters of history.”312 
 
Beginning in July 1919, the Public Health Service devoted its first postwar 
“rural sanitation” appropriation to funding cooperative work in thirty-one counties, all 
but three located in the South.313 Along with the $50,000 allotted by Congress, the 
PHS had “about $9,000 unexpended under previous contracts” to dedicate to the 
program. County and State governments put up an additional $175,093, while “civic 
sources, such as local health associations, Red Cross chapters, and the [Rockefeller] 
                                                
310 Rural Sanitation: Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House 
of Representatives, Sixty-Fifth Congress, Third Session, on H.R. 3549, December 10, 1918, p. 26-27. 
311 Ibid., p. 22. 
312 Ibid., p. 29, 38. 
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International Health Board” provided approximately $54,000 to back up the PHS’s 
work. That local governments had dedicated so much money to the effort, Lumsden 
wrote proudly in his first annual report on the cooperative work, “indicates 
unmistakably that such investment of Federal funds stimulates to a significant degree 
State, county, and municipal governments to invest in the business of rural health 
promotion.”314 
A full-time county health officer headed all of the PHS-supported cooperative 
county health efforts; the officer’s staff typically consisted of a full-time sanitary 
inspector and nurse. In all but eleven counties, located in Virginia, the county health 
officer was a physician.315 Following the precedent set during the war, the county 
health officer was also “given a status of field agent in the Public Health Service 
and… a status of deputy State health officer.” “Thus,” Lumsden explained, “his 
position is an example of common-sense coordination of the administrative features of 
the activities of the properly constituted local, State, and National governmental health 
agencies.” As long as the counties and states consented to the agreement, federal, 
state, and local public health authority would be functionally consolidated and any 
ongoing uncertainty about the proper limits of federal intervention in local public 
health matters could be brushed aside. 
“In every instance,” Lumsden wrote, hammering home the point that the 
program did not represent an intrusion on state police power, “the cooperation of the 
Public Health Service is extended only in response to formal requests from the proper 
governmental authorities of the county and from the State health department.” 
Moreover, Lumsden argued, demanding that the county health officer meet federal 
                                                
314 Lumsden, "Cooperative Rural Health Work of the Public Health Service in the Fiscal Year 1920," p. 
2334. 
315 In these counties, discussed below, the health officer was not a physician, but rather a trained 
sanitarian. 
 142 
standards, rather than simply enjoy the favor of the local county commissioners or 
other notables, would ensure that the post would be somewhat depoliticized.316 
 
Cooperative health work began with a county survey, conducted by a 
representative of the State Board of Health, a Public Health Service representative, or 
both together. After assessing the situation, the nascent county health board began 
implementing rural health measures developed by the Public Health Service in an 
order suited to the particular circumstances of the county. In determining the priority 
and sequence of public health measures, the county health officer enjoyed “the 
advantage of advice and counsel from broadly experienced representatives of the State 
board of health and the Public Health Service.” County work included “safeguarding 
of water and food supplies, sanitary excreta disposal, fly control, antimalarial 
measures, infant hygiene, school inspection, antituberculosis and antivenereal disease 
measures, [and] industrial hygiene.”317 
Much of the effort consisted of sanitary inspections of private homes, schools, 
churches, and stores. From July 1919 to July 1920, PHS-directed public health 
workers examined 32,663 southern schoolchildren. Health officers and public health 
nurses also tried to spread knowledge of sanitary measures and other means of 
preventing disease through public lectures and home visits. Meanwhile, anti-malarial  
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p. 2481. 
 143 
Table 10. Public Health Service Cooperative Work in the South, Fiscal Year 1920. 
 
Lectures Given 823 
Homes Inspected 144,648 
Schools Inspected 1,085 
Churches Inspected 95 
“Stores, Markets, etc.” Inspected 16,190 
School Children Examined 32,663 
Visits by Public Health Nurses 19,044 
Typhoid and Smallpox Immunizations 28,168 
Hookworm Treatments 840 
Venereal Disease Treatments 18,304 
Visits by P.H. Officer or His Assistant 3,509 
Sanitary Privies Installed 15,422 
New Sewer Connections 1,568 
New Water Connections 622 
Source: Adapted from Lumsden, “Cooperative Rural Health Work,” 1920, p. 2330-2333. 
 
work remained a high priority.318 Venereal disease control, an important consideration 
in the wartime extra-cantonment zones, also remained prominent in the postwar 
cooperative efforts.319 From July 1919 to July 1920, county health authorities treated 
18,304 cases of venereal disease in southern counties participating in the cooperative 
program. The new county health organizations also engaged in and encouraged 
preventive measures such as the construction of sanitary privies and inoculation for 
typhoid and smallpox. 
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In eleven Virginia counties, the Public Health Service implemented a bare-
bones cooperative county health plan, “formulated with a view to accomplishing on 
the most economical basis possible the most important results of sanitation in counties 
unable or (at the beginning) unwilling to expend much for health service.”320 After 
negotiating arrangements for funding the plan with Virginia’s State Board of Health, 
the PHS worried that these impoverished counties would prove “reluctant to 
appropriate county money to enter into the cooperative health project.” When PHS 
officers presented the plan to local authorities, to prominent citizens, and in public 
meetings, however, they found that the response was similar to that in the counties 
they had approached with more money to devote to public health: “it was discovered 
with surprise and, because of the popular interest indicated, with gratification that 
every county to which the proposition had been presented was offering to participate, 
and the requests from counties for the cooperation soon exceeded the limits of the 
combined fund from State and National Government sources.”321 
 In the eleven Virginia counties, the Public Health Service contributed $500, the 
State Board of Health another $500, and the county $1,000. In place of physicians who 
served as county health officers in other PHS-backed county programs, “a man trained 
in the fundamental principles of health work was engaged as a sanitary 
demonstrator.”322 While the overall plan of action, beginning with a sanitary survey, 
was broadly similar to PHS-backed efforts in other counties, these counties 
concentrated on the efforts that the Service believed would have the most immediate 
tangible benefits: “sanitary disposal of human excreta, protection of drinking-water 
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supplies against dangerous contamination, and to a less extent, control of mosquito 
breeding.”323 The counties were placed in three groups, with each county sanitary 
officer supervised by a Public Health Service Officer who planned the work, helped to 
keep local authorities supportive of the projects, and attempted to “stimulate popular 
cooperation.”324 Beginning in 1925, the bare-bones cooperative plan was extended to 
Tennessee. By the end of the decade, it was being carried out in eleven Virginia 
counties and eight counties in Tennessee.325 
 The expansion of the Public Health Service’s cooperative rural health efforts 
during the 1920s was largely a result of the entrepreneurial efforts of Leslie Lumsden 
and his subordinates.326 By persuading local elites, particularly county commissioners, 
of the significance of poor health and the economic benefits of public health work, 
Public Health Service officers were able to secure the initial appropriation of tax 
dollars from the county. “Oftentimes,” Assistant Surgeon General W.F. Draper noted 
while explaining to the Senate Agriculture Committee in 1931 how increased funding 
for “rural sanitation” would be put to use, “even though health conditions are very bad 
[the county people] have no conception of the real situation. We would endeavor to 
give them a true picture of their situation and persuade them to do everything they 
properly could with reference to their need to the end of providing the necessary 
service of their own.”327 
                                                
323 Lumsden, "Cooperative Rural Health Work of the Public Health Service in the Fiscal Year 1920," p. 
2337. 
324 Ibid.: p. 2338. 
325 ———, "Cooperative Rural Health Work of the Public Health Service in the Fiscal Year 1930," p. 
2627. 
326 Writing in 1930, Charles Wardell Stiles described Moses as the “patriarch of rural sanitation” and 
Leslie Lumsden as his “successor.” See Charles Wardell Stiles, "Decrease of Hookworm Disease in the 
United States," Public Health Reports 45, no. 31 (1930): p. 1773. 
327 Emergency Appropriation for Cooperation with State Health Departments in Rural Sanitation, Etc., 
Hearing before the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, United States Senate, Seventy-First 
Congress, Third Session, on S. 5440, a Bill to Authorize an Emergency Appropriation for Special Study 
of, and Demonstration Work in, Rural Sanitation,  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1931), p. 15. 
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 A crucial first step, the decision by county officials to allocate funds for public 
health work would have had little effect had the Public Health Service not offered a 
genuinely valuable service that proved compatible with local social, political, and 
economic relationships. Where implemented, the cooperative rural health plan was 
likely to foster political legitimacy and popular support: “Through good business 
management,” Leslie Lumsden wrote in 1926, “every dollar invested in the enterprise 
can be made to yield a remarkable dividend in the protection and promotion of human 
health, and in a money saving to the community amounting to many times the cost of 
the service.” Ideally, county residents would recognize the benefits of public health 
work and offer ongoing support for county health boards. 
In the years following World War I, the PHS proved itself capable of 
generating both results and legitimacy in disease-plagued counties throughout the 
region. Developed within the context of the rural South, the cooperative rural health 
effort required the blessing of county commissioners in each county before it could be 
implemented, which helped to ensure that the program represented no threat to local 
power relationships.328 Relying on arguments about the effects of disease on economic 
development in the South and employing native southerners as county health officers, 
the PHS presented itself as an agency of medical professionals sympathetic to the 
concerns of white southern elites.  
 
DEVELOPMENT OF MALARIA CONTROL 
 Closely related to its expansion into active support for the development of 
county health departments, the Public Health Service continued to engage in a variety 
                                                
328 Lumsden described the plan’s flexibility in 1926: “This plan of cooperative rural health work,” 
Lumsden explained, “has been evolved in the course of field experience and has been tested under a 
wide range of local conditions.” L.L. Lumsden, "Cooperative Rural Health Work of the Public Health 
Service in the Fiscal Year 1926," Public Health Reports 41, no. 43 (1926): p. 2383. 
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of field experiments in practical measures for limiting the transmission of malaria. In 
1920, the PHS’s malaria research and control office, headquartered in Memphis, 
entered into a cooperative agreement with state and local health departments and the 
Rockefeller International Health Board, “for the purpose of promoting and 
accelerating the control of malaria in the United States.” Participating states and 
localities provided as much money as they were capable of for the project, while the 
International Health Board provided the rest. For its part, the PHS “was expected to 
make malaria surveys, prepare estimates of cost of malaria-control measures, and 
furnish supervision of the control demonstrations.”329 Sanitary Engineer Joseph A. 
LePrince, previously supervisor of malaria-control measures in the wartime extra-
cantonment zones, now headed up the PHS’s portion of the effort. 
Following an initial survey of 133 communities, anti-malaria activities were 
undertaken in 45 towns in 10 southern states during the summer of 1920. “The 
results,” the PHS reported, “were immediate and impressive.”330 “House-to-house 
canvasses in several of the towns in which cooperative malaria control demonstrations 
were conducted revealed the fact that the economic loss directly due to malaria, 
including doctors’ fees, medicine bills, and wages lost by forced absence from work 
were so greatly reduced that the investment for malaria control resulted in an actual 
                                                
329 Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service of the United States for the 
Fiscal Year 1920,  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1920), p. 20; The Rockefeller 
Foundation International Health Board Seventh Annual Report, January 1, 1920- December 31, 1920, 
p. 15-16; J.A. LePrince, "Co-Operative Antimalaria Campaigns in the United States in 1920," Southern 
Medical Journal 14, no. 4 (1921). Quotations are from the Surgeon General’s Annual Report. 
330 Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service of the United States for the 
Fiscal Year 1923,  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1923), p. 13. Both the PHS and 
IHB were vague in reporting their findings. Data collected by the PHS suggested “reductions in malaria 
incidence in 1920 of over 75 per cent in many of these towns and of over 90 per cent in some of them, 
as compared with the 1919 malaria rate. The International Health Board, meanwhile, reported that 
“Malaria cases in these communities were reduced from 30 to 98 per cent.” See Annual Report of the 
Surgeon General of the Public Health Service for the Fiscal Year 1921,  (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1921), p. 21-22; The Rockefeller Foundation International Health Board, 
Eighth Annnual Report, January 1, 1921- December 31, 1921,  (New York: The Rockefeller 
Foundation, 1922), p. 16. 
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saving of several times the amount expended for this purpose.”331 Publicizing these 
beneficial results was deemed crucial. Where the information was available, the 
Rockefeller Foundation produced graphs, detailing apparent economic savings and 
reductions in physicians’ visits. These findings were “given wide publicity.” “The 
effect,” the Foundation optimistically claimed, “has been the creation of a sustaining 
and even aggressive public opinion which would seem to guarantee the permanency of 
the work.”332 In its annual report for 1922, the Rockefeller International Health Board 
featured a photograph of a sign, erected by the Brewton, Alabama Chamber of 
Congress, publicizing the malaria control efforts going on in the town. “Malaria Being 
Controlled!” the sign declared, “Locate With Us for Health and Prosperity.” 
Pleased with the success of the cooperative project in controlling malaria in 
southern towns, Public Health Service officers were, nonetheless, acutely aware that 
malaria was a largely rural disease.333 Though the PHS had proven adept at 
confronting the disease in southern towns, extra-cantonment zones, and other 
geographically limited areas, bringing the disease under control throughout the rest of 
the South presented significant technical and financial challenges.334 After 1923, the 
PHS ceased active efforts in southern towns in order to concentrate on the problem of 
 
                                                
331 Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service for the Fiscal Year 1921, p. 22. 
332 The Rockefeller Foundation International Health Board, Eighth Annnual Report, January 1, 1921- 
December 31, 1921, p. 16-17. Joseph A. LePrince told the 1920 meeting of the Southern Medical 
Association that “Public sentiment unquestionably is favorable to the control of malaria by drainage on 
a big scale; and drainage supplemented by fish control [fish were used to eat anopheles larvae] and 
other measures is not only feasible, but it will be done because it is what the people desire.”” See 
LePrince, "Co-Operative Antimalaria Campaigns in the United States in 1920." In 1923, the PHS 
similarly claimed that its officers “felt that the people had been so thoroughly educated in urban malaria 
control that they would demand it of their health authorities when needed and support it for 
themselves.” See Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service of the United 
States for the Fiscal Year 1923, p. 14. 
333 Maxcy, "The Distribution of Malaria in the United States as Indicated by Mortality Reports," p. 
1133. 
334 See for instance C.P. Coogle, "Preliminary Report of Screening Studies in Leflore County, Miss.," 
Public Health Reports 42, no. 15 (1927): p. 1101. Coogle estimated that in “many agricultural districts 
it may be a number of years before sufficient drainage is secured to cause Anopheles mosquitoes to 
become very scarce.” 
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Table 11. Cooperative Anti-Malaria Demonstrations, 1920. 
 
 
Demonstration 
Towns 
Area Controlled 
(Sq. Miles) 
Population 
Affected Cost 
Alabama 6 26 27,057 $18,218  
Arkansas 4 15 15,225 8,964 
Georgia 3 24.5 21,659 9,191 
Louisiana 3 17.5 35,673 15,325 
Mississippi 5 13.3 20,024 12,664 
North Carolina 3 11 19,100 24,018 
South Carolina 3 22.5 12,100 42,091 
Tennessee 2 8.9 9,604 4,227 
Texas 14 49 36,813 20,179 
Virginia 2 4.2 2,475 6,250 
     
Total 45 191.9 199,730 $161,128  
Source: Adapted from Surgeon General’s Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1921, p. 21. 
 
 
Figure 12. Example of Charts Used to Demonstrate Effectiveness of Rockefeller 
Foundation- Public Health Service Cooperative Anti-malaria efforts. Source: 
LePrince, “Co-Operative Antimalaria Campaigns,” p. 302. 
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Illustration 1. “Sign erected by the Brewton (Alabama) Chamber of Commerce.” 
Source: Rockefeller International Health Board, Ninth Annual Report, January 1, 
1922-December 31, 1922, p. 111. 
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malaria in the rural South. In many instances, “it was possible to continue the 
investigations in the same locality without interruption by merely shifting the field 
personnel from urban demonstrations to rural investigations.” “The county,” the 
PHS’s 1923 annual report explained, “is considered the unit of study because it is the 
unit of government in the South, and whatever methods of rural malaria control are 
found successful must by applied by county health organizations.”335 Throughout the 
1920s, both the Public Health Service and the International Health Board continued to 
explore a variety of non-drainage anti-malaria strategies, including attempting to limit 
outbreaks with quinine, deploying fish that devoured anopheles larvae, and attempting 
to persuade rural southerners to screen their homes against mosquitoes. 
 
 The PHS’s investigations into the screening of tenant homes shed some light 
on the confluence of technical and social challenges that the Service confronted in 
further working out its approach to malaria. Screening windows, many PHS officers 
believed, represented a potentially powerful means of limiting transmission of the 
malaria parasite in areas where attempting to control mosquito breeding through 
drainage might prove prohibitively difficult or expensive.336 The often poor quality 
construction and irregular measurements of southern tenant homes, however, appeared 
to present a significant obstacle. In addition, whether sharecroppers and tenant farmers 
                                                
335 Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service of the United States for the 
Fiscal Year 1923, p. 14. 
336 See for instance D.L. Van Dine, "The Destruction of Anopheles in Screened Dwellings," Southern 
Medical Journal XIV, no. 4 (1921): p. 20. Discussing Van Dine’s paper at the 1920 meeting of the 
Southern Medical Association, PHS Surgeon Dr. T.H.D. Griffitts, stationed in Norfolk, made the case 
for screening: “When we consider that malaria is essentially a rural problem, and is in many parts of the 
country where drainage is not feasible, or not economically possible; when we consider that the 
administration of quinine, however efficient, is, more or less, a temporary make-shift, we must finally 
come back to screening the houses of the people and keeping the mosquito away from them.” 
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would prove receptive to screening their homes and then maintaining the screening 
remained, for public health workers, an open question.337 
 D.L. Van Dine, of the Department of Agriculture’s Bureau of Entomology, 
stated the problem as it was generally understood: “Screening is not open to 
argument… If you will screen properly, then you have done a great thing in preventing 
malaria.” “It is the application or extension of the method,” he continued, “that is open 
to discussion and investigation. If you take a typical negro cabin with an open floor, 
no two windows alike, a big fireplace going down through the middle and screen it as 
well as you can, you can not compare the results obtained with those in a well-
screened modern dwelling occupied by white people who understand, and who are 
alert to the danger.”338 
Similarly, Joseph A. LePrince noted that the Public Health Service had looked 
“with care into the screening of negroes’ houses. It is a very important subject. It 
means a profit or loss to the farmer of the South. We have attempted time and time 
again to screen the negro quarters in the same way we screen the white quarters.”339 
For public health workers eager to find a cheaper approach to combating malaria than 
drainage projects, the problem of poorly constructed homes, combined with 
uncertainty over whether tenants would prove responsible caretakers of screening, 
represented a significant obstacle. Large-scale screening attempts, many believed, 
might ultimately prove prohibitively difficult. 
 
                                                
337 In his study of screening, PHS officer C.P. Coogle broke the problem down into ten questions. See 
Coogle, "Preliminary Report of Screening Studies in Leflore County, Miss.." 
338 Dine, "The Destruction of Anopheles in Screened Dwellings," p. 296. Van Dine’s comments are 
contained in the discussion of his paper, which occurred at the 1920 meeting of the Southern Medical 
Association. 
339 Ibid.: p. 295. LePrince’s comments were made in the discussion of Van Dine’s paper. On the 
problem of screening poorly constructed homes, as understood in the early 1920s, see also Jr. L.L. 
Williams, "Current Malaria Studies, with Special Reference to Control Measures," Public Health 
Reports 44, no. 33 (1929): p. 2002. 
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Field experiments, however, soon demonstrated the workability of screening as 
a preventive measure. In spring 1924, Acting Assistant Surgeon Dr. C.P. Coogle, who 
served as the county health officer in Leflore County, Mississippi, discussed the likely 
response of tenants to a screening initiative with more than fifty large landowners in 
the Mississippi Delta. Over the course of his survey, Dr. Coogle encountered 
widespread skepticism: “It appears to be a common opinion among the planters that 
farm-tenant families will not take care of screens, that they willfully destroy the 
screens, and that proper interest in the care of screening, at least by the general run of 
tenants, is not to be expected. Little encouragement was derived from these 
interviews.” “The planters,” he concluded, “have had experience with screening on a 
small and expensive scale, and their belief in its inefficiency is widespread and firmly 
fixed.”340 
 Despite this response, Coogle initiated a small-scale study the effectiveness of 
screening, intended to assess whether screening could be economically implemented 
and whether southern tenant farmers could be relied on to participate in screening 
measures and then perform screen upkeep. In 1924, twenty “tenant houses were 
screened and accurate data collected on cost of materials and on cost of labor.” The 
PHS inspected screened homes as well as nearby unscreened homes throughout the 
malaria season. In 1925, Coogle added an additional twenty tenant homes to the study. 
Following on the successes of the first two years of his study, Coogle persuaded a 
local plantation owner, W.L. Craig, to cooperate in the screening of all sixty-four 
tenant homes on his property in 1926.341 The project was a clear success: the “malaria 
sick rate of persons living in the screened houses for more than four months during the 
                                                
340 Coogle, "Preliminary Report of Screening Studies in Leflore County, Miss.." See also Annual Report 
of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service of the United States for the Fiscal Year 1925,  
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1925), p. 23. 
341 See Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service of the United States for the 
Fiscal Year 1925, p. 24. 
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malaria transmission season was only 29 per cent of that of the group living in the 
unscreened homes of the control group.”342 
 Coogle’s detailed analysis of the practicality of screening allowed the Public 
Health Service some insight into the potential responsiveness of both plantation 
owners and rural black and white tenant farmers to a concerted effort to screen the 
South. In an area like the Delta, persuading landowners would represent a necessary 
condition of any screening effort. In many cases, the landowner would likely have to 
provide either the needed materials or a means of acquiring them. Their incentives, 
Coogle reported, were fairly easy to grasp. “Planters,” he explained in his report on the 
screening demonstration, “are business men, and it must be realized that they are not 
in the farming business to accommodate the tenants. The tenants are on the plantations 
to supply the labor, and the tenant house is for the purpose of keeping the labor close 
to the crop.”343 
Since the planter “often appeared to be more concerned about the gnats and 
flies pestering his mules,” than about the welfare and comfort of his tenants, it seemed 
unlikely that humanitarian appeals would carry much weight. More realistically, he 
suggested, “One can always expect the planter to be on the alert and ready to invest in 
screening if it can be shown to be to his advantage.” Collecting accurate data on the 
effectiveness of screening and its impact on “the actual savings in man hours of labor, 
which is the essential unit of measurement on which the planter bases his profits and 
losses,” Coogle argued, would likely prove the most effective means of mobilizing 
southern landowners to support, financially and otherwise, any large-scale effort to 
screen the homes of tenant farmers. 
                                                
342 Coogle, "Preliminary Report of Screening Studies in Leflore County, Miss.," p. 1104. 
343 Ibid.: p. 1105. 
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Despite the preconceptions of landowners, Coogle found, black tenant farmers 
were eager to participate in screening efforts. “The investigations,” he reported, 
“indicated that negro tenants readily acquire an interest in and desire for mosquito 
protection, and, generally speaking, a large percentage of them would do the work 
effectively themselves if they thoroughly understood what it was for, and if they could 
get the screening materials.” “The colored tenant,” he continued, offering an 
explanation for black participation, “is largely guided by the plantation manager.” 
White tenants, he reported, were more reluctant to participate. The “white 
tenant,” Coogle wrote with some condescension, “thinks he can plan his own destiny 
and often finds he is mistaken.” As a result of this attitude, he believed, whites were 
more likely to leave the plantation at the end of the season. Moreover, the “white 
tenant also usually complains more about his housing conditions than does the negro 
tenant. The latter seems to be more appreciative of his screens and takes better care of 
them than does the white tenant under similar circumstances.” 
Far from rural blacks being resistant to screening efforts, as Coogle had 
apparently expected, it was whites who might prove to be a problem: “The negro looks 
forward to having his home inspected, and it is not difficult to teach him to repair 
minor breaks in the screens. The white tenant is usually more delinquent about repairs 
and often seems to be slightly resentful of house inspections. He would rather tell 
about the screens while at a distance from the house than have the conditions of the 
screens inspected on the premises.”344 Already by December 1925, the PHS felt 
confident enough in Coogle’s findings to report that “Experiments recently conducted 
by the service indicate that colored farm tenants can be induced to take excellent care 
of the screening of their homes.”345 
                                                
344 Ibid.: p. 1107. 
345 Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service of the United States for the 
Fiscal Year 1925, p. 24. 
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Beyond establishing that southern blacks would prove responsive to screening 
measures, and ultimately of more importance, Coogle’s study demonstrated 
unequivocally that the irregularly constructed tenant homes of the South could be 
adequately screened.346 He detailed the costs and materials necessary for adequately 
screening tenant homes, and produced instructions for properly constructing relatively 
inexpensive screen doors. The screening study, Coogle concluded, “appears to indicate 
that practically all inhabitable tenant houses can be effectively screened, although it 
will frequently be necessary to do more or less chinking work to close the numerous 
cracks, knot holes, and misfit joints in walls and ceilings.”347 Between 1924 and 1926, 
Coogle refined his methods, bringing the cost of screening an individual home down 
from an average of $18.55 to $8.51.348 By appealing to the economic interests of 
landowners, the health concerns of tenants, and showing that screening could be done 
both effectively and inexpensively, Coolge’s report suggested, public health workers 
could make significant headway in combating malaria. 
 
 
CONSOLIDATION AND EXPANSION OF FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN 
THE AFTERMATH OF THE 1927 MISSISSIPPI FLOOD 
In the spring of 1927, following a period of heavy rain, a massive flood 
overtook the lower Mississippi Valley. The flood covered 27,000 square miles, putting 
“as much as 30 feet of water over lands where 931,159 people” previously lived.349 In 
the aftermath of the flood, the knowledge, practical experience, and infrastructure that 
                                                
346 See L.L. Williams, "Current Malaria Studies, with Special Reference to Control Measures," p. 2002-
03. “Screens,” Williams told the 1929 annual meeting of the State and Territorial Health Officers with 
the PHS, “have been utilized by the well-to-do for years; but, because of their cost, they have not been 
put on the poorly-built farm homes or rickety tenant shacks. The problem of screening such homes was 
attacked by Coogle with splendid results well known to all of you.” 
347 Coogle, "Preliminary Report of Screening Studies in Leflore County, Miss.," p. 1105. 
348 Ibid.: p. 1109, 11, 12.  
349 John M. Barry, Rising Tide: The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 and How It Changed America 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), p. 285. 
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Figure 13. The LeFlore County Screening Study, 1924-1926. Source: Coogle, 
“Preliminary Report of Screening Studies,” p. 1103. 
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the Public Health Service had developed over the preceding decade became of 
immediate and crucial importance. The Service’s knowledge of malaria and pellagra 
was translated into direct action in the flood zone. Still under the direction of Leslie 
Lumsden, the federal-state-county cooperative program that had developed out of the 
wartime extra-cantonment zones quickly emerged as the institutional basis and model 
for federal efforts to tame the public health catastrophe resulting from the social and 
economic dislocations caused by the flood. 
As the magnitude of the disaster in the lower Mississippi valley became clear, 
the Public Health Service coordinated its response with Secretary of Commerce 
Herbert Hoover, who had been dispatched to the flood zone by President Coolidge, the 
American Red Cross, the Rockefeller International Health Board, and state and county 
boards of health. In an impressive effort, the Red Cross set up 149 camps for displaced 
individuals and families in Arkansas, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Missouri, and Tennessee. State boards of health and the Rockefeller Foundation 
provided medical and other emergency relief personnel. The Public Health Service, 
meanwhile, dispatched twenty-four medical officers, eight sanitary engineers, and five 
“scientific assistants” to the flood zone.350 
With money furnished by the Red Cross, Joseph A. LePrince supervised 
attempts to limit the inevitable tide of malaria through a massive emergency screening 
effort. “The distance from the north to the south end of the entire project,” the PHS 
reported, “was about 320 miles, and the homes to be screened were scattered over 36 
counties of four States.” Throughout the lower Mississippi valley, in Arkansas, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee, teams of inspectors provided by the Red Cross 
and state health departments went door-to-door, attempting to establish where carriers 
                                                
350 J.G. Townsend, "The Full-Time County Health Program Developed in the Mississippi Valley 
Following the Flood," Public Health Reports 43, no. 20 (1928): p. 1201, 00. 
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Table 12. Public Health Service-supervised screening efforts following the 1927 
Mississippi Flood. 
 
 Arkansas Louisiana Mississippi Tennessee 
Total 4 
States 
Flooded 
counties in 
which 
homes 
were 
screened 15 8 9 4 36 
Number of 
homes 
screened 2,348 653 3,276 483 6,760 
Number of 
doors 
screened 7,304 2,193 10,238 1,440 21,175 
Number of 
windows 
screened 12,200 2,777 12,931 2,387 30,295 
      
Average 
cost per 
farm-
tenant 
home $9.67  $13.99  $11.07  $11.68  $11.02  
      
Total cost $22,707.35  $9,883  $36,254.39  $5,630.87  $74,475.60  
 
Source: Williams, “Full-Time County Health Program,” p. 1201, from field report by J.A. 
LePrince. 
 
of malaria were living. When they found an individual or family with malaria, the 
inspectors “took measurements of doors and sent them to a central point in the State 
where screen door were made in conformity with such measurements and shipped to 
the communities in carload lots.” Within approximately 90 days, public health workers 
were able to screen nearly 7,000 homes, helping to deny anopheles mosquitoes access 
to malaria carriers and significantly limiting the intensity of the outbreak. 351 
                                                
351 Ibid.: p. 1200-01. In Louisiana, the screen doors were produced at the State Boys’ Industrial School 
in Monroe. In Mississippi, they were produced in Greenwood, the seat of Leflore County. In Arkansas, 
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C.P. Coogle’s Leflore County screening study, the Public Health Service 
reported in the aftermath of the flood, “has been the deciding factor in determining the 
type of malaria relief to be carried out in the recently flooded area. The only 
practicable scheme of widespread malaria control over a large area in times of 
emergency must be screening. Except for the [Leflore County study], it would have 
been thought impossible to use this method of control in large-scale relief work 
effectively and at a sufficiently reasonable cost.”352 
 
 In the wake of 1921 backlash following President Warren G. Harding’s 
comments about the menace of “famine and plague” in the South, the Public Health 
Service’s Dr. Joseph Goldberger had continued his research into the control of the 
South’s pellagra problem. Over time, Goldberger had tempered his critique of the 
southern political economy with an increasing emphasis on practical methods of 
forestalling the disease. His claim that pellagra was caused by a dietary deficiency, 
still controversial in 1921, was accepted by the vast majority of the medical profession 
by 1927. Just as the Public Health Service had made important improvements in its 
capacity to combat malaria during the years preceding the flood, Goldberger’s 
research now demonstrated that brewer’s yeast contained the “pellagra-preventive” 
vitamin, later discovered to be niacin. Distributing the yeast to rural southerners, rather 
                                                                                                                                       
they were produced at the Boys’ Industrial School in Pine Bluff. In Tennessee, meanwhile, “the manual 
training department of the public schools at Dyersburg did the work.” See also William Deklein, 
"Recent Health Observations in the Mississippi Flood Area," American Journal of Public Health 18, no. 
2 (1928): p. 148. 
352 Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service of the United States for the 
Fiscal Year 1927, p. 39. A detailed account of the logistics involved in the PHS’s post-flood screening 
effort, with discussion from southern state health officers, C.P. Coogle, and Joseph A. LePrince, may be 
found in C.P. Coogle, "Methods and Costs of Screening Farm Tenant Homes in Mississippi: Post Flood 
Malaria Control," Southern Medical Journal (1928). See also MS Biennial 26th… p. 250-260  
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than a wholesale transformation of the southern economy, represented a potentially 
workable solution to the pellagra problem.353 
 Alerted to the potential for a pellagra outbreak following the flood by 
Goldberger and the Public Health Service, the American Red Cross followed 
Goldberger’s suggestions, distributing brewer’s yeast in its camps and supplying the 
yeast to state boards of health and county health departments in the flood zone, to 
some extent beating back a mounting pellagra epidemic. Farm demonstration agents 
from the Department of Agriculture and a variety of local organizations helped in the 
effort to distribute yeast.354 Meanwhile, Goldberger traveled extensively in the flooded 
area, attempting to document the disaster’s impact on the rate of pellagra. Of the four 
states worst hit, he noted, only Mississippi had “anything like complete official 
morbidity reports of pellagra.” Following the flood, however, “even in that state the 
morbidity reports for the counties affected by the overflow were very incomplete or 
altogether lacking.”355 
 Though concrete information was scarce, it was clear to Goldberger and other 
observers that pellagra incidence had skyrocketed. The disease had already been a 
growing problem in the flood area in the years before 1927. As a result of “dietary 
habits” and the “availability of supplies of various foods which, in turn, is influenced 
by the one-crop type of agriculture, with the consequent lack of diversification,” 
                                                
353 DeKruif, Hunger Fighters, p. 365-66. Goldberger’s initial experiments with brewer’s yeast were 
conducted on dogs. Inspired by an article by two Yale professors and an encounter with a fox hound 
owner in Georgia who had lost a dog after feeding it nothing but corn bread in order to “thin her down 
for the hunt,” Goldberger established that “black tongue” was the canine version of pellagra. Although 
he continued to export his findings to southern orphanages, experimenting with dogs allowed 
Goldberger quite a bit more leeway. In his first canine experiment, Goldberger fed dogs the diet he had 
given the prisoners at the Rankin Prison Farm. As Paul DeKruif wrote in 1928, “It killed them.” 
354 Townsend, "The Full-Time County Health Program Developed in the Mississippi Valley Following 
the Flood," p. 1206; Deklein, "Recent Health Observations in the Mississippi Flood Area," p. 150. 
355 Joseph Goldberger and Edgar Sydenstricker, "Pellagra in the Mississippi Flood Area: Report of an 
Inquiry Relating to the Prevalence of Pellagra in the Area Affected by the Overflow of the Mississippi 
and Its Tributaries in Tennessee, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana in the Spring of 1927," in 
Goldberger on Pellagra, ed. Milton Terris (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 
originally published in Public Health Reports, vol. 42, no. 44 (November 4, 1927), p. 271-272. 
 162 
Goldberger noted, the lower Mississippi valley was particularly hospitable to pellagra. 
Unprofitable cotton crops in 1925 and 1926 meant that the “financial resources of the 
cotton planters… were already severely strained… and the economic status of the 
tenant population was already considerably below that of 1922 and 1923.”  The 
dislocations resulting from the flood, including a decrease in the milk supply due to 
the drowning of milk cows, destruction of “home-owned poultry and swine” that 
might have provided fresh meat and eggs, and destruction of gardens that might have 
provided vegetables, virtually guaranteed that many living in an area already on the 
brink would succumb to pellagra.356 
 In Mississippi, the Public Health Service recorded 6,000 cases of pellagra 
between July and October 1927. “Only 2,800 cases were reported for the 
corresponding period in 1926.”357 Relying on mortality data, Goldberger and PHS 
statistician Edgar Sydenstricker estimated that, in 1926, there had been 37,000 cases of 
pellagra in Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee. During 1927, they 
believed, it was likely that there were between 45,000-50,000 cases.358 
 Despite the increase in pellagra following the flood, the Red Cross-backed 
distribution of brewer’s yeast as means of warding off pellagra appeared to 
demonstrate that a viable alternative existed to the more fundamental political-
economic changes that Goldberger had long noted might free the South of the burden 
of pellagra. Any understanding of pellagra, Goldberger explained again in his report 
on the aftermath of the flood, required an appreciation of its deep interconnections 
with the southern system of mono-crop agriculture. “Thus,” he wrote, “it may appear 
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at first glance that any attempt to remove the conditions which are fundamentally 
responsible for the prevalence of pellagra would involve a revolution of dietary habits 
and of the entire economic and financial system as it now exists.”359 His experiences 
since taking over as head of the PHS’s pellagra effort in 1914, however, suggested that 
such a political-economic “revolution” was not on the immediate horizon. 
Planting small gardens and owning milk cows offered some hope of weakening 
the grip of the disease, but Goldberger recognized that such apparently straightforward 
measures would prove difficult for many southern tenants. Plantations owners, he 
wrote, tended to discourage both. Gardens “use space which otherwise might be 
planted in cotton” and require “labor on the part of the tenant and his family during the 
season when all the labor possible is required in the cotton fields.” Similarly, “Because 
of the desire to use all the land for cotton, pasturage is not furnished” for cows. Along 
with concerns about land usage, landowners worried that tenants were “prone to divert 
feed destined for mules and horses to feeding their cows.”360 
 Personally moved by the suffering of southern victims of pellagra, Goldberger 
had no illusions about his own ability to alter the underlying causes of the disease. In 
an interview with the writer Paul DeKruif following the flood, Golberger reflected on 
the poverty of the South and on the widespread lack of knowledge of pellagra and its 
causes. Ultimately, he concluded, the underlying causes of pellagra were beyond his 
reach: “I’m only a bum doctor.”361 Mono-crop agriculture would continue to play a 
dominant role in the region’s economy, and, for the time being, only the distribution of 
baker’s yeast offered the prospect of a reduction in pellagra. The response to the 1927 
flood, despite the pellagra increase in the flood zone, represented an initial 
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demonstration of this approach’s potential effectiveness. In the years following the 
flood, Brewer’s Yeast would become an increasingly prominent tool in the efforts of 
southern public health workers. When Goldberger died of cancer in 1929, the 
transformative promise of his findings was already on the verge of being fulfilled. 
 
 The crowning achievement of the Public Health Service’s intervention in the 
area flooded by the Mississippi River was the rapid extension of the cooperative plan 
for developing full-time county health departments throughout the flood zone.  In 
spring 1927, only 18 of the 103 flooded counties in six states had full-time county 
health departments. Their worth, however, appeared to have been proven by their 
performance in the aftermath of the flood. According to rural sanitation director Leslie 
Lumsden, certainly not a neutral observer, full-time county health officers “as a rule, 
performed with remarkable promptness and efficiency in the organization of working 
forces and in the carrying out of measures for both immediate and post-flood sanitary 
protection of the stricken people.” The difference between these counties and those 
without health departments with a full-time officer, he claimed, “stood out sharply.”362 
J.H. O’Neil, the Louisiana State Board of Health’s sanitary engineer, 
concluded similarly that “the value of the full-time county organization… had been 
strikingly demonstrated during the flood.”363 Full-time health departments, the PHS 
argued, were necessary “to carry on to a logical conclusion the preventive measures 
started [following the flood].”364 Nonetheless, the PHS reported that, given lack of 
funds, the likelihood of the affected states and counties creating new health 
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departments without outside help was “slight.”365 The obvious solution was an 
expansion of the Service’s existing rural sanitation program. 
In June 1927, representatives of the Public Health Service and the International 
Health Board, meeting in New Orleans, agreed to attempt to expand their county 
health programs to reach all of the counties devastated by the flood. County 
governments quickly proved amenable to their efforts. By the end of October 1927, 
sixty-seven new counties had entered into cooperative agreements with either the 
Public Health Service or the International Health Board. Within a year of the flood, 78 
counties, “or about 92 per cent of the total with which contact was made [by agents of 
the PHS and IHB]” had signed on the program.366 Where county money was too 
scarce for even a small appropriation, the PHS and IHB, along with state boards of 
health, wholly “financed the projects temporarily with a limited personnel. In many 
counties, the work was made possible by donations from the local Red Cross chapters, 
municipalities, chambers of commerce, and civic organizations.”367 
In the short term, the Public Health Service paid for the expansion of its county 
health efforts in the lower Mississippi valley with money released from its “epidemic 
fund,” designated for use in emergency situations.368 Congress, meanwhile, proved 
responsive to requests from the Public Health Service for increased funding. 
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Figure 14. The Impact of World War I and the 1927 Mississippi Flood on 
appropriations for “Special Studies of and Demonstration Work” in Rural Sanitation, 
Fiscal Years 1917-1930. Source: Adapted from Public Health Bulletin No. 222: 
History of County Health Organizations, p. 5. 
Note: The 1928 appropriation includes $180,740 “released from appropriation for the 
prevention of the spread of epidemic diseases and applied to county health work in the 
Mississippi flood area.” The initial appropriation was $85,000. 
 
Impressed with the PHS’s response to the disaster and willing, given the emergency 
circumstances, to endorse its continued involvement, Congress more than quadrupled 
the annual appropriation for “special studies of and demonstration work in rural 
sanitation” in the next fiscal year. Beginning in the summer of 1928, Leslie Lumsden 
had a $347,000 appropriation at his disposal, up from an initial appropriation of 
$85,000 in the preceding fiscal year. Of the new appropriation, $85,00 was slated for 
“general use” and the remaining $262,000 was earmarked for use in designated 
counties within the Mississippi flood zone.369 
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Public Health Service officials could barely contain their excitement. “While 
deploring the frightful disaster of last spring,” J.G. Townsend wrote in the Service’s 
report on the county health program’s post-flood expansion, “some comfort may be 
obtained in the knowledge that better communities are builded on the ruins of those 
destroyed, and, as a rule, a better public-health regime may be inaugurated. Surely in 
this experience there has developed another flood- a flood of sanitation development 
which has placed us many years ahead of our old program of full-time county health 
service.”370 
Rather than endorsing a massive and permanent expansion of the county health 
program, however, members of Congress had intended to respond to an emergency 
situation. Convenience was a far greater factor in congressional approval than the 
arguments of Public Health Service officers, which continued to center on the 
interstate threat of disease and its economic impact. Questioning Assistant Surgeon 
General W.F. Draper as he appeared before a House Appropriations Subcommittee, 
Indiana Republican William R. Wood highlighted the gap between the Public Health 
Service’s actions and reigning conceptions of the appropriate role of the federal 
government: “Have [the states in the flood zone] shown that they were unable to take 
care of the situation without Federal aid?” Told that they had, Wood wondered 
whether the states had given the PHS “an account of the money that they have 
available for state expenses, etc.?” 
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“Here is the trouble,” Representative Wood told Dr. Draper: “When these 
disasters come, of course we help them in every instance, but they ought to understand 
that they ought not to abuse the generosity of the Government by using the Federal 
Government to do for them what they ought to do for themselves when the disaster is 
over.”371 
To Representative Wood, whatever health benefits the PHS effort was bringing 
to the region appeared to be outweighed by its significant risks, particularly the 
likelihood that the federal government was “establishing some very dangerous 
precedents by doing this sort of thing.” Although Assistant Surgeon General Draper 
detailed the economic benefits of public health work and sought to reassure the 
committee that the Public Health Service’s involvement would not be indefinite, 
Representative Wood was unwilling to endorse the expansive vision of the Public 
Health Service’s role that the county health effort represented. “You want to 
encourage these people,” he concluded, “to help themselves and make them 
understand that the Government is not going to keep doing this for them forever. If we 
are, we are going to exhaust the Treasury before long.”372 
 
Initially intended for funding surveys of the extent of disease in rural America 
and temporary “demonstration” projects, the Public Health Service’s appropriation for 
“rural sanitation” had been transformed into a means of funding work in extra-
cantonment zones during World War I. In the ensuring decade, under the leadership of 
Dr. Leslie Lumsden, public health service officers had worked with county 
governments throughout the South, as well as the Rockefeller International Health 
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Board, to develop methods for successfully limiting the region’s debilitating disease 
burden. Along with methods of disease control, the Public Health Service fostered 
networks of local support and political legitimacy. The propriety of federal 
intervention in public health efforts at the local level was endorsed by county 
governments throughout the region, both through the embrace of PHS expertise and 
through the allocation of local tax revenues. In 1927, when disaster struck, the Public 
Health Service proved itself impressively capable of responding and willing to seize 
the opportunity to cement the gains of the previous decade. During the 1930s, these 
gains would be further consolidated, and the diseases that had prompted outside 
intervention in southern public health would increasingly become a thing of the past. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Depression, Drought, and Social Security 
 
 
 Drought overcame large swaths of the South during the spring of 1930. 
Concentrated in Arkansas, a state still reeling from the 1927 flood and hit hard by the 
onset of the Great Depression, the drought stretched across the Ohio River Valley and 
as far east as Virginia. The Department of Agriculture described it as the “worst 
drought ever recorded in this country.”373 Particularly in the lower Mississippi Valley, 
the drought had severe effects for farm families counting on a decent harvest to pay 
back the debts they had incurred both to survive and to plant the year’s cotton crop. 
Over the course of the summer, Arkansas recorded only 35 percent of its 
average rainfall. Kentucky, meanwhile, recorded 43 percent, Mississippi 47 percent, 
Tennessee 50 percent, and Louisiana 56 percent. In Arkansas, the cotton harvest 
reached only 48 percent of the average yield.374 Yields were also diminished further 
west in Oklahoma, which had its smallest harvest since 1923, and in Texas, which 
produced its smallest crop since 1925.375 
Following a substantial delay, during which President Herbert Hoover favored 
minimal federal intervention in the drought area and a reliance on the Red Cross, 
Congress began passing relief measures for the drought area. After passing legislation 
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authorizing loans for feed and seed to farmers in the drought area, Congress extended 
and expanded the Public Health Service’s program for creating county health boards. 
The basis of this expansion was the precedent of federal intervention following the 
1927 flood, widespread local support for federal public health measures, and the 
support of southern members of Congress. Local support and political legitimacy, 
generated at the county level throughout the South, became the bedrock of support 
from national-level politicians. Beginning in 1933, public health measures, supervised 
by the Public Health Service, were carried out by the public works agencies created 
under the auspices of the New Deal. In 1935, the PHS’s federal-state-county 
cooperative program was included, on the basis of both precedent and the apparent 
importance of health for economic security, in the Social Security Act. 
 
INITIAL FEDERAL RESPONSE TO THE 1930-31 DROUGHT 
Discussions about the federal response to the southern drought quickly became 
inseparable from the emerging debate over the appropriate national government 
response to the Depression as a whole. President Herbert Hoover, well-regarded for 
his skillful management of the response to the 1927 flood as Secretary of Commerce 
and earlier famine relief work in Europe during and after World War I, was reluctant 
to mount a large-scale federal relief effort in drought area. Doing so, he worried, might 
lead the nation closer to embracing direct benefits such as unemployment relief from 
the national government for victims of the Depression. 
 In his December 1930 State of the Union Address, a year into the Depression, 
the President emphasized the importance of cooperation and volunteerism in 
confronting the crisis. “Economic depression,” he told Congress and the nation, 
“cannot be cured by legislative action or executive pronouncement.” Instead, he 
argued, “each community and each state should assume its full responsibilities for 
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organization of employment and relief of distress with that sturdiness and 
independence which built a great nation… The best contribution of government lies in 
encouragement of this voluntary cooperation in the community.” Briefly addressing 
the southern drought, Hoover endorsed federal loans to affected farmers for the 
purchase of seed for the next year’s crop and feed for animals. The Red Cross, he 
suggested, would prove capable of supplying food to individuals in the drought area 
without federal assistance.376 
 Secretary of Agriculture Arthur Hyde elaborated the thinking behind the 
administration’s support for animal feed loans and opposition to food aid. “There are a 
great many objections to the government making loans for human food,” he explained. 
“From a national point of view, this latter class of loans approaches perilously near the 
dole system and would be a move in the wrong direction.” Opposed to measures that 
the President believed might foster dependency, the administration nonetheless 
endorsed an increase in public works projects in the affected areas. Road projects, 
Secretary Hyde continued, had “been proposed with the object in view of giving the 
farmers an opportunity to find employment during the Winter and thus provide for 
themselves their food and clothing.” 
Together, feed and seed loans, temporary public works projects, and the efforts 
of the American Red Cross would tide over farmers in the drought area. “Direct” relief 
was out of the question: “There is no more justification for the government to furnish 
food for farmers in the drought area,” Secretary Hyde maintained, acknowledging the 
implications of the drought for the wider depression, “than there would be in 
furnishing food to any other section of the United States or to any other class of our 
people who may be in distress… If we go beyond the established precedents of loans 
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for seed, feed for work animals and fertilizer, we are treading on dangerous ground 
from a national and governmental viewpoint, and in the long run will be doing great 
injury to the agricultural industry.”377 
 
Members of Congress from the drought area had little cause to accept either 
the Hoover administration’s optimistic assessment of existing relief efforts or its 
insistence on federal restraint. Already by August of 1930, the Red Cross had 
documented severe food shortages in affected areas and an increased incidence of 
pellagra, particularly in eastern Arkansas and northern Mississippi. In Kentucky, fresh 
vegetables were “more scarce than in Winter. There is no water in the country, and 
most towns are curtailing the water supply, some to the extent that water is only turned 
on in the mains during certain hours during each day.” As a result of water shortages, 
typhoid was becoming prevalent in many communities.378 
As the crisis wore on, cold weather, dwindling food and water supplies, and 
the accelerating collapse of the banking system fueled a growing sense of 
desperation.379 On January 3rd, the New York Times reported that “Five hundred or 
more farmers and their wives… stormed the business section” of England, Arkansas, 
“demanding food and threatening to forcibly seize it in [the] event it was not 
forthcoming.” More than three hundred people, the Times reported, were given food 
by frightened local merchants.380 The Washington Post described the England incident 
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in similarly disturbing terms: “The merchandise amounted to $3 a person, most of 
them heads of large families and 90 per cent of them white. Many of them were 
armed. Weeping women were scattered through the crowd of grim-faced farmers.”381 
Though the details and severity of the England incident were quickly called 
into question by the administration, the specter of rural unrest drew the attention of 
Congress. Arkansas Senator Thaddeus Carraway responded to reports of the England 
riot by calling for $15 million in federal food loans for the drought area. “There has 
got to be more relief. While the people are grateful for the Red Cross relief, it is 
wholly inadequate.” The problem, Carraway continued, went far beyond Arkansas: 
“The administration has not treated the suffering resulting from unemployment 
sympathetically, but I believe that when members of Congress return, after having 
learned of the conditions in their districts, there will not be any niggardly action by 
Congress.”382 
Secretary of Agriculture Hyde, following a discussion with the chairman of the 
Red Cross, reasserted administration’s position that “the Red Cross has the funds and 
the ability and the organization to take care of the situation.”383 Meanwhile, press 
coverage of the situation in Arkansas emphasized the potential for violence. “Unless 
measures for the betterment of the situation are taken,” an England-area lawyer and 
plantation owner told a reporter from the Associated Press, “the merchants must either 
put their stocks in the street or mount machine guns before their stores.”384 
From Arkansas, the Times reported that “many tenants are so ‘broke’ that they 
could not pay for the food and clothing advanced by the furnisher or planter, and their 
mules and tools are mortgaged. The share cropper made nothing last year, owes the 
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planter for his food and clothing and must hope to work it out this year.” A prominent 
northeastern Arkansas banker was quoted as saying that “there would have been 
bloodshed here if the Red Cross had not intervened.” “Nutritional troubles,” the Times 
reported, “are numerous. Pellagra is common, and yeast is being used to avert some of 
these diseases.”385 According to another account, recipients of relief in the drought 
area walked “miles on foot to obtain food, and with their feet wrapped in sacks for 
lack of shoes.”386 
 
Returning to Washington following their winter break, southern members of 
Congress pressed for a drought relief bill with a renewed sense of urgency. Disputes 
between the House and Senate, between representatives of urban and rural 
constituencies, and over the question of direct food aid, however, slowed passage of 
the relief plan.387 Though much of the Democratic caucus in the Senate supported a 
plan through which the federal government would donate funds to the Red Cross for 
food aid, Arkansas Senator and Democratic Minority Leader Joseph Robinson decided 
to temporarily postpone the push for food, backing instead a relief plan likely to secure 
the speedy backing of the Hoover administration and Senate Republicans.388 As a 
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result, the legislation signed by President Hoover on January 15, 1931 consisted 
entirely of a loan program for feed and seed in the drought area.389 
Congress, however, continued to consider additional relief proposals. Among 
them was a Robinson-sponsored bill, soon reported out of the Senate Agriculture 
Committee, authorizing $3 million for “an emergency appropriation for special study 
of, and demonstration work in, rural sanitation.”390 
 
FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN SOUTHERN PUBLIC HEALTH: 
LOCAL SUPPORT AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 
Largely ignored by Congress during the years following World War I, the 
Public Health Service’s cooperative “rural sanitation” initiative had achieved a degree 
of national legitimacy following the Mississippi flood. Arguing for its enlargement as 
part of the federal response to the drought, the program’s proponents could now rely 
on evidence of its success in limiting disease, a broad base of local popular and 
political support, and, crucially, the example of 1927. As Dr. Arthur T. McCormack, 
Kentucky’s state health officer, explained to the Senate Agriculture Committee, the 
precedent for federal intervention in public health in the drought area was 
unambiguous: “This proposal is based upon the action taken during the Mississippi 
flood under the leadership of President Coolidge and Secretary of Commerce 
Hoover.”391 
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Asked whether there was any local “opposition to Federal work of this kind,” 
Dr. McCormack replied that “There is the general opposition to Federal aid of any 
kind. But there is no specific opposition, and so great was the improvement in the 
situation following this other work [in the aftermath of the 1927 flood] that in no 
county in the flood area during this period has there been any opposition to this work 
by anybody.”392 
As McCormack, Surgeon General Hugh Cumming, Assistant Surgeon General 
W.F. Draper, and Arkansas state health officer C.W. Garrison testified before the 
Senate Agriculture Committee, their descriptions of the Public Health Service’s 
actions in the South were met with knowing recognition. At one point, Arkansas 
Senator Thaddeus Caraway interrupted Assistant Surgeon General Draper to extol the 
virtues of the federal-state-county cooperative program. Praising the efforts of the 
Public Health Service following the 1927 flood, Senator Caraway declared that he was 
“so thoroughly persuaded that there is no work the Government does which pays such 
a dividend as this in the matter of public health, that I feel there could be no objection 
to it, because a strong healthy population is most important… It contributes more to 
the national welfare than otherwise could be contributed. I live in the valley of the 
Mississippi, and we know of what tremendous importance this is.”393 
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Kentucky Senator Ben Williamson told the committee that, in his own home 
county, the similar cooperative initiative of the Rockefeller Foundation’s International 
Health Board had provided funding for the development of a county health board. The 
board, Williamson informed his fellow senators, had been a great success. Following 
an initial period of support from the Rockefeller Foundation, it had emerged fully 
independent, supported by local and state funds. In the aftermath of the flood, “our 
county health organizations were called on to go into this flood area, and they went in, 
and it was a wonderful thing to have had that.”394 
A large collection of letters, solicited by Dr. C.W. Garrison, Arkansas state 
health officer and head of the Conference of State Health Authorities of North 
America, further demonstrated the growing breadth of local support for the Public 
Health Service’s cooperative program. In letter after letter, state and county officials 
testified to the urgency of the public health situation and need for federal support. 
James M. Smith, a county judge from Desha County, Arkansas, explained that his 
home county needed money to continue to pay for a health officer, nurse, sanitary 
inspector, vaccines and antitoxins for typhoid and diphtheria, and brewer’s yeast, 
which was quickly becoming an established public health expenditure for the 
prevention of pellagra throughout the South. 
The people of Desha County, Judge Smith wrote, “have begun to appreciate” 
the importance of the county’s public health programs. “We feel sure that the death 
rate has been lowered considerably during the past three years.” What advances had 
been made, Smith believed, were likely to be lost if the county’s public health board 
was allowed to be discontinued: “During the next few months the undernourished 
condition of a great number of our people will make it almost imperative that every 
possible precaution be taken to prevent the spread of communicable diseases. Pellagra 
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is already on the increase, and no one knows what could happen before the middle of 
next year. Insanity, said to be due largely from pellagra, is again on the increase.” 
Evoking the long-established reasoning of the Rockefeller hookworm 
campaign and arguments of Public Health Service officers during the 1920s, Judge 
Smith drew attention to the economic significance of disease. “I feel reasonable sure,” 
he wrote, “that a continuation of the health program in this county would be worth $3 
for every dollar it might cost. Well and healthful people are not only able to earn more 
money and produce a great deal more crops, but there is a great saving in doctor bills, 
medicine bills, and funeral expenses.” “I cannot help but feel,” he continued, “that our 
own Senator Robinson, with the able assistance of our other Senator and 
Congressmen, will be able to convince the Congress that the physical welfare of our 
people is a matter of grave and paramount importance.”395 
 
On February 6, 1931, in a show of confidence in the Public Health Service’s 
cooperative rural sanitation initiative, Congress appropriated an additional $2 million 
for its operation in the drought-stricken areas. The existing appropriation for the 1931 
fiscal year had been for only $338,000.396 Acknowledging the weak economic 
condition of participating counties and states, the new authorization did not require 
local matching funds for “cooperative” projects.397 The Public Health Service quickly 
telegrammed officials from states in the drought area defined by the Department of 
Agriculture and, on February 10th, held a meeting in Memphis with representatives 
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from twenty states deemed affected.398 Some county health work funded by the new 
appropriation was underway as early as March 1931.399 
 When it came time to reauthorize the Public Health Service effort in the 
drought area a year later, the enthusiasm of many members of Congress for the 
program was palpable. Senators Alben Barkley of Kentucky and Josiah Bailey of 
North Carolina testified to the need for the continuation and expansion of the 
cooperative program, while Oregon Republican Charles McNary, chair of the Senate 
Agriculture Committee, wondered aloud whether the program should be extended into 
the Northwest. Questioning the Surgeon General, McNary asked whether is was 
“essential that something of this kind should be done elsewhere than originally 
planned, and if so, should it be nation-wide and embrace all of the states?” Somewhat 
hesitant, Dr. Cumming expressed his belief that the senators “need no longer attribute 
the need for the work to drought conditions alone.” Restrictions on the destination of 
the federal money previously earmarked for the drought area, he suggested, should be 
removed, “so that there may be more elasticity in our work with counties and states 
which for reasons other than drought need the work.”400 
Pressed on his understanding of the proper role of the federal government in 
public health, Surgeon General Cumming attempted to articulate the ideas underlying 
the Public Health Service cooperative program: “We believe that very little good is 
accomplished if the Federal Government contributes everything and the States and 
counties do not contribute anything. We also have the belief, which is shared by the 
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Figure 15. The Cumulative Number of Southern County Health Boards Receiving 
Assistance from the United States Public Health Service and the Rockefeller 
Foundation, 1915-1933. Source: Adapted from Public Health Bulletin No. 222: 
History of County Health Organizations. 
 
Rockefeller Foundation, and we work along the same policy, that it is wise to attempt 
to go into a county and with this cooperation, build them up for a period of from three 
to five years, at which time it should be self-supporting. That is the general rule, but 
there are exceptions to every rule, and there are some parts of the country that will 
never be able to get taxes enough to carry on an efficient health department. As to 
them it is a great problem for the Federal Government to know what it shall do.”401 
 
                                                
401 Ibid., p. 819. 
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The confluence of war, natural disaster, and bureaucratic will had, by the early 
1930s, drawn the federal government into increasingly close cooperation with 
southern state and county governments in pursuit of public health goals. By 
highlighting the precedent of 1927 and portraying federal intervention as a temporary 
measure, necessitated by the humanitarian disaster in the drought area, the proponents 
of federal-state-county cooperation in public health further consolidated the 
institutional gains made during the 1920s. Political legitimacy, generated by federal 
public health workers at the local level, had helped to persuade national-level 
politicians to support an increase in the Public Health Service’s rural cooperative 
efforts. Still, neither the Congress nor the President had endorsed such efforts as a 
permanent goal of federal public policy. Within a few years, however, as the power of 
the federal government expanded in a number of fields, the issue of “health security” 
would be taken up in earnest by the authors of the Social Security Act. 
 
THE NEW DEAL 
The election of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932 made southern Democrats 
members of a winning presidential coalition for the first time since the reelection of 
Woodrow Wilson. In charge of the House of Representatives following the 1930 
midterm elections, Democrats now also controlled the Senate. Wildly popular in the 
South, the new president appeared an adept negotiator of the cleavages between the 
northern and southern wings of his party. Well aware of the unemployment, poverty, 
and hunger that haunted the nation’s cities, Roosevelt possessed a deep commitment, 
expressed time and again in his campaign against Herbert Hoover, to addressing the 
hardships that had plagued rural America beginning with the agricultural depression of 
1921 and throughout the industrial boom of the 1920s. 
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The Agricultural Adjustment Act, signed into law in May 1933, was the 
centerpiece of the Roosevelt administration’s plan to stabilize and hopefully 
reinvigorate American agriculture. The representatives of southern agricultural 
interests eagerly supported the bill. Since the fall of 1929, when cotton sold for 
between 16 and 18 cents per pound, its price had dropped to around six and a half 
cents.402 The worldwide economic depression combined with ongoing competition 
from other cotton producers, such as India, to curtail the demand for American cotton. 
Meanwhile, the incentive structure for southern farmers continued to push them 
towards growing as much cotton as possible, bringing prices further downward. The 
Agricultural Adjustment Act aimed to halt American agriculture’s self-defeating 
tendencies. “The sole aim and object of this act,” AAA administrator George Peek 
explained, “is to raise farm prices… It is to enable [farmers] to do what all other 
producing social groups do, and that is… not to produce and send to market more 
goods than consumers at home and abroad want and have money to pay for.”403 
The ideas underlying the AAA were an outgrowth of attempts to develop a 
plan for limiting overproduction or restoring “parity” between agriculture and industry 
during the 1920s.404 The Act’s core principle was straightforward: by inducing farmers 
to limit the size of their crops, the AAA would raise the prices of depressed 
commodities. In the South, farmers would be given the option of taking either a cash 
payment, based on expected yield, to release cotton acreage from production, or a 
smaller cash payment combined with an option to purchase government-owned cotton 
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“at six cents a pound in amounts equaling their crop reduction.”405 Since the new 
growing season was already underway when the AAA was signed into law, much of 
the crop already planted crop had to be uprooted. By the end of August 1933, the 
Department of Agriculture could report that over 10,000,000 acres of cotton had been 
destroyed. 406 Previously languishing at 6½ cents, cotton prices rose to just over ten 
cents a pound.407 
The Agricultural Adjustment Administration operated a broadly similar 
program for reducing the South’s yield of tobacco, which had undergone a price 
collapse mirroring that of cotton. Together, these programs set in motion fundamental 
shifts in the southern political economy. In addition to bringing an end to regional 
overproduction, they laid the groundwork for the ultimate demise of the system of 
tenancy and sharecropping that had dominated the region since Reconstruction. By 
reducing the size of the cotton crop, the Agricultural Adjustment Act set in motion a 
process that, in the long run, almost guaranteed the displacement of the families that 
grew it. For the time being, however, southern agriculture remained unmechanized, 
guaranteeing a strong demand for workers to pick cotton at the end of the growing 
season and limiting the ability of landowners to get rid of tenants. The federal relief 
agencies helped to ensure the availability of this labor supply, regularly releasing 
workers from the relief rolls in order to provide landowners with labor at harvest 
time.408 
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Already growing in stature as a result of its response to the 1927 flood and the 
1930-31 drought, the Public Health Service’s efforts at building local public health 
infrastructure were further strengthened by the Roosevelt administration’s expanded 
vision of the role of the federal government. In October 1933, the creation of the Civil 
Works Administration, a short-lived public works program, quickly directed the 
energy of thousands of out-of-work southerners towards public health efforts in the 
region. Asked to suggest efforts in which Civil Works Administration workers “might 
be profitably employed,” the Public Health Service proposed a malaria-control 
drainage program, a large-scale privy building campaign, surveys of typhus fever, and 
an effort to seal abandoned coal mines. Employing funds channeled through the states 
by the Civil Works Administration, the anti-malaria effort had at its disposal, as it 
began, approximately $4.5 million to devote to labor costs. The directors of the privy 
building project controlled around $5 million in funds for paying CWA laborers.409 
 Between December 1933 and February 1934, when the Civil Works 
Administration was discontinued, the agency spent a little less than half of the money 
set aside for anti-malaria and privy-building efforts. At one point, during January 
1934, the Public Health Service estimated that “the number at work on malaria 
drainage… was over 130,000 laborers,” though the average for the period between 
December and March was likely around 64,000 workers. 410 By March, the Public 
Health Service had recorded the construction of more than 200,000 privies and 
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estimated that CWA workers had “constructed or partially completed” an additional 
25,000 more.411 
 Ultimately of more importance, cooperation between the Civil Works 
Administration and the Public Health Service proved only the beginning of the 
relationship between the Public Health Service and the new federal public works 
agencies. The Federal Emergency Relief Agency, which had overseen the CWA, soon 
opted to continue backing the Public Health Service-directed anti-malaria and privy-
building projects.412 At the same time, FERA took on the responsibility for funding 
the Public Health Service’s county health program, which had appeared briefly to be 
in danger as the drought appropriation expired and the Depression made it 
increasingly difficult for county governments to provide funding to support the 
effort.413 
 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION: PUBLIC HEALTH AND 
THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 
Already by the end of 1934, steps were being taken that would guarantee the 
permanence of the Public Health Service’s county health initiative as well as the 
expansion of its scope and influence into a set of institutions and programs that, in 
time, helped make the federal government the principle force in the direction of public 
health policy throughout the nation.414 Charged with investigating “problems relating 
to the economic security of individuals,” the presidentially-appointed Committee on 
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Economic Security drew up the proposals that would become the Social Security Act 
of 1935.415 Dr. Edgar Sydenstricker, Joseph Goldberger’s collaborator in the 
investigation of pellagra in South Carolina mill villages during the 1910s, was placed, 
along with Dr. Isidore Falk, in charge of the study of “risks to economic security 
arising out of ill health.”416 Initially envisioning the role of their subcommittee to be 
the development of ideas about how a national health insurance plan might work, 
Sydenstricker and Falk quickly broadened their focus. Personally an advocate of a 
national system of insurance, Sydenstricker was forced to acknowledge that significant 
barriers, particularly the opposition of many physicians and the American Medical 
Association, stood in the way of any insurance legislation. Even the Committee on 
Economic Security’s health subcommittee appeared irreconcilably divided over the 
insurance issue.417 
Nonetheless, Sydenstricker recognized that there were other, less controversial, 
ways that the emerging Social Security Act could positively benefit the nation’s 
health. The health advisory committee included physicians with intimate knowledge of 
the Public Health Service’s rural county cooperative program. Dr. Allen Freeman, 
now a professor of public health at Johns Hopkins, had directed Virginia’s hookworm 
campaign during the 1910s and, as Ohio’s state health officer, had urged his fellow 
state officers to support the failed Lever Rural Health Bill in 1919.418 Dr. Felix 
                                                
415 Edwin E. Witte, The Development of the Social Security Act:  A Memorandum on the History of the 
Committee on Economic Security and Drafting and Legislative History of the Social Security Act 
(Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1962), “Appendix I: Executive Order Establishing the 
Committee on Economic Security and the Advisory Council of Economic Security,” p. 201-02. 
416 "Public Health in the Program for Economic Security," The Milbank Fund Quarterly 13, no. 2 
(1935): p. 149; Witte, Development of the Social Security Act, p. 172. 
417 Edgar Sydenstricker, "Public Health Provisions of the Social Security Act," Law and Contemporary 
Problems 3, no. 2 (1936): p. 264-65. 
418 See Economic Security Act: Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of 
Representatives, Seventy-Fourth Congress, First Session, on H.R. 4120, a Bill to Alleviate the Hazards 
of Old Age, Unemployment, Illness, and Dependency, to Establish a Social Insurance Board in the 
Department of Labor, to Raise Revenue, and for Other Purposes,  (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1935), p. 505. 
 188 
Underwood, Executive Director of the Mississippi State Board of Health since 1924, 
was a firm advocate of the Public Health Service’s efforts in his state and respected 
public health voice in the region as a whole.419 
“It was not long,” Sydenstricker wrote, “before the technical staff to which the 
subject of health was specifically assigned realized that health insurance was only one 
method by which certain risks to economic security might be lessened.”420 For the 
members of Sydenstricker and Falk’s health advisory subcommittee, an expansion of 
the Public Health Service’s program of stimulating the development of county health 
departments appeared to make both practical and political sense. Ongoing since World 
War I, federal-state-local cooperation had a deep well of local support and 
longstanding record of success. Rather than provoking opposition, it seemed likely 
that an expansion would help to ease political tensions over the massive expansion of 
federal power being contemplated by the Committee on Economic Security. 
Within the health advisory subcommittee itself, the proposed expansion of the 
county cooperative program swiftly gained the support of both proponents and 
opponents of national health insurance. Edwin Witte, the Committee on Economic 
Security’s Chairman, noted that “Some members believed that much more good could 
be accomplished through an extension of public health work and public medical 
services than through health insurance.” At the same time, “a somewhat larger group, 
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who were strongly opposed to health insurance, looked upon increased appropriations 
for public health work as a means of killing the proposal for health insurance.”421 
 
 The Committee on Economic Security’s report, containing the proposals of 
Sydenstricker and Falk’s health subcommittee, was issued in January 1935. Endorsing 
a substantial expansion of the Public Health Service’s federal-state-county cooperative 
program, the report explained that there were “well-established precedents for Federal 
aid for State health administration and for local public facilities, and for the loan of 
technical personnel to States and localities. What we recommend involves no 
departure from previous practices, but an extension of policies that have long been 
followed and are of proven worth.” The ideal outcome was stated clearly: “What is 
contemplated is a nation-wide public health program, financially and technically aided 
by the Federal Government, but supported and administered by the State and local 
health departments.”422 
 Eventually codified as Title VI of the Social Security Act, the expanded 
cooperative program “was drafted to suit the wishes of the United States Public Health 
Service.”423 As Committee on Economic Security director Edwin Witte explained, the 
“authorized appropriations for public health work… were throughout the 
congressional consideration of this measure a source of strength for the bill.” In line 
with the geographical origins of federal involvement in the development of local 
public health capacity, Title VI was aimed in large part at addressing the health needs 
of the South. “The aids provided in this title,” Witte wrote, “were understood to be 
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primarily for states in which public health work had been backward, due largely to 
state poverty. These were particularly the southern states, and the heads of the state 
departments of health in nearly all these states appeared before the congressional 
committees to endorse this part of the bill.”424 
During the congressional hearings, Title VI was routinely characterized as an 
unobjectionable extension of existing federal activities. “This program,” Assistant 
Surgeon General C.E. Waller told the House Ways and Means Committee, “will not 
set up new activities in the Public Health Service. It will simply enable us to extend 
cooperative activities with the States that we have carried on for a number of years.”425 
Similarly, Surgeon General Hugh Cumming informed the Senate Finance 
Committee that the proposal was “treading no new ground; it is an extension of an 
attempt on the part of the Federal Government many years ago which has been 
eminently successful. It is not a problematical thing.”426 Kentucky Congressman Fred 
Vinson, describing his personal experience of the Public Health Service’s cooperative 
activities, remarked that “they carry this preventive medicine into the roots of our rural 
society and, to my mind, it is the most splendid work that the Federal Government 
participates in.”427 
The active support and professional prestige of southern public health workers 
helped to solidify the support of southern members of Congress. Southern state health 
officers, Edwin Witte wrote, “gave very strong testimony regarding the need for 
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additional public health work in the South and these arguments strongly appealed to 
members of Congress from this section, many of whom were very influential in the 
two committees considering this legislation.”428 
 
Passed into law as part of the Social Security Act on August 14, 1935, the new 
legislation authorized an ongoing appropriation of $8 million for “the purpose of 
assisting States, counties, health districts, and other political subdivisions of the States 
in establishing and maintaining adequate public-health services.” The new 
authorization also allowed for this funding to be used for “the training of personnel for 
State and local health work.” Money for the development of public health 
infrastructure, which was placed under the administrative control of the Public Health 
Service, would be appropriated on the basis of population, “special health problems,” 
and the “financial needs” of the states. 429 Title VI, Edwin Witte remarked, vested 
“broader discretionary power in the United States Public Health Service than is 
conferred upon any federal agency in any other title.”430 
In the aftermath of the Social Security Act, the bureaucratic model of public 
health, centered around the county health board and backed by the federal 
government, was consolidated throughout the South. In 1936, as the federal 
government further expanded its role, the Rockefeller Foundation, central in the 
development of public health infrastructure since 1910, effectively pulled out of the 
region. 431 Its contribution, nonetheless, had been invaluable: employing methods 
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developed by the Rockefeller International Health Board and the United States Public 
Health Service beginning in the 1910s, county health boards would provide the 
foundation for the permanent transformation of the disease environment in the 
southern United States. Adopting the model of the Rockefeller Foundation, the Public 
Health Service’s federal-state-county cooperative initiative emerged from World War 
I under the leadership of Leslie Lumsden, expanded and gained national legitimacy 
following the 1927 flood and 1930-1931 drought, and finally was made, with the 
support of its southern constituency, the institutional bedrock of a new federal 
commitment to the health of individual citizens and communities throughout the 
nation.
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CHAPTER 5 
 
“The Religion of Mankind’s Future” 
 
 
By 1937, as Franklin Roosevelt began his second term, the impact of New 
Deal public works projects and the Public Health Service’s attempts to build local 
public health infrastructure in the South was increasingly evident. Operating from a 
base of knowledge, practical experience, and institutional support developed 
beginning in the 1910s, public health workers achieved dramatic gains within an 
impressively short period of time. These gains were reinforced and cemented by the 
permanence, now guaranteed by the federal government, of state and local public 
health infrastructure. Over the course of the 1930s, the mortality rate for both pellagra 
and malaria dropped dramatically, never to increase again. 
As the health status of the South made significant gains, the inconsistent 
ideological inclinations of the constituencies comprising the New Deal coalition 
became more and more apparent. President Roosevelt’s attempt to alter the 
composition of the Supreme Court in 1937 created an opening for southern Democrats 
wary of the expanding role of the federal government to openly criticize the President; 
later, his attempts to influence southern Democratic primary elections in 1938 both 
highlighted and exacerbated intra-party tensions. The emergence of the “conservative 
coalition” during Roosevelt’s second term highlighted the growing disconnect 
between southern dependence on federal aid and the historical concern of the South’s 
political leaders with states’ rights and local autonomy. 
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THE DECLINE OF HOOKWORM 
Still an important problem, Hookworm was already greatly diminished in 
prevalence as a result of the efforts of the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission and the 
focus of southern county health departments on encouraging privy construction and 
shoe-wearing. As the disease receded, southern public health workers had turned 
increasingly towards attempting to deal with the threats posed by pellagra and malaria. 
Already in 1927, the Rockefeller International Health Board concluded, much to the 
dismay of hookworm discoverer Charles Wardell Stiles, that “At the present time it is 
fair to say that hookworm disease has almost disappeared from the United States.”432 
When publicized, Stiles later wrote, this announcement “had the effect of still 
further decreasing the school interest in hookworm disease and, very unfortunately, in 
inducing many mothers to refuse to accept the diagnosis by physicians and 
consequently to decline to permit the children to be treated.” Nonetheless, Stiles 
believed, “very few” southern physicians southern “had taken the announcement in 
question seriously.”433 Now, in the face of federally-funded public works efforts to 
provide adequate privies for the South, hookworm retreated further to the periphery of 
southern society, persisting only lightly and in a few isolated pockets. 434 
 
THE DECLINE OF PELLAGRA 
Despite the unfavorable economic conditions, pellagra incidence declined 
throughout the 1930s. In retrospect, it was clear that the 1927 Mississippi flood was a 
crucial turning point. In 1938, science writer Paul DeKruif , who had interviewed 
Joseph Goldberger following the flood, wrote that the response to the disaster “was the 
                                                
432 The New York Times, “Hookworm Menace Ended, Says Board,” August 22, 1927; Stiles, "Early 
History," p. 305. 
433 Stiles, "Early History," p. 305. 
434 See Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service of the United States for the 
Fiscal Year 1936,  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1936), p. 72-75. 
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Table 13. Privies Installed under Civilian Works Administration, Emergency Relief 
Administration, and Works Progress Administration Programs, December 1933 
through June 1937. 
 
 No. of Privies 
Alabama 8,251 
Arkansas 63,341 
Florida 13,195 
Georgia 35,400 
Kentucky 47,189 
Louisiana 52,885 
Mississippi 64,844 
North Carolina 108,060 
Oklahoma 83,620 
South Carolina 76,624 
Tennessee 106,630 
Texas 90,817 
Virginia 96,970 
 
Source: Surgeon General’s Annual Report for the Fiscal Year 1937, p. 33-34. 
 
first field test, under practical conditions, under the worst possible scientific 
surroundings,” of Goldberger’s finding that brewer’s yeast would cure pellagra. 
Following the flood, public health workers “began their sowing of the seeds of 
knowledge of this dirt-cheap science. It was the deepest down-to-the grass-roots mass 
sowing because only the lowest of the human mass was threatened.” “Yes,” De Kruif 
concluded, echoing the barely concealed enthusiasm of Public Health Service officers 
a decade before, “the flood was a good disaster.”435 
Goldberger’s discovery that brewer’s yeast would prevent and cure pellagra 
meant that the disease could be confronted head on even in the context of the 
Depression. Knowledge of the cure could be spread through the growing system of 
county health departments. Since yeast was a commercially distributed product, there 
were also incentives for private companies, such as Fleischmann’s, to advertise its 
                                                
435 Paul DeKruif, The Fight for Life (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938), p. 16-17. 
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Figure 16. A&P grocery advertisement emphasizing the Pellagra-Preventative 
qualities of yeast, 1931. Source: Atlanta Constitution, January 3, 1931. 
 
health benefits. The spread of knowledge about the pellagra-preventative qualities of 
yeast was complimented by the changing face of the southern countryside: reduction 
of the cotton crop following the Agricultural Adjustment Act meant that families 
could begin to grow small gardens. The confluence of brewer’s yeast, county health 
departments, and new opportunities to plant vegetables signaled the onset of pellagra’s 
retreat. 
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Following up on his earlier writings on Goldberger’s pellagra research, 
DeKruif traveled to Sunflower County, Mississippi in May 1937 with officers from 
the Public Health Service. With financial support from the Red Cross and the help of 
community groups, the PHS officers hoped to identify pellagra victims in a select 
group of Mississippi Delta counties. Within these model counties, the Public Health 
Service planned to wholly eliminate the disease by administering brewer’s yeast and 
persuading residents to grow their own gardens. 
Aware of the rapid decline of pellagra over the course of the preceding decade, 
DeKruif was nonetheless shocked by what he saw in Sunflower County. The county, 
he wrote, was “supposed the blackest pellagra spot remaining in Mississippi. This was 
where over thirteen hundred had been found pellagrous in 1931, and though the 
sickness had been since that on the downgrade, yet the number suffering in 1935 was 
formidable.” By the time of DeKruif’s visit in 1937, however, pellagra had nearly 
vanished. The disease “had become so no-account that it was not mentioned as a 
public health menace in County Health Officer Hugh Cottrell’s report for 1936.” 436 
The residents of Sunflower County, DeKruif found, were well-informed of 
both the menace of pellagra and proper methods of warding off the disease: “Did the 
Negro sharecroppers know about pellagra? Oh, yas, suh, we know pellagracy. Did 
they know about yeast? In leaky cabin after ramshackle shanty the dark people, 
mammies, aunties, told how ‘east was mighty good for the pellagracy.” In addition to 
consuming tablespoons of yeast mixed with water, it appeared that sharecroppers 
throughout the county were now growing vegetables in home gardens. Ten years 
before, Joseph Goldberger had noted that southern landowners, insisting that as much 
land as possible be dedicated to cotton, often prohibited tenants from planting gardens. 
                                                
436 Ibid., p. 25. 
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Now, DeKruif wrote, “It was astounding to find so few cabins without their fenced-in 
patch of green. Here was Aunt Lyra, in her garden patch on a big plantation near 
Indianola. Yas, suh, she’d had the pellagracy. Not no more.”437 
Having spent the day driving throughout Sunflower County looking for victims 
of pellagra, DeKruif and the Public Health Service officers found only one case, that 
of a white tenant farmer. Mississippi State Epidemiologist H.C. Ricks, Sunflower 
County Health Officer Hugh Cotrell, and a local public health nurse each offered 
DeKruif a similar explanation for pellagra’s decline, which was seconded by local 
planters and black sharecroppers: “pellagra was bad business, in the literal sense of the 
word business.” In blunt language that captured much of the reasoning long employed 
by public health workers in the South, Dr. Ricks explained to DeKruif that white 
landowners would cooperate with anti-pellagra efforts “because your planter wants his 
nigger to work.”438 
 
The changes observed by DeKruif had an unmistakable institutional basis. 
Prior to 1927, Sunflower County had had no full-time county health department. The 
Rockefeller Sanitary Commission recorded treatment of only twenty-eight cases of 
hookworm between 1910 and 1914 in the lightly infected county, which also fell 
outside the jurisdiction of the Public Health Service’s efforts in the wartime extra-
cantonment zones.439 Beset by both pellagra and malaria in average years, the county 
was hit hard by the 1927 Mississippi flood.440 A full-time county health department 
                                                
437 Ibid., p. 25-26. 
438 Ibid., p. 27. 
439 Out of 1,858 school children survey by the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission in Sunflower County, 
only 27, or 1.45%, were found to be infected. RSC records show that a total of 28 people were treated 
for the disease. See The Rockefeller Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm, Fifth 
Annual Report, p. 70, 72. 
440 Public Health Service officer Kenneth Maxcy’s 1923 study of malaria incidence found that 
Sunflower County averaged a mortality rate of 10.9 per 10,000 population in 1919-1921, indicating a 
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was created in July 1927 as emergency funds from the Public Health Service and the 
Rockefeller Foundation became available. By the end of the year, the Public Health 
Service had spent $2,063 in the county and the Rockefeller Foundation $987. 
Meanwhile, the state government contributed $1,375 and the county government 
allocated an impressive $1,825. By 1933, in the depths of the Depression, the health 
department’s annual budget stood at $10,480.441  
DeKruif was impressed by the health department’s efforts at community 
outreach. At a black church in Inverness, Mississippi, he observed a health clinic put 
on by County Health Officer Hugh Cottrell and the department’s public health nurses. 
The mothers and children present, he wrote, were “participants in a service that was- 
to this reporter- prophetic of the religion of mankind’s future.” The children were 
given diphtheria antitoxin and vaccinations for smallpox and typhoid, while the 
mothers were instructed in “how to care for themselves before their babies came” and 
“the latest in the science of the feeding of their children, in little words that all could 
understand.” 
From DeKruif’s perspective, “there was something the opposite of 
condescending or paternalistic in the atmosphere of that church clinic.” Instead, he 
asserted that “Cottrell and his nurses, white people, highly educated, were exactly like 
older brothers and sisters teaching the great power of science- not the book knowledge 
of it but the actual use of it- to these childlike dark mothers.” White scientific 
expertise, in the form of practical public health measures, represented a gateway to 
racial uplift and modernity: “it was plain that these present descendents of a people, 
 
                                                                                                                                       
particularly severe malaria problem. See Maxcy, "The Distribution of Malaria in the United States as 
Indicated by Mortality Reports," p. 1129. 
441 Mead, Public Health Bulletin No. 222: History of County Health Organizations in the United States, 
1908-33, p. 272. The county’s health budget ranged from an initial point of $6,250 in 1927 to a high of 
$25,500 in 1931.  
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Figure 17. Pellagra Deaths per 100,000 Estimated Population (Entire United States). 
Source: Census Bureau, Annual Mortality Statistics, 1928-1936; Census Bureau and 
Public Health Service, Vital Statistics, 1937-1945. 
 
 
benighted and savage two hundred years ago, were now beginning to understand this 
new magic, and to depend upon its life-giving power.”442 
 
 
THE DECLINE OF MALARIA 
Still an unwelcome presence in many southerners’ lives, malaria, like pellagra, 
was also falling victim to increasingly effective public health efforts. Under attack 
throughout the 1920s, the disease had entered a decline after 1933 from which it 
would never recover. Mortality statistics, the only reliable evidence of malaria rates 
during the 1930s, are an imperfect means of gauging the extent of malaria’s effect on 
                                                
442 DeKruif, Fight for Life, p. 27-28. 
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southern society, which, like pellagra, came largely in the form of sickness rather than 
death. Nonetheless, the decline in the death rate helps to illustrate the broader decline 
in malaria incidence: from 3.7 deaths per 100,000 Americans in 1933, the malaria 
mortality rate fell to 2.1 per 100,000 in 1937. By 1940, the rate had fallen to 1.1443 
Given the context, the rate of decline is striking: malaria is a disease of poverty, and 
the rural South was hit hard by the Depression. The economic dislocation that affected 
many rural tenants in the aftermath of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, meanwhile, 
might reasonably have been expected to increase the prevalence of malaria in the 
region. 444 
 
The decrease in malaria incidence during the 1930s is largely attributable to 
the efforts of the federal public works agencies, supervised by Public Health Service 
officers, and the expansion of anti-malaria efforts centered in county health boards. By 
the end of June 1937, relief workers had drained an estimated 425,000 acres of 
Anopheles mosquito breeding grounds.445 Though less well-organized than the Public 
Health Service would have liked, these efforts made a quick impact.446 In reviewing 
                                                
443 The methodology used to determine these rates and number of states (48) within the Death 
Registration Area remained consistent throughout this period. Texas, the final state to join the 
Registration Area, was first included in 1933. See Mortality Statistics, 1933: Thirty-Fourth Annual 
Report,  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1936), p. 37; Vital Statistics of the United 
States, Part I,  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1939), p. 24. 
444 On the displacement of farmers, hastened by changes in the AAA contract for the 1934 growing 
season, see Wright, Old South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy since the Civil War, p. 
229-30. 
445 Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service of the United States for the 
Fiscal Year 1937,  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1937), p. 32. 
446 For a particularly critical account of the public works efforts, see T.H.D. Griffitts, "Malaria Control- 
Comments on the Past and Future," American Journal of Public Health 27(1937). “Owing to the speed 
with which such employment was to be met and the continual indefiniteness during the periods of 
work,” writes Griffitts, of the PHS ‘s Henry Rose Carter Laboratory in Savannah, “these efforts could 
not be regarded, by those professionally and by experience trained in malaria control, as a rounded 
program of malaria control, such as would have been set up under normal conditions, with equal funds 
available and a long period over which to plan and to execute anti-malaria drainage. The Primary 
purpose was ‘putting men to work.’” 
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Figure 18. Malaria Death Rate per 100,00 Estimated Population (Entire United 
States). Source: Census Bureau, Annual Mortality Statistics, 1928-1936; Census 
Bureau and Public Health Service, Vital Statistics, 1937-1945. 
Note: Texas became the last state to enter the Death Registration area in 1933, 
accounting for some of the spike between 1932 and 1933. The states included in the 
Registration area remained consistent from 1933-1945. 
 
the Civil Works Administration’s anti-malaria effort during the winter of 1933-1934, 
the Public Health Service’s Dr. Louis L. Williams noted that many “projects during 
their inception were improperly planned by supervisors of limited experience and 
some even were constructed where work was unnecessary. Here and there ditches 
appeared that were almost impossible to maintain.” Nonetheless, Williams continued, 
“most of these errors were corrected, and those few remaining are on the program for 
proper reconstruction.” Based on the estimates of the PHS’s “most experienced men in 
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the field,” Williams believed it likely that “at least 90 per cent of the work has been 
good work.”447 
The CWA’s drainage efforts were continued, with apparent success, first by 
the Federal Emergency Relief Agency and then by the Works Progress 
Administration. Surveying the efforts of the WPA in Mississippi, the Public Health 
Service’s Joseph A. Le Prince found that “Excellent supervisory judgment has been 
used, both as to the planning of the work and the economic methods of overcoming 
potential difficulties and particularly of making use of available low cost selected 
material.”448 By the end of the decade, the WPA and the PHS were increasingly 
focused on making improvements in drainage permanent by sealing projects with 
concrete and brick and mortar. Despite substantial early regional variation in the 
degree of the program’s impact, the overall malaria mortality rate began to drop in the 
summer of 1934, the first summer following the beginning of public works drainage 
projects, and never rose again.449 
A more dramatic decrease in malaria mortality followed the release of Title VI 
funds at the beginning of 1936. From 3.1 deaths per 100,000 in that year, the malaria 
mortality rate declined to 2.1 in 1937. By 1940, the malaria mortality rate had declined 
to 1.1 per 100,000. By providing a more permanent and comprehensive basis for 
malaria control in the form of county health departments and money for the training of 
local public health workers in malaria control techniques, Title VI of the Social 
Security Act helped both to advance and solidify the gains already made by public 
                                                
447 Williams, "Civil Works Administration Emergency Relief Administration Malaria Control Program 
in the South," p. 13. 
448 Report of the Board of Health of the State of Mississippi, Thirtieth Biennial Report, July 1, 1935- 
June 30, 37, p. 99. 
449 See C.C. Dauer and Ernest Carroll Faust, "Malaria Mortality in the United States, with Especial 
Reference to the Southeastern States," Southern Medical Journal 30, no. 9 (1937); ———, "Malaria 
Mortality in the Southern United States for 1934, with Supplementary Data for Previous Years," 
Southern Medical Journal 29, no. 7 (1936). 
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works efforts.450 State health department laboratories received funding to test blood 
samples for malaria, while laboratory technicians were given new training 
opportunities.451 State and county departments coordinated malaria-control operations 
with the Works Progress Administration and Public Health Service, working with the 
PHS to develop long-term plans for eliminating the disease through drainage, 
screening, and larvicice. Meanwhile, public health workers from throughout the South 
were given Title VI funds to take short courses at the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
malaria research lab in Tallahassee, the Public Health Service’s facilities in Savannah, 
the Bureau of Entomology’s lab in Orlando, and at the facilities of the Tennessee 
Valley Authority in Muscle Shoals.452 
 
The South’s debilitating diseases were increasingly the victims of a mounting 
revolution in public health, centered in the region’s county health infrastructure. 
Wisely, many participants in this revolution expressed only a restrained optimism. The 
decline of malaria, in particular, appeared too good to be true. For some medical 
professionals, it seemed consistent with a broader cyclical pattern of malaria 
incidence. In 1938, prominent malariologist Ernest Carroll Fuast suggested that the 
malaria death rate, “which developed to a peak so suddenly in 1933,” had “apparently 
reached its trough, and that, unless unusual circumstances supervene, an average rise 
                                                
450 Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service of the United States for the 
Fiscal Year 1937, p. 31; Joseph W. Mountin and Emily K. Hankla, "Training Public Health Workers: 
Programs Sponsored by State Health Departments under Title Vi of the Federal Social Security Act and 
the Federal Venereal Disease Control Act (1936-44)," Public Health Reports 61, no. 21 (1946); Emily 
Hankla Joseph Mountin, and Georgie Druzina, Ten Years of Federal Grants-in-Aid for Public Health, 
1936-1946 (Washington, D.C.: Federal Security Agency, Public Health Service, 1948), p. 23. On the 
role of local public health workers trained in malariology by the PHS, see for instance State Board of 
Health of North Carolina Biennial Report, Twenty-Seventh Biennial Report, July 1, 1936-June 30, 38, 
p. 106. 
451 Joseph Mountin, Ten Years of Federal Grants-in-Aid for Public Health, 1936-1946, p. 23. 
452 Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service of the United States for the 
Fiscal Year 1937, p. 31. See also Annual Report of the State Board of Health of Alabama, for 1937 p. 
179. Newly hired engineers from Alabama, for instance, spent four weeks in Savannah, two in 
Tallahassee, and four weeks at the facilities of the TVA before being assigned to individual counties. 
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in the rate may again be anticipated in 1938 or 1939.”453 That malaria remained an 
ongoing threat in the face of substantial federal spending suggested, in addition, that a 
resurgence might occur when spending was reigned in.454 
 
SOUTHERN POLITICS AND THE NEW DEAL COALITION 
As the beneficial effects of the federal government’s public health efforts 
began to be felt throughout the South, the relationship between southern members of 
Congress and President Roosevelt grew increasingly strained. Reelected in a landslide 
in 1936, Roosevelt began his second term with an assault on the existing makeup of 
the Supreme Court. In early February 1937, the President proposed that he be allowed 
to appoint one additional judge to the Supreme Court for every sitting judge over the 
age of 70, a plan unmistakably aimed at shifting the ideological makeup of the Court 
in favor of the New Deal. 455 
In a series of cases over the preceding years, the Court had declared key 
legislative components of the New Deal to be unconstitutional. The Court’s 1935 
decision in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, striking down parts of the 
National Industrial Recovery Act, called into question the expansive interpretation of 
the Constitution’s Interstate Commerce Clause that underpinned much of the New 
Deal’s attempt to regulate the American economy. In 1936, its ruling in United States 
v. Butler invalidated the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Regardless of his success at the 
                                                
453 Ernest Carroll Faust, "Malaria Mortality in the Southern United States for the Year 1937," in 
Malaria and Its Control: Some Papers Read at the 21st Meeting of the National Malaria Committee, 
Oklahoma City, Okla., Nov. 15-18, 1938 (Tallahassee: 1939), p. 4. 
454 Ibid., p. 8-9. 
455 The New York Times, “President’s Message,” February 6, 1937. 
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polls, it appeared that the Court might dismantle the bulk of Roosevelt’s legislative 
accomplishments, including potentially the 1935 Social Security Act.456 
Though a handful of congressional Democrats offered public support for the 
President’s plan, most remained initially silent. In a sign of what was to come, 
Virginia Senators Carter Glass and Harry F. Bird “indicated fundamental opposition.” 
North Carolina Senator Josiah Bailey, the most vocal early Democratic opponent of 
plan, announced that he would “do all that I can to preserve the independence of the 
judiciary and that respect for the judicial branch of the Government which always has 
been and always will be indispensable to the national stability.”457 
It soon became apparent that a number of congressional Democrats were at 
best skeptical of the President’s plan to pack the Court with New Deal supporters. The 
misleading manner in which the President had justified the proposal only exacerbated 
the unease felt by many. For a key group of southern Democrats, already worried 
about the growing centralization of power in the federal government and wary of the 
strength of the executive branch, Roosevelt’s plan represented an opportunity to speak 
out against a president still intensely popular in the region. 
The Supreme Court began, for its part, began to move decisively away from 
the philosophy that had provoked the President in the first place. In late March, the 
Court ruled state minimum wage laws constitutional in West Coast Hotel v. Parish, 
signaling a major shift in its attitude towards government regulation of contracts. In 
April, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the 1935 National Labor Relations Act, 
inaugurating a trend of Supreme Court deference to legislative claims about the extent 
of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce that soon placed the New Deal 
                                                
456 Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, p. 330-31. See also, for instance, The Washington Post, “Death Blow 
to AAA Presages Like Fate for Other New Deal Measures,” January 12, 1936; The New York Times, 
“Roosevelt Puts Court on Trial Before Nation,” January 10, 1937. 
457 The Washington Post, “Party Lines are Split as Democrats Attack Plan,” February 7, 1937. 
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on solid constitutional ground. The threat to the Social Security Act and other New 
Deal legislation from Court had, over the course of a few months, disappeared.458 
 
Roosevelt, however, was already paying the price for his miscalculation. His 
legislative agenda went nowhere during the spring and, as a new recession overtook 
the nation, an inter-party “conservative coalition” became increasingly emboldened 
and vocal. In a “conservative manifesto” made public in December 1937, a group 
comprised largely of southern Democrats and northern Republicans criticized the 
growing welfare state and called for a balanced budget, lower taxes, and a 
reinvigoration of states’ rights and home rule.459 
Roosevelt responded by openly backing the primary challenges of pro-New 
Deal candidates against conservative Democrats during the 1938 midterm elections. 
Appearing in Georgia, the President deemed incumbent Senator Walter George “a 
dyed-in-the-wool conservative” and endorsed his opponent, Lawrence Camp.460 In 
route back to Washington, Roosevelt addressed a crowd of around 15,000 from the 
platform of his railroad car in Greenville, South Carolina. “If you believe in the 
principles for which we are striving,” the President said, in a speech aimed at Senator 
Ellison D. “Cotton Ed” Smith, “then I hope you will send representatives to the 
National Legislature who will work toward those ends.” Alluding to a claim made by 
Smith on the floor of the Senate that a man could support a family in the “lap of 
luxury” on 50 cents a day in South Carolina, the President ended his remarks by 
                                                
458 Winfred Harbison Alfred Kelly, and Herman Belz, The American Constitution: Its Origins and 
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noting that he didn’t “believe any family or any man in South Carolina can live on 50 
cents a day.”461 
 
Roosevelt’s preferred candidates were defeated. Meanwhile, both Walter 
George in Georgia and “Cotton Ed” Smith in South Carolina responded to Roosevelt’s 
attempts to interject himself into local politics by raising the specter of federal 
intervention in southern race relations. Always a potentially effective campaign tactic, 
the appeal to concerns about race had an added air of urgency given the recent passage 
of a federal anti-lynching law in the House of Representatives and mounting fears 
about the potentially leveling role of labor unions in southern life. “This is the one 
time,” Smith told voters in South Carolina, “whether you like Ed Smith or not every 
red-blooded white man should vote for Smith, because outside organizations are 
seeking to defeat me because of my stand for white supremacy.”462 
North Carolina Senator Josiah Bailey told a convention of young Democrats 
that the South would “not permit Northern Democrats to frame a race policy or any 
social policy for us, no more than we would permit Northern Republicans to do so.” 
The Macon Telegraph, meanwhile, editorialized that the “people of the South have 
been definitively warned that it is the purpose of the New Deal strategists to destroy 
the Democracy of the South by exploitation of the Negro vote.” First through a federal 
anti-lynching law and then through the abolition of the poll tax, the paper alleged, the 
Democratic Party would gain the support of both northern and southern blacks, 
helping to form the base for a new party, shorn of the conservative southerners who 
had been the President’s targets during the midterm elections.463 
                                                
461 The New York Times, “President Appeals to South Carolina,” August 12, 1938. 
462 Quoted in Ibid., “Negro Issue Raised in South at ‘Purge,’” August 23, 1938. See also The New York 
Times, “ ‘White Supremacy’ Issue Revived in the South,” August 28, 1938. 
463 The Washington Post, “Enemies of the New Deal in South Now United,” September 18, 1938. 
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The decline of debilitating disease and institutionalization of federal 
intervention in local public health had been complimented, somewhat paradoxically, 
by the resurgence of states’ rights rhetoric and emergence of the conservative 
coalition, early signs of the divisive role that concerns about race relations would play 
within the Democratic Party. Still, these developments had no apparent immediate 
effect on southern Democrats’ appetite for federal intervention in the field of public 
health. During the next decade, however, southern concerns about the role of the 
federal government would play an important role in the debate over national health 
insurance and in shaping other aspects of federal public health policy. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Southern Maladies 
 
 
World War II and the immediate postwar era marked a crucial turning point in 
the relationship between the federal government and southern public health and in the 
federal role in public health in general. The Communicable Disease Center, later 
renamed the Centers for Disease Control, emerged from the Public Health Service’s 
wartime malaria-control efforts as the central institution in the federal government’s 
attempts to coordinate local public health efforts nationwide. Created as a field station 
of the PHS’s States Relations Division, the CDC’s coordinating role was envisioned 
and set in motion by individuals who had worked at promoting the PHS’s county-level 
efforts under Leslie Lumsden during the post-World War I years. 
Southern politicians, meanwhile, continued to play a central role in shaping the 
contours of federal intervention in public health. The Hill-Burton hospital construction 
program, enacted into law by Congress in 1946, contained explicit provisions for the 
construction of separate-but-equal facilities. Southern concerns about potential role of 
the central government in local race relations helped to derail Harry Truman’s attempt 
to pass compulsory national health insurance. Continuing to support federal programs 
consistent with the preservation of white supremacy, southern Democrats backed an 
alternative health insurance proposal, introduced by Alabama Senator Lister Hill, that 
foreshadowed the Medicaid program passed into law in 1965. As public health efforts 
became an established fact and access to hospitals spread throughout the South, the 
region’s disease environment and health status became increasingly similar to that of 
the rest of the nation. 
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MALARIA CONTROL IN WAR AREAS 
The United States had been moving towards a war footing for well over a year 
when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. In September 1940, 
Congress passed legislation creating a peacetime draft; in March 1941, it approved the 
Lend-Lease program, granting President Roosevelt a great deal of leeway in supplying 
war material to support the British effort to withstand the Nazis. Meanwhile, the 
Public Health Service’s Division of States Relations, which administered the funding 
authorized by Title VI of the Social Security Act, created a “Mosquito Control in 
Defense Areas” program in May of 1941. With an emergency appropriation from 
Congress and the aid of workers provided by the Works Progress Administration, the 
Service expanded drainage projects and other sanitary efforts in communities 
surrounding the nation’s growing military installations.464 
The situation, Assistant Surgeon General Joseph Mountin noted, was 
reminiscent of 1917: “Only those who have seen the insanitary conditions of the boom 
towns are able to appreciate problems now confronting health authorities in many 
localities. Almost overnight, communities have sprung up in which no facilities have 
yet been provided. In other places, the sudden increase in population has rendered 
existing facilities altogether inadequate.” “In many instances,” Mountin continued, “it 
is utterly impossible for the communities in question to provide for the facilities 
through their own resources.”465 
                                                
464 Joseph W. Mountin, "Adaptation of Public Health Programs to Defense Needs," American Journal 
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Nonetheless, there had been significant improvements in local infrastructure 
and capabilities. “As compared with the 1917-18 defense work,” Public Health 
Service Senior Sanitary Engineer E.C. Sullivan and Assistant Sanitary Engineer J.S. 
Wiley reported the month before Pearl Harbor, “better local health service facilities 
and experienced personnel are available at the present time than during the period of 
the previous World War.” In many places, local health departments already existed as 
a result of Title VI of the Social Security Act: “For example, there is a county health 
unit in every county in Alabama, and, as a result, each of the 14 defense areas is 
provided with local health service.”466 Still, “in many cases the local health unit 
facilities were hardly great enough to meet the health needs prior to the national 
defense program. It has been necessary to enlarge and expand these units to care for 
large increases in population.”467 
 
The States Relations Division rapidly expanded its operations following the 
attack. In February 1942, the Division created a new “Malaria Control In War Areas” 
program, headquartered in Atlanta. By late March, malaria control operations were 
under way in the field.468 In many respects similar to the Public Health Service’s 
extra-cantonment zone effort during World War I, Malaria Control in War Areas could 
draw on a vastly larger budget, improved malaria control techniques, strong relations 
with local elites and political leaders, and increasingly sophisticated public health 
infrastructure at the state and county level. As a result of this preexisting 
infrastructure, a later PHS report concluded, “There was no loss of time in acquiring a 
background of knowledge of the malaria problem and of previous malaria control 
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activities, such as malaria surveys and drainage and larviciding projects, and prompt 
advantage could be taken to permit institution or expansion of control measures where 
needed.”469 Following the established pattern of the States Relations Division, Malaria 
Control in War Areas “carried on its malaria control activities largely within the 
framework of the State health departments.”470 
The program’s central focus was ensuring that malaria, in decline since 1934, 
did not reemerge in the southern United States. “At Present,” the 1942-1943 Malaria 
Control in War Areas report announced, “malaria in the United States is at a low point. 
This is the result of the cyclic nature of the disease, and control work carried on by 
community, state, and federal agencies. The purpose of the present MCWA program is 
to maintain the existing low incidence throughout the period of war mobilization. It is 
an enterprise of preventive medicine.”471 
By June of 1942, Malaria Control in War Areas had undertaken operations in 
93 “war areas.”472 A year later, MCWA had initiated projects in 226 “war areas,” 
surrounding air fields, factories, Army and Navy bases, and Japanese-American 
relocation camps. Anti-malaria projects were ongoing in the South, the Border States, 
Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the midwestern states of Indiana, Illinois, and Kansas, and in 
parts of California and Oregon.473 
 
At the core of MCWA’s efforts were larvicide and drainage projects 
employing long-known techniques aimed at controlling mosquito populations.474 Fuel 
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oil and the larvicide paris green were applied to water surfaces by men wielding hand 
dusters and sprayers or from airplanes to limit Anopheles breeding in rivers, streams, 
lakes, and swampland.475 A variety of ditching techniques, employing dynamite, hand 
digging, and heavy construction equipment, were used to drain mosquito breeding 
grounds.476 
These programs were complimented by increased surveillance measures and 
community education campaigns aimed at giving southerners the information 
necessary to avoid becoming infected with malaria. School teachers taught lessons 
about malaria transmission and sent students home with questionnaires soliciting 
information on malaria morbidity in their families. Public health workers went house-
to-house, held public meetings, placed articles in newspapers, and appeared on local 
radio broadcasts in an effort to prompt community members to engage in preventative 
measures such as the screening of windows, doors, and front porches.477 
 
There were good reasons to believe that malaria might reemerge as a 
consequence of the war. Along with the danger posed by the remaining pockets of 
infection in the United States and internal population movements, prisoners of war 
from the malarial South Pacific and American soldiers who had fought there 
threatened to bring malaria into areas where it was not already present or provide 
additional sources of infection where it was. Beginning in November 1942, the allied 
invasion of North Africa ensured that even larger numbers of Americans would come 
into contact with malaria that might be brought back to the United States. 
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In cooperation with the Army and Navy, the Public Health Service initiated a 
program to study the problem of imported malaria at the National Institute of Health’s 
Malaria Research Laboratory in Columbia, South Carolina.478 Using infected U.S. 
soldiers and local mental patients undergoing therapeutic malaria treatment for 
syphilis as subjects, PHS officers tested the virulence of foreign strains of malaria. 
Imported malaria, MCWA found, could be transmitted by American mosquitoes. 
Indeed, some foreign strains resulted in higher rates of relapse than those present 
already in the United States.479 
The risks appeared straightforward. “Military demobilization,” the Public 
Health Service’s Louis L. Williams told the annual meeting of State and Territorial 
Health Officers in November 1944, “will introduce a large number of malaria carriers 
into the civil population. Some of the new strains will be more virulent than those we 
now have and will present a more difficult therapeutic problem. The greater relapse of 
Mediterranean and South Pacific strains will make these soldiers more dangerous 
carriers, as they will be more frequently infectious to the mosquito.”480 
 
EMERGENCE OF THE COMMUNICABLE DISEASE CENTER 
The threat of a malaria epidemic, however, never materialized. Despite large-
scale population movements within the United States and the return of soldiers from 
the South Pacific, North Africa, and Italy, malaria mortality continued to decline over 
the course of the war and into the postwar years. The Malaria Control in War Areas 
program, meanwhile, continued to grow, expanding first into operations against Aedes 
aegypti mosquitoes, the vector for both Dengue Fever and Yellow Fever, in southern 
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cities. By the end of the war, MCWA had taken over the Public Health Service’s anti-
murine typhus activities in the Deep South and was inaugurating efforts against 
encephalitis and dysentery. 
The program’s expansion was grounded in both the political capabilities of its 
leaders and the ongoing threat that malaria or other tropical diseases might be 
reintroduced into the United States. Dr. Joseph Mountin, head of the States Relations 
Division and one of the central figures in MCWA’s evolution, was a highly-regarded 
scientist and bureaucratic veteran. By the 1940s, he had more than twenty years of 
experience in promoting the interests of the Public Health Service at the state, local, 
and national levels. 
After beginning his PHS career in the World War I extra-cantonment zones, 
Mountin’s central focus had been the development of local public health 
infrastructure. During the 1920s, he was a subordinate of Leslie Lumsden, the early 
driving force behind the Service’s rural county cooperative program. First in the 
cotton counties of southeast Missouri and then in Tennessee, Mountin worked to 
persuade county governments to establish health boards and provided needed expertise 
for them to do so.481 In 1939, he became head of the Public Health Service’s Domestic 
Quarantine Division, renamed the States Relations Division in 1941 to reflect its post-
Social Security Act role.482 In this capacity, Mountin administered the federal grant-in-
aid program created by Title VI of the Social Security Act.483 For Mountin, along with 
a small group of others in the Public Health Service, the wartime emergency 
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represented an opportunity to create a permanent agency for coordinating the nation’s 
still disparate local public health systems under the auspices of the PHS’s existing 
States Relations program.484 
The goals of the PHS officers in the States Relations Division and Malaria 
Control in War Areas were furthered by the clear successes of the Public Health 
Service in fighting malaria and the emergence, after 1943, of DDT.485 By the time of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the chemical, which had been used to fight malaria in the 
South Pacific and typhus in Europe, was viewed more and more as an all-purpose 
means for eradicating insect pests. “While it is almost axiomatic,” MCWA’s 1945-
1946 report noted in describing a newly developed and highly effective DDT oil-mist 
spray, “that all new insecticides making their initial appearance are heralded by the 
statement that here at last is ‘an insecticide to end all insecticides,’ the results obtained 
with this spray seemed to surpass by far any previous larvicide.”486 Like the U.S. 
military in Europe, the Public Health Service began to use the chemical to kill the 
fleas that transmitted typhus from rats to humans. Effective and versatile, DDT could 
also be used to kill houseflies, cockroaches, and bedbugs.487 As a consequence, DDT 
was extremely popular among individuals and families eager to rid their homes of 
insect pests, helping to ensure a high level of support for ongoing MCWA activities 
even as the war ended. 
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Between July 1945 and July 1946, MCWA’s “Extended Malaria Control 
Program” sprayed approximately 400,000 homes in thirteen states with DDT.488 The 
extended program continued MCWA’s extensive educational campaign and trained 
“professional personnel in the diagnosis of tropical diseases and control methods” and 
how to perform original research.489 Soon, Joseph Mountin succeeded in persuading 
Surgeon General Thomas Parran, another veteran of the World War I extra-
cantonment efforts and the Public Health Service’s rural cooperative program, of the 
need to transform MCWA into a permanent organization capable of performing 
research and disseminating information to states and communities. Remaining a field 
station of the States Relations Division, MCWA was rechristened the “Communicable 
Disease Center” on July 1st, 1946.490 “The CDC,” historian Elizabeth Etheridge writes, 
“was the capstone of Joseph Mountin’s effort to supply state and local health units 
with the support they needed.”491 
 
POSTWAR TENSION 
Southern politicians, meanwhile, appeared poised to continue their enthusiastic 
support for the expanded and increasingly coordinated federal role in local public 
health. One month after the formal creation of the CDC, Congress passed the Hill-
Burton Hospital Survey and Construction Act, authorizing more than one billion 
dollars for a new program of federally-backed hospital construction to be administered 
by the Public Health Service.492 Aimed at providing hospital access for underserved 
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communities, the bill was co-sponsored by Alabama Senator Lister Hill, an 
enthusiastic advocate of increased federal funding for public health efforts. Along with 
strong support from southern Democrats, the new legislation met with the approval of 
both the American Medical Association and the American Hospital Association.493 
The formula for allocating Hill-Burton money was designed to bring hospital access to 
rural southerners in particular, strongly favoring poorer states and requiring “that 
special within-state priority be given to the construction of facilities in rural areas.”494 
Consistent with previous southern support for federal assistance in public 
health, the new bill’s language nonetheless reflected the heightened sensitivities of 
southern members of Congress during the postwar period. Hookworm, pellagra, and 
malaria, the debilitating diseases that caused the federal government to become 
involved in southern public health, had receded from their previously central role in 
the region’s health. At the same time, the implications of federal money and its 
corollary, federal regulation, for the South’s racial status quo were increasingly 
unmistakable. Rather than risk any future misunderstanding, Hill-Burton provided 
explicitly for the construction of “separate but equal” facilities.495 
 
Evident already in the inclusion of “separate-but-equal” language in Hill-
Burton, the growing importance of the issue of civil rights represented a significant 
political threat to Harry Truman’s 1948 presidential campaign. Though Franklin 
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Roosevelt had faced southern resistance following his attempt to pack the Supreme 
Court and misguided intervention in the 1938 midterm elections, mobilization for war 
had gone a long way towards muting the intra-party rift of the late 1930s. Substantially 
less supportive of the President’s domestic initiatives than they had been during the 
early years of the New Deal, southern politicians nonetheless remained a valuable 
source of support for Roosevelt, particularly in matters of national defense. Following 
Roosevelt’s death and the end of World War II, however, Harry Truman emerged as a 
restrained but determined advocate of increased civil rights for black Americans. 
Intra-party tensions came to a head at the 1948 Democratic National 
Convention, held in Philadelphia. Following a passionate speech by Minneapolis 
Mayor Hubert Humphrey, the Party adopted a pro-Civil Rights platform that, along 
with calling for congressional action to ease discrimination, commended President 
Harry Truman “for his courageous stand on the issue of civil rights.”496 In response, 
Deep South Democrats, who had hoped someone other than Truman might be 
nominated, held their own convention in Birmingham and nominated South Carolina 
Governor Strom Thurmond as a “states’ rights” candidate for president. 
Though it was clear Thurmond himself would not win the election, the 
defectors hoped his candidacy might result in blocking both Truman and Republican 
candidate Thomas Dewey from getting sufficient votes in the electoral college to be 
elected, throwing the decision to the House of Representatives. Reluctant to discard 
the label of the Democratic Party, Thurmond and his supporters suggested that the 
Party had turned its back on its own commitments and core southern supporters. 
“President Truman,” Thurmond maintained, “has betrayed the South, and we 
Southerners are going to cast our votes for candidates who are true believers in states’ 
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rights principles. For our loyalty to the party we have been stabbed in the back by a 
President who has betrayed every principle of the Democratic party in his desire to 
win at any cost.”497  
Nine days later, in an action that further accentuated the rift in his party and 
sent a clear message about the dangers posed to the southern racial order by 
centralizing power in the federal government, Truman issued executive orders 
mandating the end of race-based discrimination in the armed forces “as rapidly as 
possible” and instituting fair employment practices in the federal civil service.498 
Although the process initially moved ahead slowly, segregation would be ended in 
military bases throughout the South at the discretion of the President. 
 
LOCAL AUTONOMY AND NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 
Despite the defection of four Deep South states to Thurmond, Truman 
managed to win a full term of his own in a close election. The Democratic Party, 
moreover, regained control of Congress after two years of Republican rule. Though 
the party was clearly divided along regional lines, the President was mildly hopeful 
about the prospects for moving forward on the domestic agenda he had campaigned 
on, which prominently featured a proposal for the creation of a mandatory 
contributory national health insurance plan in the mode of Social Security’s retirement 
benefits plan. 
Regardless of Truman’s optimism, the prospects for such a program, embodied 
in the various iterations of the Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill first proposed in 1939, 
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were dim from the beginning.499 When Truman had first voiced support for a national 
health insurance program in late 1945, congressional Republicans and southern 
Democrats responded coolly. Following the President’s statements in favor of civil 
rights and unilateral move towards desegregation of the armed forces, southern 
Democratic support for a health insurance program administered directly by the 
national government bordered on unthinkable. 
Increasingly on guard against potential federal intrusions on the side of black 
rights, the South’s political representatives remained attuned to the benefits of federal 
funding and expertise. Introducing legislation aimed at further expanding federal 
funding for the development of local public health infrastructure in January of 1949, 
Lister Hill suggested the contours of southern support for federal public health efforts. 
“Public health,” Hill maintained, “is the forlorn stepchild among Governmental 
services.” More federal money was needed to help “get enough trained doctors, 
nurses, and technicians into the local and county health departments to carry on the 
great fight of preventive medicine against tuberculosis, syphilis, malaria, typhoid and 
undulant fever, hookworm, pellagra, infantile paralysis, and the epidemic diseases.” 
“The bill, which would give aid on the basis of need,” he continued, with an 
eye towards concerns about the President’s Civil Rights agenda, “fully protects state 
control and administration of health programs.”500 Federal money need not be an 
instrument of federal dominance. Administered by the Public Health Service, which 
now had more than thirty years of experience working at the ground level in the 
segregated South, and channeled through state and local institutions, the federal 
government’s efforts at developing local public health infrastructure were both 
popular and of proven safety. 
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National Health Insurance was another matter. Speaking to the Fulton County 
Medical Society in November 1949, Georgia Congressman James C. Davis outlined 
the likely corrosive effects of a nationally-administered health insurance program on 
southern segregation: “Negro doctors would treat white patients. White patients would 
be interested in Negro hospitals. White doctors would have to treat Negro patients and 
admit them in their hospitals.” “Certain persons high in government,” he warned, 
“intend to do away with every vestige of segregation in this country if it is possible to 
do so.” As evidence, Representative Davis cited Truman’s unilateral desegregation of 
the armed forces and overt support for Civil Rights. 501 
Davis’s claims were both unsurprising and likely accurate: if the President 
could desegregate the armed force through executive order, it was not clear what 
might stop him or a later president from doing the same to an insurance program 
administered directly by the federal government. Indeed, Oscar Ewing, the 
controversial head of the Federal Security Agency, had drawn similar conclusions. 
“The President’s fight for Civil Rights,” Ewing contended, “is having much more of 
an effect than many of us realize. And, with the passage of national health insurance, I 
believe we shall see, so far as the medical profession is concerned, a steady 
development in its practical application.”502 
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By the time Truman asked Congress, in a late April 1949 special message, for 
the enactment of compulsory national health insurance, the American Medical 
Association, the Republican Party, and southern Democrats had all staked out 
positions irreconcilable with those of the President. 503 National health insurance, the 
AMA maintained, was “one of the final, irrevocable steps toward state socialism.” The 
President’s plan “would regiment doctors and patients alike under a vast bureaucracy 
of political administrators, clerks, bookkeepers and lay committees.”504 Ohio Senator 
Robert Taft, the Republican Party’s leading domestic policy voice, maintained that the 
Truman plan “would necessarily be arbitrary, tyrannical and bureaucratic.”505 In April, 
Taft re-introduced his own health bill, first offered as a substitute to the Democratic 
Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill in 1946 and based on grants-in-aid to the states to 
provide insurance for the indigent.506 
Lister Hill, meanwhile, beat Taft to the punch in proposing legislation designed 
to undercut the President’s new health insurance push. Already in March, with the 
support of southern Democrats and a small number of Republicans, Hill had 
introduced a new grant-in-aid plan, known as the Hill-Aiken Bill, designed to “provide 
hospital and medical care for persons who could not pay by giving them Government-
supported membership in non-profit, prepayment health insurance plans.”507 Like 
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Hill’s earlier hospital construction bill, his health insurance proposal enjoyed the 
support of the American Hospital Association, which helped to draft the bill and 
viewed it as a means of gaining additional patients while warding off national 
government control. 
Though the American Medical Association had not been involved in the 
development of Hill’s proposal, its leaders appeared inclined to support it. In midst of 
a publicity campaign aimed at discrediting the idea of compulsory national health 
insurance by tying it to fears about Soviet communism, the AMA noted approvingly 
that, under Hill-Aiken, government-backed insurance policies for the indigent would 
be voluntary and eligibility would be determined by the individual states. An editorial 
in the Journal of the American Medical Association asserted that Hill-Aiken was “in 
accord with the basic principles of freedom of choice of physician and hospital, and 
absence of interference in the personal relationship between doctor and patient.”508 
By providing insurance to the poor and allowing the private, employment-
linked, insurance industry to continue on its rapid trajectory of postwar growth, the 
Hill plan was, by design, likely to increase the obstacles confronting future attempts at 
creating a contributory national health insurance system. “The fact is,” Hill noted in a 
statement announcing his bill that echoed the AMA’s argument that private health 
insurance was proving an effective means of providing coverage to most Americans, 
“that while we have been debating the pros and cons of a complete new system of 
Federal compulsory health insurance, the voluntary agencies already in the field have 
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gone quietly ahead to provide protection against the costs of hospital and medical care 
to nearly a third of our population.”509 
Meanwhile, from the perspective of southern Democrats, the positive attributes 
of Hill’s approach, beyond its clear benefits for some the region’s poorest individuals 
and communities, were clear: under Hill’s legislation, unlike the President’s, federal 
money would be funneled through the states, which could be counted on to maintain 
the racial status quo.510 
 
THE CONTOURS OF FEDERAL INTERVENTION 
As both a limiting factor and driving force, southern concerns remained at the 
forefront of national health policy during the postwar years. Highly influential in 
Congress as a result of the seniority system, southern Democrats represented 
constituencies with a genuine interest in the expansion of federal support for health 
programs. At the same time, the prominence of the issue of civil rights heightened 
their insistence on the sanctity of local autonomy.  
The ambiguities of this situation were embodied in Lister Hill’s new health 
plan.511 His idealism and belief in government as an agent of social progress, buffeted 
by his position as a protector of states’ rights and white supremacy, had produced a 
workable proposal that foreshadowed the Medicaid bill enacted sixteen years later. 
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Legal Medicine and Legislation, American Medical Association, April 1, 1949," p. 1008. On the 
AMA’s shift towards supporting private insurance plans as an alternative to national health insurance 
on the Social Security model, see Jacob S. Hacker, The Divided Welfare State: The Battle over Public 
and Private Social Benefits in the United States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 
227-28. 
510 In his support for compulsory national health insurance, Florida Senator Claude Pepper was a 
notable exception. Pepper went on to lose Florida’s 1950 Democratic primary in the wake of charges 
that he favored “socialized medicine” and was friendly towards civil rights. See for instance The New 
York Times, “ ‘Pepper Comforts Pro-Reds,’ is Smathers’ Main Primary Cry,” April 24, 1950. 
511 For an excellent study of Hill’s career, emphasizing the conflict between Hill’s role as a proponent 
of federal intervention in a variety of areas, particularly health, and defender of states’ rights, see 
Virginia Van der Veer Hamilton, Lister Hill: Statesman from the South, Fred W. Morrison Series in 
Southern Studies (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1987). 
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Passed into law, it would have helped to provide coverage for millions. Where the 
President’s preferred course of action had scarce chance of success, the Hill plan could 
have relied on the support of southern Democrats, some northern Republicans, the 
American Hospital Association, and likely even the American Medical Association.512 
For the same reasons that the AHA and AMA looked upon the bill favorably, 
however, the President resisted it. Committed to the creation of a nationalized 
contributory system of health insurance, Truman and his advisors recognized that Hill-
Aiken would serve to further consolidate the position of the existing private insurance 
industry.513 Meanwhile, the political costs appeared steep: as Monte Poen has argued, 
Truman “could not shift his support to the Hill-Aiken bill without alienating organized 
labor and other elements of the liberal political coalition that had just elected him.”514 
The result was a stalemate. Truman avoided compromise and even engagement 
with Hill and the other southern Democratic proponents of the bill.515 Southern 
opposition to Truman’s insurance proposal, in conjunction with the strong disapproval 
of northern Republicans and ongoing efforts of the American Medical Association to 
portray national health insurance as a dangerous lurch towards Soviet-style 
totalitarianism, ensured that Truman’s plan for national health insurance would come 
to nothing.516 
                                                
512 Hill’s legislation, Monte Poen concludes in his authoritative study of Truman’s attempts to pass 
health insurance legislation, “could have attracted significant southern Democratic and moderate 
Republican support.” “Had the president modified his position and backed the AHA supported [Hill-
Aiken] bill… the nation might very well have seen the enactment of a compromise system of health 
security during his presidency.” See Poen, Harry S. Truman Versus the Medical Lobby: The Genesis of 
Medicare, p. 166-67. 
513 See Ibid., p. 170-71. 
514 Ibid., p. 169. 
515 “Senator Hill,” David Blumenthal and James Morone write, “was a liberal southerner and an old 
Truman pal, but relations had frosted over civil rights. Truman was never inclined to trim his policies; 
the rising tension over civil rights made negotiation between health bills even more unlikely.” See 
David Blumenthal and James A. Morone, The Heart of Power: Health and Politics in the Oval Office 
(Berkely: University of California Press, 2009), p. 89. 
516 Already by October of 1949, the New York Times could report that the Senate sponsors of 
compulsory health insurance had given up hope not only for 1949 but also for the Congress’s second 
session in 1950. See The New York Times, “Sponsors Abandon Early Health Bill,” October 27, 1949. 
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While Truman’s attempt to create a nationalized health insurance system 
languished, the central unifying institution of the nation’s future public health efforts 
was emerging in Atlanta. Now an independent Division within the PHS’s Bureau of 
State Services, the Communicable Disease Center had 1,832 full-time employees as of 
June 30, 1949, only 469 less than the National Institutes of Health, which had been in 
operation as the NIH since 1930 and for thirty years before that as the PHS Hygienic 
Laboratory.517 
During its first years, the CDC continued the work in the field of malaria that 
had initially helped to justify its extension beyond the war emergency. Beginning in 
1947, it began a campaign aimed at eradicating the remaining pockets of malaria in the 
United States. Though it was increasingly evident that the disease had already 
disappeared throughout most of the South and was unlikely to reemerge, the CDC 
continued spraying homes with DDT, draining swampy land, and encouraging the 
screening of homes. By the mid-1950s, less than a thousand malaria cases per year 
were reported in the United States; death from the disease was almost unheard of. 
“The Southeastern states,” a Public Health Service report concluded in 1955, 
“formerly the hotbed of malaria, are now practically free of the disease. Thus there has 
been conquered, probably for all time, the most serious of the parasitic diseases which 
have plagued this part of the country since the earliest of colonial days.”518 
Along with its ongoing anti-malaria work, the CDC emerged from the 
beginning as a training center for public health workers from throughout the United 
                                                
517 Annual Report of the Federal Security Agency, 1949: Public Health Service,  (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 15, 28-29. In 1930, Louisiana Senator Joseph 
Ransdell helped the PHS get legislation passed expanding the Hygienic Laboratory, the institutional 
home of both Charles Wardell Stiles and Joseph Goldberger, into the NIH. Ransdell was defeated in a 
reelection bid the same year by Huey Long. See Victoria A. Harden, Inventing the Nih: Federal 
Biomedical Research Policy, 1887-1937 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). 
518 Willard H. Wright, "Current Status of Parasitic Diseases," Public Health Reports 70, no. 10 (1955): 
p. 973-74. 
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States.519 As the Public Health Service became involved in supporting the growing 
American role in postwar international health efforts such as the World Health 
Organization, the CDC trained an increasing number of public health workers for 
work in Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia.520 In addition, it dispatched small 
groups of scientists and sanitary engineers to locations across the globe to assist with 
the development of anti-malaria work.521 
Beyond the investigation and control of tropical diseases, the CDC acquired a 
reputation for its epidemiological prowess, centered in its Epidemic Intelligence 
Service, created in 1951, and its laboratory work.522 Gradually, the CDC took over 
public health efforts that had been dispersed across the Public Health Service.523 An 
outpost of the PHS’s Washington-based States Relations Division immediately 
following World War II, the Communicable Disease Center had emerged as the 
premier force in the coordination of public health activities throughout the nation by 
the end of the 1950s, supplying both technical information and personnel to local 
health departments and embarking on large-scale epidemiological studies. In 1960, the 
CDC began occupying brand new facilities in Atlanta on land donated to the Public 
                                                
519 Etheridge, Sentinel for Health, p. 24; Ellis S. Tisdale, "A National Program for Training Public 
Health Personnel," Public Health Reports 66, no. 42 (1951): p. 1362; Trawick H. Stubbs William S. 
Boyd, Paul P. Weinstein, "The Tropical Disease Education Program of the United States Public Health 
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521 See for instance Miriam Ziony, "Malaria Control in Iran," Public Health Reports 65, no. 11 (1950). 
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"International Technical Assistance in Public Health," Public Health Reports 67, no. 4 (1952). 
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Health Service by Emory University. The same year, it gained control of the collection 
of national vital statistics, cementing its new role.524 
 
Meanwhile, as a consequence of the Hill-Burton Act, levels of access to 
hospital facilities in the southern countryside and in cities and towns were on their 
way towards greater convergence with national norms. In 1946, the Public Health 
Service organized an independent Division of Hospital Studies within the Bureau of 
States Relations; assisted by the Division, individual states began surveys of hospitals 
and other health facilities, after which they submitted proposals for federal funding.525 
In 1947, Mississippi became the first state to have its Hill-Burton plan approved.526 
The next year, construction of hospital facilities began, to the disproportionate benefit 
of the rural South.527 Between fiscal years 1948 and 1955, an average of $1.02 per 
capita was allocated for hospital construction to the eight lowest per capita states in 
the nation, all southern. By contrast, an average of 42 cents per capita was allotted to 
the eight highest per capita states.528 
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A massive undertaking, Hill-Burton construction further expanded the Public 
Health Service’s role in preserving and helping to reproduce the southern racial order. 
Following the model of New Orleans’s Charity Hospital, built by the federal Public 
Works Administration during the New Deal, the new hospitals were constructed with 
internally segregated wards for white and black. The Public Health Service closely 
supervised and regulated new construction, often providing blueprints for spatially 
segregated buildings.529 
Measured in terms of increased access to facilities, Hill-Burton was a boon for 
both black and white southerners. As Karen Kruse Thomas has shown, the program 
“resulted in the proliferation of modern, well-equipped hospitals that admitted black 
and white patients but internally segregated them by ward or floor. These biracial 
hospitals substantially included blacks in the dramatic postwar expansion, 
modernization, and geographic redistribution of southern hospital facilities, which 
without [Hill-Burton] would have remained racially separate and grossly inadequate 
for patients of all races.”530 
Though these advances were real, blacks remained subject to humiliation and 
discrimination. Where new additions were made to existing hospitals, black patients 
were relegated to the old facilities. Black physicians were often denied staff privileges 
at the new hospitals, meaning that they could not treat their patients once they had 
been admitted. 531 
                                                
529 Thomas, "The Hill-Burton Act and Civil Rights: Expanding Hospital Care for Black Southernerns, 
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The journal of the National Medical Association, the professional organization 
of black physicians, deemed the new hospitals “a kind of de luxe Jim Crow which is 
supposed to be more palatable than the customary variety and therefore more 
acceptable.”532 From the perspective of the National Medical Association, it was not: 
“The cruel irony of the fact that the new segregated hospitals are concerned with such 
a vital human consideration as health should be as stinging a rebuke to the consciences 
of those who force them [to be segregated], as they are crushing a depressant to those 
who must accept them.” Since there was little likelihood that whites would 
desegregate the hospital system on their own, the NMA encouraged blacks to actively 
pursue change. “The load is fully on the minority physician to evince more leadership 
in enunciating the goals and drawing the blueprints for full equality in medicine.”533 
Along with the NAACP, the National Medical Association endorsed desegregation of 
hospitals and the granting of full staff privileges to black physicians.534  
  
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s 1954 Brown v. Board of Education 
decision, the Public Health Service’s role in perpetuating the South’s racial order 
became increasingly glaring. One of the Service’s apparent strengths, its longstanding 
integration with the communities it served, now appeared, to advocates of civil rights, 
to be a federally-endorsed example of racial recalcitrance. By the early 1960s, the 
National Medical Society and the NAACP had both come to view Hill-Burton’s 
“separate-but-equal” clause as a potential object of litigation. In November of 1961, 
the Journal of the National Medical Association asserted its belief that segregation in 
                                                                                                                                       
the nursing care both in quantity and quality, the general personnel attention, and the adequacy of such 
necessities as diet, bed linen and provisions for privacy in personal matters have been worse for the 
Negro than for white patients.” 
532 "The Crushing Irony of De Luxe Jim Crow," Journal of the National Medical Association 44, no. 5 
(1952): p. 386. 
533 Ibid.: p. 387. 
534 See "Hospital Discrimination Must End!." 
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hospitals that accepted Hill-Burton Funds, whether public or private, was almost 
certainly unconstitutional. “Interested attorneys,” the Journal reported, believed “that 
racial discrimination in hospitals can be fought effectively in court actions based on 
Federal Government involvement in hospital activities.”535 
Three months later, in February of 1962, a group of black dentists, physicians, 
and patients, backed by the NAACP’s Legal Defense Fund, brought suit in the U.S. 
District Court in Greensboro, North Carolina, arguing that segregation in hospitals that 
had received Hill-Burton funds was unconstitutional. The suit named two Greensboro 
hospitals, Moses H. Cone Memorial, which operated separate wards for black and 
white, and Wesley Long Community, which did not admit any black patients. It 
requested that the Court “issue a declaratory judgment that the separate but equal 
provisions of the Hill-Burton Act violated the constitutional guarantees of due process 
and equal protection.”536 
 On May 8th, following an initial period of silence, the Department of Justice 
joined the suit, asking the Court to declare Hill-Burton’s “separate-but-equal” clause 
unconstitutional and mandate desegregation in hospitals that had received Hill-Burton 
funds. Moses Cone, Attorney General Robert Kennedy noted in a written statement, 
had received $1,229,552 in federal money, while Wesley Long had received 
$1,596,301.537 Despite the contention of the NAACP, the plaintiffs, and the Justice 
Department that, because the hospitals had received federal money, channeled through 
state governments, they were instruments of government, the Greensboro District 
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Court found in December 1962 that Moses Cone and Wesley Long were both private 
institutions and could choose to continue segregating patients if they so desired.538 
Although the Kennedy Justice Department believed that the District Court’s 
ruling would be overturned on appeal, it put the administration and pro-civil rights 
congressional Democrats in a somewhat awkward position.539 It was evident that the 
Public Health Service, a federal agency, was actively involved in the promotion of 
segregation. New Jersey Democratic Senator Harrison “Pete” Williams, writing to a 
Public Health Service official in February 1963, bemoaned the Service’s ongoing 
post-Brown insistence on adhering to the principle of “separate but equal” and local 
practices of segregation: “Considering that the United States Supreme Court, in a 
unanimous decision, declared this doctrine unconstitutional, I find it hard to accept 
your position. I cannot think that a Federal agency must continue to operate, some 
eight years after the Court’s decision, in a manner that perpetuates this principle.”540  
Despite the mounting indignation of civil rights advocates, the President and 
Democratic leaders in Congress continued to back Hill-Burton, a politically popular 
program that brought sorely needed access to hospitals to some of the nation’s most 
impoverished communities.541 Though there were suggestions that the President might 
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follow the lead of Truman and issue an executive order banning segregation in Hill-
Burton facilities or ask Congress to withhold funding, the administration preferred to 
pursue an independent civil rights bill.542 In August of 1963, when New York 
Republican Senator Jacob Javits nearly succeeded in adding an anti-segregation rider 
to the Hill-Burton appropriation for the 1964 Fiscal Year, as he had attempted to do 
for other legislation during 1963, Senate Democratic Leader Mike Mansfield worked 
to ensure its defeat and avoid a southern filibuster. Majority Whip Hubert Humphrey, 
who had declared his unwillingness to vote against desegregation riders to the 
President a few weeks before, was successfully dispatched to convince northern 
Democrats to vote against the Javits Amendment.543 
 
In November 1963, the United States Court of Appeals in Richmond, Virginia 
overruled the Greensboro District Court, finding that Hill-Burton construction 
involved “extensive state-Federal sharing in the common plan.” As an undertaking of 
state governments and of the federal government, “separate-but-equal” hospital 
construction violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.544 The 
dissenting opinion, which attempted to categorize federal grants-in-aid as a form of 
gift that did not bind the recipient, noted that the legislative language underpinning 
                                                                                                                                       
burdens, on the other hand, were less visible, being submerged in general income taxes… The 
popularity of the original legislation is suggested by its relative freedom from major amendments, 
especially during the period to 1964, and by its survival in the face of the Nixon administration’s efforts 
to end the program.” 
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hospital segregation was fairly unmistakable: “Congress showed its legislative intent 
by refusing to strike the ‘separate but equal’ clause from the Hill-Burton Act in 
August.”545 
Followed swiftly by the 1964 Civil Rights act, Title VI of which explicitly 
prohibited discrimination on the basis of “race, color, or national origin” in programs 
receiving federal aid, the Appellate Court’s decision appeared to demand action from 
the Public Health Service. Civil Rights advocates, however, were dismayed by the 
Service’s languid response. Though it put in place a new set of regulations outlawing 
discriminatory practices by future recipients of Hill-Burton aid, the Service appeared 
reluctant to enforce the new rules took little action against existing patterns of 
segregation. Throughout 1964 and 1965, the NAACP continued to document 
segregation in southern hospitals and to lodge complaints with the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare, which oversaw the Public Health Service.546 One 
NAACP lawyer, speaking to the New York Times in 1965, noted that HEW had 
“started extremely slowly, and they seemed to have no idea of what was involved. 
They had allocated little money and no manpower until we started hitting them with 
complaints and started putting them in the public eye.”547 
The difficulties inherent in the project of desegregating the South’s hospitals 
were exacerbated by the close relationships that Public Health Service officers had 
formed with the communities in which they lived and worked. “The Public Health 
Service,” sociologist Jill Quadagno finds in her analysis of hospital desegregation, 
“did not respond forcefully because staff in its local offices had deeply embedded ties 
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to local political structures and were satisfied to leave the resolution of conflicts to 
local officials.”548 “Whatever they believe personally,” one civil rights lawyer noted at 
the time, “they are obviously going to have to experience a radical change in their 
thinking if they are going to administer Title VI. Even if you’re a flaming liberal it is 
hard to tell a guy you’ve been playing golf with for eight years that his hospital is 
going to have to undergo a revolution.” 549 
 
Closely identified with the interests of the South, the Public Health Service 
officers charged with desegregating the region’s hospitals supported its leaders and 
institutions to a surprising extent, dragging their feet in the face of efforts by the 
Courts, Congress, and the President. The passage of Medicare in 1965, however, 
marked the beginning of a new phase of desegregation. In order to become eligible to 
receive payments from the federal government for Medicare patients, hospitals needed 
to be certified as in compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. Importantly, the 
Social Security Administration, rather than the Public Health Service, was largely in 
control of the new desegregation push.550 
As July 1, 1966, the first day of Medicare payments, approached, a number of 
southern hospitals continued to hold out in the hopes that enforcement would not 
prove harsh. President Johnson, however, took a hard line, warning a meeting of 
health professionals in June that “The Federal government is not going to shy away 
from its clear responsibility.”551 Indeed, as the program took effect, the Washington 
Post reported that “three-fourths of Mississippi’s hospitals” were “denying benefits to 
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the aged… In entire Southern communities- such as Danville, Va., Selma, Ala., and 
Macon, Ga.- not a single hospital was qualified to accept medicare patients.” Mobile, 
Alabama, “was credited with the ‘worst showing’ because only 30 of its 3986 
hospitals beds were certified for medicare.”552 For southern hospitals, however, as Jill 
Quadagno has shown, the pressure to accept the money offered by the federal 
government in the form of medicare payments quickly proved irresistible. Following 
the initial drama of their failure to comply, the recalcitrant hospitals fell into line fairly 
rapidly. The prospect of Medicare funding quickly proved irresistible. By October of 
1966, “only 12 southern hospitals were still not certified.”553 
 
Following the rapid decline of debilitating disease in the South during the 
1930s, the Public Health Service created the Malaria Control in War Areas 
organization in order to ensure that the disease did not reemerge within the region and 
that it would not be reintroduced as a result of the return of soldiers from malarious 
parts of the world where U.S. soldiers fought. Following the war, MCWA was 
transformed into the CDC, which became the central coordinating institution for 
federal public health and epidemiological efforts. Although southern politicians 
continued to support the efforts of the federal government in areas such as the 
construction of segregated hospital facilities, they became increasingly wary of the 
potential threats that federal intervention represented to local autonomy in race 
relations. As a result, the region’s political leaders opposed President Harry Truman’s 
attempt to create a national health insurance system on the grounds that it might lead 
to the integration of facilities and services. The potential threat represented by the 
extensive federal role in southern public health materialized in the aftermath of the 
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passage of Medicare, which allowed the Social Security Administration to implement 
the federal appellate court decision that hospitals receiving federal funds should be 
desegregated and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. As southern Democrats had feared 
during the Truman years, federal intervention and money led directly to desegregation.
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
Writing in 1911, Rockefeller Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of 
Hookworm Director Wickliffe Rose detailed a visit to a Tidewater Virginia 
community with endemic hookworm. The whole population, he wrote, “has for 
generations borne the burden of a heavy infection; the community has been islanded 
and this isolation has been both the cause and effect in accentuating the cumulative 
results- physical, intellectual, economic and moral- which have been handed down 
from one generation to the next.” “From generation to generation,” Rose continued, 
“there has been a lowering of physical vitality; this in turn has brought a lowering of 
mental vitality; the struggle for existence has grown more hard and hopeless; one 
result has been a deadening of the moral sense and a loss of self-respect, which shows 
itself in the moral tone of the community. The result has been an almost complete 
abandonment of the ordinary decencies of life.”554 
After the treatment of most of the locals, Rose reported, the community had 
been transformed. A school teacher told him that “Children who were listless and dull 
are now active and alert; children who could not study a year ago are not only 
studying now, but are finding joy in learning.” Children who had previously not 
attended school were now enrolled. A local woman explained that she “had been 
anemic since she could remember; had never until this year known a well day; had 
borne six children; one of them had died of hookworm disease, or ‘dropsy,’ as they 
thought at the time; had been confined to her bed much of the time.” “The whole 
family,” Rose wrote, “was ill, the father being able to do about half work and the elder 
boy doing almost none.” A year after the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission came to 
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the area, the family appeared fully recovered. All who were old enough to work were 
doing so. The oldest boy, who Rose observed at work plowing corn, planned on going 
to school in the fall.555 
Rose’s description makes it clear that surrounding communities viewed those 
living in the hookworm-ravaged area, “a people set apart by marked peculiarities,” 
with an unease that bordered on disgust. The local physician who had been in charge 
of the hookworm campaign, according to Rose, was convinced that the effects of the 
elimination of hookworm in “reforming the moral life of the individual and elevating 
the moral tone of the community” would prove “as marked as the economic results.” 
Though a few individuals and families had held out against treatment, Rose wrote, 
“they are being ostracized by their neighbors, and it is only a question of time when 
they must yield to the force of enlightened public sentiment.” 556 
The transformation of this community appeared, to Rose, to herald the 
redemption of an entire region long blighted by disease. Shiftless men, women, and 
children would become, almost overnight, productive members of society. They would 
work at full capacity in the fields, attend school, and purchase more than the “barest 
necessities.”557 “The results which I witnessed here,” he wrote, “are not only 
gratifying, they are stirring. I predict that within five years the whole face of the 
country in those pockets of extreme infection will be changed and one will see here a 
new people and a new earth.”558 
 
 
                                                
555 Ibid., p. 122-23. 
556 Ibid., p. 126. 
557 Ibid., p. 124-25. Rose describes a conversation with a local store owner in which the store owner 
reported that “already the change is coming… all who are old enough to work are earning something; 
they are feeling hopeful and buying more things.” 
558 Ibid., p. 125-26. 
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A LAND TRANSFORMED 
Although Rose’s prediction was premature in its timing, and characteristic of 
the early stages of public health intervention in its utopianism, his vision of a South 
revolutionized by public health practices proved prescient. While the region’s white 
leaders clung to segregation and asserted their determination to maintain the southern 
“way of life” during the postwar decades, the South was already, in important 
respects, a land transformed. An economic system that fostered severe and unrelenting 
poverty had been fatally compromised by the programs of the New Deal, particularly 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act and its successors. While the residue of the old 
system remained, sharecropping and tenancy were increasingly things of the past. 
Other substantial changes improved living conditions in the South and made 
in-migration more likely. Air conditioning helped to blunt the heat of southern 
summers, increasing the likelihood that northerners would turn south both for business 
and for leisure. The Civil Rights Movement, bolstered by decisions by the Supreme 
Court and actions by the Executive Branch and ultimately Congress, was on the brink 
of achieving the legal desegregation of the United States and reinstatement of black 
voting rights. 
At the heart of the South’s postwar economic growth were outside investment, 
improving levels of human capital, increased consumption, in-migration of talented 
individuals, tourism, and the movement of retirees. Though the elimination of 
debilitating disease was not a sufficient condition for the emergence of this new 
economy, it was a necessary one. At the level of the individual and family, hookworm, 
pellagra, and malaria worked to ensure low levels of educational attainment, 
compromised productivity, and limited cognitive function. In the absence of public 
health measures, the victims of these diseases had little recourse beyond hope. At the 
level of the community and the region, the burden of disease was greater than the sum 
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of its parts. Indigenous business, technology, and energy were hampered by a 
population trapped in poverty and disease and unable to find its way out. People from 
outside the South, meanwhile, were unlikely to invest in its development, relocate to 
the region, or vacation there. Previously a land set apart, the South became 
increasingly amenable to outsiders. 
 
At the risk of oversimplification, it is worth considering the disease burden that 
confronted particular areas in the first decades of the twentieth century. Harris County, 
Texas, the core of the Houston metropolitan area, was subject to both malaria and 
hookworm at the beginning of the 20th Century. Even after World War I, when Harris 
County was the site of the Public Health Service’s Camp Logan Extra-Cantonment 
zone, the county had a “moderate” incidence of malaria, averaging 1.5 deaths per 
10,000 population between 1919-1921.559 When surveyed by the Rockefeller Sanitary 
Commission, 55.6% of the county’s schoolchildren were found to be infected with 
hookworm.560 Something of a deviation, given the already urban character of Houston, 
the Public Health Service and the International Health Board both played important 
roles in the decline of debilitating disease in Harris County. 
More typical is Madison County, Alabama. Home to Huntsville, a 
paradigmatic New South town centered around the aerospace industry and a large 
Toyota manufacturing plant, Madison County was found to be among the most 
malarious counties in Alabama during the 1910s by the Public Health Service.561 
Hookworm incidence, however, was relatively light, with only 13.6% of 
                                                
559 Maxcy, "The Distribution of Malaria in the United States as Indicated by Mortality Reports," p. 
1130. Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service of the United States for the 
Fiscal Year 1918, p. 129. In neighboring Chambers County, the rate was 4.8 per 10,000. 
560 The Rockefeller Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm Disease, Fourth Annual 
Report, p. 75. 
561 See "Malaria in Alabama: Prevalence and Geographic Distribution- 1915 and 1916," Public Health 
Reports 32, no. 51 (1917). 
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schoolchildren infected.562 A county of significant cotton production, pellagra was 
almost certainly present. Like other Alabama counties along the Tennessee River, 
Madison County gained significant public health benefits from the construction of the 
Muscle Shoals Nitrate Plant during World War I. The Public Health Service actively 
fought malaria in the area throughout the war. Beginning in 1918, the Service 
provided funds to help stimulate the creation and ongoing operation of a full-time 
county health department in Madison County.563 
Hilton Head Island, located in Beaufort County, South Carolina, is home to a 
flourishing tourism industry. During 1919-1921, the county had an average of 5 
malaria deaths per 10,000 residents, indicating a moderate to severe malaria problem. 
Though apparently not surveyed by the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission, Beaufort 
County’s location along the South Carolina coast meant that hookworm was likely 
endemic. The average infection rate for the county’s State Economic Area, a means of 
harmonizing county data across decades and imputing missing information employed 
by the Census Bureau, was a staggering 82%.564 County health work, backed by the 
Rockefeller International Health Board, began in Beaufort County in 1924. The Public 
Health Service began cooperative work in the county in 1931.565 
 
 
 
                                                
562 The Rockefeller Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm Disease, Third Annual 
Report, p. 32. 
563 Mead, Public Health Bulletin No. 222: History of County Health Organizations in the United States, 
1908-33. 
564 Steven Ruggles; J. Trent Alexander; Katie Genadek; Ronald Goeken; Matthew B. Schroeder; 
Matthew Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 5.0 [Machine-Readable Database] 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2010). Counties grouped within State Economic Areas are 
typically contiguous and possess historically similar economic characteristics. Calculated from SEA 
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THE OUTLINES OF SUCCESS 
 Public health scholar David Hemenway has suggested four key reasons that 
public health programs are underfunded.566 Considering the development of the 
Rockefeller Foundation and Public Health Service’s southern public health efforts 
from this perspective sheds some light on the outlines of their successes. First, 
Hemenway argues, “the benefits of public health programs lie in the future… Most 
public health measures… incur costs today but don’t provide benefits until sometime 
in the future.” For both the victims of hookworm, pellagra, and malaria and their 
employers and creditors, small investments in public health could yield quick and 
tangible results. Within a short period of time, ill southerners could be freed of the 
effects of disease and back to work at higher levels of productivity. This provided both 
those suffering from disease and those who stood to benefit from increased worker 
productivity, such as landowners and mill owners, with clear short-term incentives for 
supporting public health interventions. 
 “Second,” Hemenway argues, “the beneficiaries of public health measures are 
generally unknown… Public health interventions… are aimed at improving the health 
of a group of people; when lives are saved, it’s often unclear whose lives they were.” 
People “have stronger emotional and moral reactions to the plights of identifiable 
victims than to those of statistical victims… We willingly provide resources for relief 
when publicized catastrophes affect specific individuals or communities, from New 
Orleans to Haiti.” At the ground level, of course, the victims of debilitating disease 
were readily identifiable. More importantly, from this perspective, external support for 
preventive public health measures in the South expanded episodically, in reaction to 
specific focusing events. This is particularly true for the development of federal 
                                                
566 David Hemenway, "Why We Don't Spend Enough on Public Health," The New England Journal of 
Medicine 362, no. 18 (2010). 
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intervention in public health. Emerging out of the World War I extra-cantonment 
zones, the Public Health Service’s rural cooperative sanitation program went largely 
unnoticed by Congress between 1919 and 1927, when its expansion was portrayed as a 
workable reaction to a specific crisis situation. Ultimately, the PHS proved capable of 
transforming the opportunities offered by national attention to the plight of southerners 
in specific moments into lasting gains in preventive public health infrastructure. 
 “Third,” Hemenway writes, “in public health, the benefactors, too, are often 
unknown… Public health has little news value- saving statistical lives doesn’t make 
for good human-interest stories of photo ops. Public health also has few well-known 
scientists or leaders.” As a result, “there is generally no grateful public providing 
substantial support for public health initiatives.” This condition also does not hold for 
the early 20th Century South. As a benefactor, few were less well-known than John D. 
Rockefeller. Charismatic individuals, meanwhile, played a central role in the 
development of public health. Charles Wardell Stiles and Joseph Goldberger were 
both well-known scientists whose actions were publicized in national newspapers, 
magazines, and in books. As a result of the dramatic nature of the diseases that 
plagued the South, individual political leaders could claim credit for supporting the 
efforts of either the Rockefeller Foundation or the Public Health Service. 
 Finally, writes Hemenway, “some public health efforts encounter not just 
disinterest but out-and-out opposition.” Because public health initiatives “often require 
societal change,” they may provoke opposition may come from individuals and 
communities. In other instances, such as public health measures aimed at curbing 
tobacco use, attempts at change may prompt the opposition of powerful special 
interests. Writing in 1932, sociologist Rupert Vance cited the growth of county health 
boards in the South as “the most valuable single index of the change in attitude” 
among southerners since the initial backlash against John D. Rockefeller’s 
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announcement that he would donate $1 million towards fighting hookworm in the 
region: “Representing local units, financed partly from local funds, employing local 
doctors, these organizations encountered less and less antagonism in their attack on 
hookworm and malaria.”567 
 The general trend towards acquiescence in public health measures, as indicated 
by the decline of hookworm, pellagra, and malaria, is impressive. Well-integrated with 
local communities and supported by local elites, public health workers developed 
techniques over the course of the 1910s and 20s that both persuaded and pressured 
those who were indifferent or resistant towards public health measures. Widespread 
support for public health measures meant that members of a community who resisted 
would be frowned upon or, in the case of privy-building campaigns, publically 
embarrassed. Entire communities that might not have been freed of disease were 
prodded towards participation by representatives of the Rockefeller Foundation and 
the Public Health Service, who could point to evidence of the success of public health 
efforts in nearby areas. Local elites, meanwhile, assumed a central role in the 
development of public health efforts: authorizing and cooperating with outside 
interventions, they helped to ensure that tenant farmers, both black and white, 
participated. 
 Though they intruded at times on personal privacy, public health workers 
tended to favor solutions based on persuasion rather than outright coercion. Rather 
than viewing blanket privy laws as a solution to the problem of hookworm, they 
facilitated the construction of privies and brought community pressure to bear on those 
who resisted. After raising the ire of southern leaders in 1921, Joseph Goldberger 
focused on developing a technological, rather than political-economic, fix to the 
problem of pellagra. After, 1927, knowledge of the pellagra-preventive qualities of 
                                                
567 Vance, Human Geography of the South, p. 385-86. 
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brewer’s yeast was then diffused through persuasion, publicity, and word of mouth. 
Effective malaria control, meanwhile, rested on drainage, larvacide, and the screening 
of individual dwellings. Both drainage and larvaciding could be accomplished without 
the participation of individual households. Screening, crucially, could not. Supported 
by landowners, local health departments measured the windows and doors of tenant 
dwellings, whose occupants proved far more willing to install and maintain screens 
than plantation owners had assumed they would. 
 Unlike the later fight against lung cancer, which aroused the opposition of the 
tobacco lobby, there were no southern special interest groups with any motivation to 
oppose the actions of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Public Health Service during 
the 1910s, 20s, and 30s. With the important exceptions of their initial response to the 
Rockefeller hookworm donation and the 1921 response to President Harding’s 
“famine and plague” comments, southern elites proved highly receptive to outside 
offers of intervention in public health. Resistance made little sense for southern 
businessmen and landowners who stood to gain both directly and indirectly from the 
development of county health departments. 
Concerns about the preservation of segregation and white supremacy, which 
played an important role in southern opposition to Harry Truman’s health insurance 
initiative, had little negative impact on the earlier fight against hookworm, pellagra, 
and malaria. Though public health workers explicitly furthered measures that would 
benefit black southerners, interventions were framed within the context of prevailing 
racial attitudes. Freeing white southerners of disease could only be achieved if the 
“reservoir of disease” within the black population was eliminated; alternatively, blacks 
would prove more reliable and efficient workers if they didn’t suffer from debilitating 
disease. Rather than challenging the racial order, public health interventions aimed at 
both white and black helped to reproduce it. The degree to which the Public Health 
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Service was invested in and participated in the southern status quo is well-illustrated 
by the reluctance of its officers to desegregate southern hospitals during 1964 and 
1965. 
 
For those concerned with ameliorating the disastrous effects of debilitating 
disease in the contemporary Third World, the implications of this analysis are mixed. 
The decline of hookworm, pellagra, and malaria in the face of severe and ongoing 
poverty suggests that the reciprocal relationship between poverty and disease may 
indeed be broken. As Jeffrey Sachs and others have suggested, removing the burden of 
disease may help to release the dormant energies of millions, even billions, of people. 
Framing the problem in this manner, however, obscures the relationship 
between scientific knowledge and the implementation of public health measures. 
William Easterly, a critic of Sachs, has argued that rather than focusing on large-scale 
plans aimed at bringing “the end of poverty,” development aid should be directed 
towards finding ways to succeed in an individual specified task. Portraying Sachs’s 
approach as essentially utopian and unworkable, Easterly aligns himself with the 
intellectual legacy of Edmund Burke and Karl Popper, who, he writes, “recognized the 
economic and political complexity of society. That complexity dooms any attempt to 
achieve the end of poverty through a plan, and no rich society has ended poverty in 
this way.”568 
The elements of a successful strategy for freeing the South of disease were 
assembled, piecemeal, over the course of nearly two decades. Even when the causes 
and appropriate treatments for diseases were known, practical public health measures 
required experimentation in the field, mobilization of local elites, and integration with 
                                                
568 See William Easterly, The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done 
So Much Ill and So Little Good (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), p. 15. 
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local practices, beliefs, and expectations. In practice, this meant that public health 
workers often helped to reinforce and perpetuate local hierarchies. Public health 
interventions were couched in terms of both race and class; later, when the federal 
government began funding hospital construction in the South, the hospitals were 
segregated. If the experience of the South is any guide, implementing public health 
interventions within the context of hierarchical and largely rural societies may raise 
difficult questions about the tradeoffs between principle and effectiveness. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Seemingly both straightforward and intractable, the burden of disease was 
among the central facts of southern life during the first decades of the twentieth 
century. The federal government, increasingly active in the region as a consequence of 
war, tragedy, and bureaucratic entrepreneurship, came to play a decisive role in the 
elimination of the South’s debilitating diseases during the 1930s. Ultimately, the 
federal response to southern disease resulted in the creation of permanent institutions 
that continue to dominate public health practice in the United States to this day. 
Shaped by both the nature of the South’s medical problems and the nature of its 
politics, the federal role in public health at the local level is now an established fact. 
For the people of the South as well as for the nation as a whole, the eradication 
of hookworm, pellagra, and malaria represented a genuine, if ultimately forgotten, 
triumph. If not entirely a “new people and a new earth,” the post-intervention South 
resembled, in its freedom from debilitating disease and increasingly in its level of 
prosperity, the rest of the nation rather than the Third World. 
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